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ABSTRACT 
MATURING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ADDRESS 
THE CYBERSPACE ATTACK ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM 
Jeff J. McNeil 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. Kurt T. Gaubatz 
One of the most significant challenges to deterring attacks in cyberspace is the 
difficulty of identifying and attributing attacks to specific state or non-state actors. The 
lack of technical detection capability moves the problem into the legal realm; however, 
the lack of domestic and international cyberspace legislation makes the problem one of 
international cooperation. Past assessments have led to collective paralysis pending 
improved technical and legal advancements. This paper demonstrates, however, that any 
plausible path to meaningful defense in cyberspace must include a significant element of 
international cooperation and regime formation. 
The analytical approach diverges from past utilitarian-based assessments to 
understand the emerging regime, or implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures, around which actor expectations are beginning to converge 
in the area of cyberspace attack attribution. The analysis applies a social-practice 
perspective of regime formation to identify meaningful normative and political 
recommendations. Various hypotheses of regime formation further tailor the 
recommendations to the current maturity level of international cooperation in this issue 
area. 
Examining international cooperation in cyberspace and methods for maturing 
international cooperation to establish attribution in other domains inform political 
mitigations to the problem of cyberspace attack attribution. Potential solutions are 
analyzed with respect to four recent cyberspace attacks to illustrate how improved 
international cooperation might address the problem. Finally, a counterfactual analysis, 
or thought experiment, of how these recommendations might have been applied in the 
case of rampant Chinese cyber espionage inform specific current and future opportunities 
for implementation. Although timing is difficult to predict, the growing frequency and 
scope of cyber attacks indicate the window of opportunity to address the problem before 
some form of cataclysmic event is closing. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Cyberspace attacks have become a matter of daily front page news. Operation 
Aurora, the December 2009 to January 2010 cyber attack on Google subsequently 
attributed to servers in China, is an excellent case in point.1 Additional vulnerabilities 
and attacks against the US electrical power grid raise the stakes even further invoking the 
specter of a cyber 9/11 or even World War III. Loss of confidence in financial 
transactions and other secure communications could set global society back to the pre-
information age. Although timing is difficult to predict, the growing frequency and 
scope of cyber attacks indicate the window of opportunity to address the problem before 
some form of cataclysmic event is closing. 
In the spring of 2009, General Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic 
Command, and Mr. Tom Weaver of his Strategy and Policy Directorate noted: "The most 
significant deterrence challenge posed by the threat of cyberspace attack is the perceived 
difficulty of attributing such attacks to a specific attacker, be it a state or nonstate actor."4 
This dissertation follows the format requirements of A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and 
Dissertations 7th edition by Kate L. Turabian. 
1
 Kim Zetter, "Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show," Wired, January 14, 2010, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora (accessed February 20, 2010); and John 
Markoff, "2 China Schools Said to Be tied to Online Attack," New York Times, February 18, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/technology/19china.html (accessed February 20, 2010). 
2
 Jeffrey Carr, "Project Grey Goose Report on Critical Infrastructure: Attacks, Actors, and Emerging 
Threats," GreyLogic, January 21, 2010. 
3
 Eugene E. Habiger, "Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism: The Need for a New U.S. Strategic Approach," 
Cyber security Institute, February 1, 2010. 
Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, "Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century," Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, 39. 
2 
Cyberspace attacks are difficult to detect and even more difficult to attribute. Even if an 
attack is attributed to a specific machine, the attack must be attributed to a user 
determined to even know their machine was involved in the attack. To prove state 
culpability, it must further be shown the user was acting under state direction or 
acquiescence. The lack of technical detection capability moves the problem into the legal 
realm; however, the lack of domestic and international cyberspace legislation makes the 
problem one of international cooperation. Given the de-facto reliance on international 
cooperation, this paper questions: "How might maturing international cooperation 
mitigate the cyberspace attack attribution problem?" 
Four recent cyber attacks, including those on Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), 
Kyrgyzstan (2008-2009), and the U.S. and Republic of Korea (2009) illustrate specific 
problems of cyberspace attack attribution. The attacks also highlight the de-facto 
principles and norms of the nascent cyberspace attack attribution regime, and others 
worth pursuing to pressure states and entities to assist in mitigation and attribution 
efforts. 
The regime has so far been ineffective at imposing costs to shift the burden of 
attribution from the defender to the attacker. Past assessments have led to collective 
paralysis pending improved technical and legal advancements. While states and 
international organizations are changing their behaviors based on perceived costs and 
benefits, their lack of effectiveness continues to embolden and even entice violators. 
The regime is, however, creating arrangements that affect more normative 
political behaviors, including processes of social learning. Normative and political 
criteria focused on attack mitigation support a very different assessment and the 
3 
identification of meaningful recommendations for advancing global security in 
cyberspace. 
States and entities voluntarily support mitigation efforts primarily for reasons of 
political support for victim states and secondarily out of collective interest in Internet 
security. If the collective-action problem is to be addressed to realize joint gains, these 
priorities require reversal through mechanisms sufficiently embedded in internal state 
politics to appreciably enmesh state or non-state behavior. 
Applying this evidence against factors prominent in theories of regime formation 
demonstrate the current cyberspace attack attribution regime remains in the early stages 
of regime development. Identifying opportunities to shape expectations, promote 
institutional learning, enmesh actors, and coerce compliance support specific 
recommendations tailored to the maturity level of the regime. Recommendations 
identified from successful outcomes in other domains and the unique nature of 
cyberspace, are integrated into a broad policy approach. This approach was evaluated 
through a counterfactual analysis, or thought experiment, of Chinese information warfare 
theory and development to develop conclusions and recommendations in the form of 
current and future opportunities. 
First, Internet security organizations such as computer emergency response teams 
(CERT) and the international telecommunications union (ITU) global response center 
(GRC) should work even more closely with public-private hybrid organizations to share 
information and assessments. One of the key aspects of Operation Aurora is that Google 
broke silence. This is proving to be instrumental to future action and deterrence. 
Transparency of technical evidence of the majority of attacks to a broader audience 
4 
would greatly enhance power in this area. Hybrid organizations include both 
decentralized aspects more attuned to the decentralized nature of cyberspace as well as 
traditional centralized features that allow for the provision of security, authority, and 
accountability. 
Second, international funding tied to improved technical and legal standards 
should be made available to hybrid organizations to provide incentives for cooperation 
and an ability to impose costs for detractors and violators. This would have to be 
tempting for nations ultimately desiring economic development and Internet security. 
International funding provides needed capacity as well as an incentive that may be 
withheld to coerce detractors. 
Third, technological development efforts provide cooperative opportunities to 
address a range of issues such as China's outlaw mentality to software procurement and 
development. In the example of Operation Aurora, Google claimed intellectual property 
had been stolen. This opens a venue to recourse through world intellectual property 
organization (WIPO) and world trade organization (WTO) dispute settlement 
mechanisms, potentially significantly extending the shadow of the future for would-be 
rational attackers. 
Fourth, venues for international discussions and consensus-building in this issue 
area should be pursued in the form of negotiating rounds. Such a stepwise approach 
shapes expectations, promotes institutional learning, enmeshes actors, and facilitates the 
ability of the global Internet community to coerce compliance. Current dialogue over 
Operation Aurora provides a specific venue, as do recent U.S.-Russian discussions. More 
deliberate venues such as ITU Internet governance forum (IGF) dynamic coalitions and 
5 
other established telecommunications sector discussions also provide less confrontational 
and more enduring opportunities. 
Fifth, power to advance the regime and coerce violators is gained through 
cooperative efforts, the ability to withhold funds or technologies, and a dispute settlement 
mechanism allowing for variance across technical, economic, social and political 
regions. These efforts provide a venue to enmesh responsible actors. For example, the 
fact regarding Operation Aurora is that many in China now want Google to stay. 
Allowing various levels of state control over the array of hubs, networks, and 
domains may place another potential conflict of interest aside through better 
understanding and informed decision-making in support of future development and 
investment decisions. The key point here is one of privacy versus censorship and control. 
Human rights advocates and civil liberties lawyers want total anonymity. Groups such as 
the Open Net Initiative and Electronic Freedom Foundation advance this agenda. 
Conversely, law enforcement officers and security officials want transparency. At the far 
end of this spectrum pushing beyond transparency to control is China's "Golden Shield" 
of censorship. 
This is at the very heart of the current Operation Aurora controversy. Since 
Google's entry to China, the company has been subject to intense criticism for complying 
with censorship laws. By doing so, however, Google established a foothold, drawing 
China into a position of accountability and responsibility. Google declared it would stop 
abiding by national censorship laws only after evidence of cyber espionage, in essence, 
daring the Chinese government to throw them out of the country. Google has established 
6 
real bargaining power in this situation, for perhaps the first time. Only time will tell how 
much power Google has amassed vis-a-vis the Chinese government. 
Although the focus of this paper is cyberspace as a security domain, the vast 
majority of the Internet is civil, commercial and recreational in nature. Attacks in 
cyberspace are felt across commerce and industry, and non-military activities comprise 
the bulk of responsibilities and authorities. Therefore, the public-private sphere provides 
both a first line of defense, and necessary role in response actions. Addressing 
cyberspace from a purely security perspective is therefore misleading, unhelpful and 
insufficient for formulating recommendations. 
While governments and institutions spawned the Internet and have worked to 
subsequently control and manage it, decentralized forces have revolutionized not only the 
world of cyberspace, but through it the world we live in. The sheer magnitude of 
cyberspace and the fact the bulk of communications over it are of a business or leisure 
nature, place departments or ministries with these jurisdictions, such as the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, in a much better position to pursue these agendas than military 
departments or security agencies. This has an important ramification for how state 
security efforts in cyberspace should be viewed. 
While viewing cybersecurity operations as a form of irregular or hybrid warfare 
may be effective in the offense, lack of control over the domain dooms it to failure in the 
defense. A hybrid warfare approach offers no incentives for competitors to work together 
to realize joint gains. The recommendations are rather focused on moving the cyberspace 
domain out of the grey area between peace and war where irregular warfare thrives. 
Regardless of how individual states chose to advance their own security in cyberspace, 
7 
this paper illuminates one immutable truth: any plausible path to meaningful defense in 
cyberspace must include a significant element of international cooperation and regime 
formation. 
PURPOSE AND IMPORT OF RESEARCH 
This paper examines international cooperation in the area of cyberspace attack 
attribution, identifying specific political mitigations to the problem. General Kevin 
Chilton, the Commander of United States Strategic Command recently noted "the most 
significant deterrence challenge posed by the threat of cyberspace attack is the perceived 
difficulty of attributing such attacks to a specific attacker, be it a state or nonstate actor."5 
As recently as January, 2010, a pentagon wargame showed "[the] enemy had all the 
advantages: stealth, anonymity and unpredictability. No one could pinpoint the country 
from which the attack came, so there was no effective way to deter further damage by 
threatening retaliation... [The military] lacked the legal authority to respond."6 
This problem is further complicated by the lack of known historical track record 
of detection, attribution, response, or even mere definition as few nations have publicly 
defined what they consider to be a cyberspace "attack."7 This lack of formal definition 
clearly hampers coordinated assessment and response by policy-maker and theorist alike. 
5
 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, "Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century," Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, 39. 
6
 John Markoff, David E. Sanger, and Thorn Shanker, "In Digital Combat, U.S. Finds No Easy Deterrent," 
New York Times, January 26, 2010. 
7
 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, "Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century," Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, 39-40. 
8 
The community has recognized the difficult challenge of attribution, as well as the 
fact that a purely technological solution is impossible. As one further challenge, security 
mechanisms need to make it possible to attribute malicious behavior, as defined by 
society through a legal or policy process, while preserving privacy in the case of benign 
use. The Internet will remain a valuable medium so long as the free share of human 
o 
thought unimpeded by fear of retribution is preserved. 
The spectrum of conflict addressed within this paper is attacks conducted or 
sponsored by nation-states against other nation-states or their critical infrastructure. It 
does not address cyber crime or recreational hackers for which other legal remedies exist 
or are being researched elsewhere. This scope is consistent with existing literature of 
deterrence, or the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs or risks of a given course of 
action outweigh the benefits.9 Successful deterrence requires a sufficient probability of 
attack detection and attribution to be effective. 
As observed in other areas of international cooperation, the vast majority of 
cyberspace activity routinely occurs effectively, efficiently and securely on a global 
scale.10 This echoes an oft-cited response to critics of international law upon observation 
that most of the nations follow most of the rules most of the time." The problem occurs 
when they do not. Kenneth Oye specifically addresses the difficulty in achieving 
cooperation in world politics, noting "[there] is no common government to enforce rules, 
8
 Jeffrey Hunker, Bob Hutchinson, and Jonathon Margulies, "Role and Challenges for Sufficient Cyber-
Attack Attribution," Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, January, 2008, 
http://www.thei3p.org/docs/publications/whitepaper-attribution.pdf, (accessed January 4, 2010). 
9
 Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice 
(Columbia UP, 1974), 11. 
10
 Marcus Franda, Governing the Internet: the emergence of an international regime (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2001). 
11
 Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, Fourth Edition (Cambridge UP, 1997), 6. 
9 
and by the standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak. Cheating 
and deception are endemic." Yet the case studies cited by Oye demonstrate that 
cooperation is sometimes attained, albeit with significant variance among issues and over 
time. 
Law is not the only basis for international cooperation. Regimes are "implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area." Marcus Franda has presented a 
convincing case for the burgeoning cyberspace regime from the perspective of Internet 
and worldwide web development and operation.14 This dissertation builds upon Franda's 
research with regards to the specific problem of attribution in cyberspace. 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND APPROACH 
Given the de-facto reliance on international cooperation, this paper inquires: 
"How might maturing international cooperation mitigate the cyberspace attack attribution 
problem?" This leads to the null hypothesis that: "Given the lack of technical attribution, 
deterrence in cyberspace cannot be achieved through regime-level principles and norms." 
The ramifications of the null hypothesis, if true, are enormous. Without state 
control and provision of physical and information security, global security is at its heart 
jungle rules where might makes right. This means deterrence is limited to military 
12
 Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton UP, 1985), 226. 
13
 Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 2. 
14
 Marcus Franda, Governing the Internet: the emergence of an international regime (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2001). 
10 
coercion, with little room for peaceful incentives, and international cooperation is 
ultimately doomed to failure. 
If, however, the null hypothesis is proven wrong, it not only supports international 
cooperative efforts in matters of global security, but it does so in perhaps the most 
uniquely contested environment of global cyberspace. One of defining features of the 
Internet is its level of decentralization. From the standpoint of the World Wide Web, Jeff 
McNeil holds the same position as Barak Obama or Sarah Palin. We are all users -
independent, empowered, and in many ways, at least at times and places of our choosing, 
anonymous. If the principles and norms of international regimes stand up to this test 
case, it may be some of the best evidence to date for regime theorists. Finally, such 
analysis is critical for formulating policy recommendations for international cooperation. 
First, lessons from other domains inform an approach to security regime 
formation to address individual findings and formulate recommendations. Key aspects of 
the problem are described against the backdrop of four recent cyber attacks. The facts of 
the attack and international cooperation to mitigate and attribute the attacks are presented 
for each case. Three tailored models are used to 1) assess the results of attribution efforts 
and their effectiveness, 2) assess the maturity of international cooperation in this area, 
and 3) to develop recommendations to mature the regime. These recommendations 
inform a policy approach applied in a counterfactual analysis, or thought experiment, in 
the case of countering Chinese information warfare strategy development and resulting 
intrusions. Finally, the concepts of international cooperation and security regime 
effectiveness and maturity are discussed and recommendations for the future are 
proposed. 
11 
KEY DEFINITIONS 
Given the relatively new domain of cyberspace, it is important to be explicit with 
key terms. Also, cyberspace security is a large, complex and highly technical area of 
study, so it is equally important to be clear about the scope of what this paper does and 
does not address. 
This paper adopts the May 12, 2008 U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Memorandum definition of cyberspace as "a global domain within the information 
environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers."15 While the fact the cyberspace domain 
informs human decision-making is fully recognized, the human element is not considered 
part of the domain itself. Similarly, the definition does not include the electromagnetic 
spectrum as competing versions still do. In his work for the U.S. Center for Technical 
and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Dr. Dan Kuehl of the Information Resources 
Management College of the National Defense University has well documented the path to 
the above definition, and its limitations.16 
A cyberspace attack is defined as "malicious activity targeting the computer or 
telecommunications networks of critical infrastructures, such as power systems, traffic 
15
 Dan Kuehl, "From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem," 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Cyber%20Chapter%20Kuehl%20Final.doc (accessed 
January 4, 2010). 
16
 Dan Kuehl, "From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem," 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Cyber%20Chapter%20Kuehl%20Final.doc (accessed 
January 4, 2010). 
12 
control systems or financial systems."17 Cyber attacks may target information technology 
(IT) through a direct attack against an information system through the wires alone (i.e. 
hacking), through a physical assault against a critical IT element, or from the inside as a 
result of compromising a trusted party with access to the system.18 Certainly other 
definitions exist, such as that adopted by Dartmouth's Institute for Security Technology 
Studies as a "computer-to-computer attack that undermines the confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability of a computer or information resident on it."19 Such competing definitions 
are sufficiently similar to the one adopted here for the purposes of this paper. 
The extent to which a cyberspace attack constitutes an act of armed aggression 
under international law, justifying legitimate acts of self-defense, remains in debate. This 
point is specifically addressed in the attacks reviewed. 
Susan Brenner differentiates between the three categories of cybercrime, cyber 
terrorism and cyber warfare: 
"Cybercrime is the use of computer technology to.. .engage in activity that 
threatens a society's ability to maintain internal order.... [Cyber] terrorist 
acts are designed to undermine a society's ability to maintain internal 
order.. .and should be treated as crime regardless of whether they are 
perpetrated locally or remotely.... Cyberwarfare is the conduct of military 
operations by virtual means."21 
17
 Emma Nash, "How vulnerable are we to a cyber attack?" Computing, April 15, 2004, 
http://infomaticsonline.co.uk/computing/features/2072400/vulnerable-cyber-attack (accessed August 11, 
2009). 
18
 Emma Nash, "How vulnerable are we to a cyber attack?" Computing, April 15, 2004, 
http://infomaticsonline.co.uk/computing/features/2072400/vulnerable-cyber-attack (accessed August 11, 
2009). 
19
 Kevin O'Shea, "Cyberattack Investigative Tools and Technologies presentation," Institute for Security 
Technology Studies, May 7, 2003, http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/107.pdf (accessed January 4, 
2010). 
20
 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Runnimeri, Mari Kert, Ann-Maria Taliharm, and Liis Vihul, Cyber 
Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCDCOE, August, 2008). 
21
 Susan Brenner, "At light speed: Attribution and response to cybercrime/terrorism/warfare," Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, 97, 2007, in Jeff Wozniak and Samuel Liles, "Political and Technical 
Roadblocks to Cyber Attack Attribution," IO Journal, April 2009, 24. 
13 
An important concept in the field of international cooperation is the concept of 
international regimes. Regimes are defined as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area,"22 in this case the intersection of international relations and cyberspace. 
• Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
• Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
• Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. 
• Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice. 
Other definitions of regimes also exist. Oran Young defines regimes as "social 
institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities, (or accepted 
sets of activities). Like all social institutions, they are recognized patterns of behavior or 
practice around which expectations converge."23 Young himself considers his definition 
compatible with the definition used here. 
It is significant to point out that the principles and norms addressed herein are 
concerned with cyberspace security, and are not intended to address normal networking 
or computing. Marcus Franda concisely describes the origin of the "international regime 
for the Internet" discussing the latter, and which significantly informs portions of this 
paper. Franda asserts the international Internet regime began with the acceptance of the 
first Transmission Control Protocol/Internetwork Protocol (TCP/IP) as a de facto 
worldwide standard in the 1980s and 1990s.24 This paper does not challenge or portend 
22
 Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 2. 
23
 Oran Young, "Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes" in Stephen D. Krasner, 
International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 93. 
4
 Marcus Franda, Governing the Internet: the emergence of an international regime (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2001), 21. 
14 
to discuss either normal cyberspace operations or technical details. This study is rather 
focused on political mitigations for a stated security issue, the attribution of cyberspace 
attacks. To this end, this research addresses emerging cyberspace security regime 
principles and norms. 
As Stephen Krasner points out, security regimes are both especially valuable and 
difficult to achieve - "valuable, because individualistic actions are not only costly but 
dangerous; difficult to achieve, because the fear that the other is violating or will violate 
the common understanding is a potent incentive for each state to strike out on its own 
even if it would prefer the regime to prosper."25 Krasner identifies four specific criteria 
for security regime formation to occur, which are used to assess international cooperation 
in cyberspace attack attribution. 
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
Chapter two describes regime formation and methods of establishing or mitigating 
the lack of attribution in other, predominantly security-related domains. Observations 
inform assessments and recommendations in subsequent chapters, helping to identify 
current and future opportunities to advance the regime. 
Chapter three describes key aspects of the cyberspace attack attribution problem 
against the backdrop of four recent cyber attacks, incorporating research not well 
documented in international relations literature. While great effort is being expended at 
Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 174. 
15 
the technical level to address the attribution problem with limited success, each of the 
cases posits the requirement for increased international cooperation. As former U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Franklin Kramer 
recently testified to Congress, "there is no effective international arrangement that deals 
with the security and law enforcement aspects of cyber. Given, however, cyber's 
international character, national security efforts as well as the development of 
enforcement will necessarily be less effective than could be accomplished by an 
integrated international effort."27 
The evaluation incorporates Krasner's criteria for security regime formation and 
maintenance.28 The extents to which governments exhibit coordinated action or 
uncoordinated behavior demonstrate international preferences for cooperation over 
cyberspace attacks and help to explain the outcomes of the attacks reviewed. If existing 
venues or incentives are insufficient to facilitate bargaining among actors, and emerging 
cyberspace norms do not structure sufficient incentives for governments to exercise 
restraint, they are unlikely to lead to mutually beneficial outcomes. If cyberspace norms 
are in fact self-reinforcing in a negative fashion, advancing the regime will likely require 
formal commitment and improved international cooperation to manage. 
Chapter four describes cyberspace regime formation to explain the historical 
context of key aspects of the problems and their root causes. These include the 
decentralized nature of the domain, and the desire to maintain a free and open Internet 
26
 Ian Gregorio-de Souza, et al., "Detection of Complex Cyber Attacks," Thayer School of Engineering, 
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 2006, http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/245.pdf (accessed January 
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preserving privacy for legitimate transactions. The chapter identifies and evaluates the 
significant agendas that have been developed for bringing into being principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures that might assure international cooperation in 
cyberspace attack attribution into the future. The assessment examines negotiations that 
have taken place or are in progress to move internationally toward these goals. In so 
doing, the chapter informs the remaining issues of how improved international 
cooperation in this area can structure incentives for governments and facilitate bargaining 
among them.2 
Chapter five assesses the regime's effectiveness in this area through both 
collective-action and social practice perspectives of international regime formation. The 
evaluation inquires: "To what extent has effective operationalization of an international 
cyberspace security regime occurred?" Evidence from recent attacks and cyberspace 
regime formation to date is applied against a series of hypotheses of how regimes 
influence behavior to evaluate regime effectiveness according to a range of criteria. 
Chapter six further inquires: "How might maturing international cooperation 
mitigate the problem of cyber-space attack attribution?" Evidence of cyberspace regime 
formation and effectiveness to date is applied against a three-stage model of international 
regime formation - agenda formation, negotiation, and operationalization. Security 
regime formation criteria are incorporated to assess the maturity level of the regime. 
Finally, lessons learned from international cooperation in other domains inform 
recommendations for a policy approach tailored to the maturity level of the regime. 
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Chapter seven illustrates how these recommendations might have been applied in 
a notional thought experiment against China's information war theory and strategy 
development over the years 1995-2003, and their resulting rampant intrusions into U.S. 
networks. The experiment complements the review of recent attacks through 
counterfactual reconstruction of the flow of events in the relative presence or absence of 
cyberspace regime cooperation. The evaluation reviews the decision-making process of 
key actors at critical junctures including Chinese assessments of U.S. operations in 
Kosovo (2000) and Iraq (2003). 
Chapter eight summarizes the papers conclusions and identifies concrete 
recommendations for addressing cyberspace attack attribution through international 
cooperation in the future. The chapter concludes with lessons learned in assessing 
security regime effectiveness and maturity, and recommendations for future work. 
"US warned of China 'cyber-spying,'" British Broadcasting Corporation, November 20, 2008, 
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CHAPTER II 
REGIME DEVELOPMENT AND ATTRIBUTION IN OTHER DOMAINS 
Domain origination and attribution in other, predominantly security-related 
regimes inform assessments and recommendations in the cyberspace domain. The 
identification, definition and development of international security principles and norms 
in other domains inform potentially useful approaches for the nascent cyber security 
regime. While confident attribution is required for military action consistent with the 
international laws of armed conflict, principles and norms established in other domains 
provide a guide for how to proceed in the face of insufficient attribution, or for 
cooperative activities focused on attaining it. Lessons from other domains specifically 
address attribution as a collective action issue. 
REGIME FORMATION 
International principles and norms in today's security regime are grounded in 
customary international law. It is not surprising much of this chapter is rooted in the 
international law of armed conflict, or as it is also referred, international humanitarian 
law. Where useful, thoughts of influential writers are also referenced whether presently 
considered international law or not, which is also consistent with international law 
development. As the principles and norms of international law are well established and 
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documented,31 detailed references are omitted, unless deemed necessary for a particular 
position or interpretation. 
The identification, definition and development of international security principles 
and norms in other domains inform potentially useful approaches for the cyber security 
regime. The purpose is not to interpret the applicability of existing international law, or 
to identify specific legal remedies for areas regarding cyberspace security not covered by 
the law. Other efforts are already dedicated to these extremely important endeavors. 
The review of each domain is focused on the following questions meant to inform 
the current study. What was the catalyst for the principles and norms comprising the 
regime? What organizations are involved, such as an applicable arms control regime? 
What are the major principles and norms of the regime? 
The Land Domain 
While the principles and norms of the international law of armed conflict were 
initially developed through experience in the land domain, they were more importantly 
reflective of human experience of war. The laws of war on land effectively codified and 
advanced understandings of use of force for those in power, presumed to be leaders of 
nation-states. This moved the application of force into well-defined concepts of peace 
and war, belligerent and neutral, combatant and non-combatant. Certain weapons, 
material, and methods of warfare designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering were prohibited or restricted in their use. These principles and norms have 
31
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stood the test of time despite technological development and the expansion to other 
domains, and we should expect the same to be true of cyberspace. Cyberspace, however, 
defies these well-defined assumptions, and no such restrictions apply specifically to 
cyberspace weapons. 
Several observations from the international law of armed conflict in the land 
domain are applicable for consideration in our assessment of the cyber domain. First, 
regarding regime origination and evolution, leaders came to recognize the stake they held 
in their system as reflected in the 1874 Severalties of War Conference and 1899 Hague 
Convention. Second, everything was not accomplished at once, but rather through a 
series of conventions, conferences and agreements over a significant period of time. 
Third, it was recognized at the first Hague convention that such agreements would not be 
exhaustive, highlighting the use of custom as governing principles. Fourth, it included 
remedies for violations, including reprisals and war crimes trials. 
Agendas were set as necessity demanded and not on notional or hypothetical 
situations. They were significantly informed by influential writers and academics. 
Negotiations were informed by practitioners, but conducted by diplomats and lawyers. 
Key principles and norms in the land domain include the principle of self-help. 
There is, however, recognition that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited. The principle of necessity dictates using only that degree and 
kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the 
partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, 
and physical resources. Unnecessary suffering is to be prevented. 
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The principle of proportionality prohibits the employment of any kind or degree 
offeree not required for the purpose of the partial or complete submission of the enemy. 
The principle of humanity prohibits inflicting suffering, injury or destruction not actually 
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. Although deception is permitted, 
dishonorable conduct is forbidden. 
The international law of armed conflict and deterrence principles and norms in the 
land domain were operationalized through actual conflict and adhered to for reasons of 
public support, reciprocity and an assumption of eventual restoration to peace. 
Internal pressures on the international law of armed conflict are mitigated as they 
are largely descriptive of customary practices, and at times, normative by agreement. In 
this sense the law complements and supports the principles of warfare embodied in the 
generally universal military concepts of objective, mass, economy of force, surprise, and 
security. 
The principles and norms associated with land warfare were in fact the crux of 
what we now recognize as the international law of armed conflict, or international 
humanitarian law, in what might be considered the preeminent security regime. It is 
important to understand that the international law of armed conflict we know today was 
at its inception primarily descriptive rather than normative. It was a matter of powers 
recognizing the rules of warfare as practiced at the time and not necessarily changing 
them except where all parties were interested. In this sense, the law then and now was 
meant to complement other generally recognized principles of warfare. That is to say the 
law of armed conflict is not intended to impede legitimate warfare. The purpose is to 
ensure the effects of hostilities are directed toward the enemy's forces and not used to 
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cause purposeless, unnecessary human suffering or physical destruction. Together, both 
the international law of armed conflict and the principles of warfare underscore the 
importance of concentrating forces against critical military targets while avoiding the 
expenditure of personnel and resources against persons, places, and things that are 
militarily unimportant. 
With the rise of the nation-state, leaders came to recognize the stake they held in 
their nascent international system.33 Stephen Krasner demonstrates the Concert of 
Europe prevailing from 1815-1823 and, in attenuated form, until the Crimean War as a 
security regime which deterred the individual powers from maximizing their positions at 
the expense of the others.34 Alexander George and Richard Smoke portray deterrence 
i t 
before the atomic age, and its role in the balance of power politics of the day. 
In 1874 a conference of 15 states called together by Czar Alexander II drew up a 
document which addressed the "severalties of war." This unofficial document led the 
Institute of International Law at its Oxford conference to draw up the Manual of the Laws 
of War on Land. This document was very influential in moving states towards adoption 
of the first Hague treaty. 
In 1899, 26 countries met at The Hague and adopted a series of Conventions and 
annexes. Most important was the convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land with an annexed set of regulations delineating the rules. This was the first 
codification of the laws and customs of war accepted by powers in a multilateral 
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document. The drafters realized such law would not be exhaustive. The Martens Clause 
specifically stated customs would continue to govern "principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of 
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." 
In 1907 a further conference was held at The Hague which amended the 
Convention of 1899, and adopted ten others governing such things as the opening of 
hostilities, naval warfare, and the rights and duties of neutrals. The Geneva conventions 
dealt primarily with the treatment of people, clearly delineating between noncombatants 
and combatants. Additional conventions were added in 1864, 1906, and 1929, including 
two Additional Protocols in 1977. 
Nations comply with the Law of Armed Conflict not only because they are legally 
obliged to do so, but for the practical reason that it is in the best interests of belligerents 
to be governed by consistent and mutually acceptable rules of conduct. Three 
assumptions underline the national self interest for compliance. First, violations, whether 
real or perceived, lead to loss of public support, both national and international. Second 
is an assumption of reciprocity. Belligerents treat opposing forces the way they would 
want to be treated or the same way they are being treated. Some obligations under the 
Law of Armed Conflict are reciprocal in that they are binding on the parties only so long 
as both sides continue to comply with them. A major violation by one side will release 
the other side from all further duty to abide by that obligation. For example, the 1925 
Gas Protocol forbids the first use of gas, resulting in German chemical warfare restraint 
in World War II. 
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Third, there is also an assumption of the eventual restoration of peace. Violations 
may arouse the enemy to greater resistance and prolong the conflict resulting in greater 
casualties. All conflicts come to an end. It is therefore desirable to have a smooth 
transition from war to peace. 
There are times when opposing forces step outside the limits of the international 
law of armed conflict. If they do, various means are available to belligerents under 
international law for inducing the observance of legitimate warfare to include reprisals 
and war crimes trials. 
The right of the belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited 
and it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such. Distinctions 
must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to the effect that noncombatants 
are spared as much as possible. It is prohibited to attack or bombard towns or buildings 
which are undefended. Undefended places are those places where no combatants or 
military equipment are present, either fixed or mobile, there is no hostile use made of any 
installations, the population is committing no acts of hostilities, and there are no activities 
in support of military operations. Medical units, sick and wounded, and enemy military 
police may be present. The definition of war-sustaining may be very broad, such as oil 
shipments during the Iran-Iraq War. A city or town behind enemy lines is, by definition, 
neither undefended nor open, and military targets therein may be attacked. 
Certain weapons, material, and methods of warfare that are designed to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited or restricted in their use, 
including chemical, biological, incendiary, and laser weapons. No such restrictions apply 
specifically to cyberspace weapons. 
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The laws of war on land effectively codified and advanced understandings of use 
of force for those in power, presumed to be leaders of nation-states. This moved the 
application of force into well-defined concepts of peace and war, belligerent and neutral, 
combatant and non-combatant. Cyberspace, however, defies these well-defined 
assumptions. While experience in the land domain supports the concept of moving 
cyberspace attacks out of the grey area between peace and war, we must look further for 
more applicable approaches. 
The Sea Domain 
The sea domain is a particularly interesting metaphor for cyberspace. As in the 
land, air and trade domains, but unlike the nuclear or space domains, the cost of 
admission is low, so nations and peoples are broadly represented. As in cyberspace 
countless transactions occur daily on a global scale. The vast majority of these 
transactions are commercial or recreational and benign in nature, with some malicious 
elements such as piracy, smuggling, or poaching, policed by a relatively very small 
number of warships. A ship carrying the flag of one state may be crewed by many, 
carrying diverse cargo between numerous ports anywhere in the world. Ships routinely 
change cargo and crew, and occasionally flags, exacerbating the identification and 
tracking of vessels of interest. This environment has created a need for maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) concept of operations (CONOPS)36 and multinational naval task 
3
 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 2005), 
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/NSMS-National-Plan-to-Achieve-Maritime-Domain-Awareness.pdf 
(accessed July 1,2009). 
26 
forces37 not unlike the current situation experienced in cyberspace. The MDA concept 
leverages sensors, analytical fusion, and international cooperation through regional hubs. 
From a security perspective, two areas inform regime-level principles and norms 
in the sea domain. First are specific portions of the law of armed conflict introduced in 
the previous section. The second is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or 
UNCLOS. 
The origination of the law of the sea is interesting and has evolved over many 
decades around the concept of the freedom of the high seas. That concept was modified 
over time in response to discovery of resources in the sea and its seabed beyond a state's 
territorial sea, previously considered the limit of a state's jurisdictional reach. A series of 
conferences in the 1950s led to four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea (The 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the 1958 Convention on the 
High Seas, the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources and 
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf). 
A 1967 UN General Assembly meeting debating the preservation of the seabed 
and ocean floor for peaceful purposes first discussed the concept of common heritage of 
humankind in an international context. Elaborating a new framework convention for the 
law of the sea began amid numerous other economic, political and strategic factors during 
the negotiations of the ensuing UNCLOS III. A substantive debate emerged between 
several developing countries and more technologically advanced western nations 
"Multinational Task Force Targets Pirates," American Forces Press Service, January 8, 2009. 
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regarding territorial limits and control of seabed resources on the one hand and freedom 
of passage and seabed exploitation on the other. 
Ironically, the great debate over mining deep sea resources formed in response to 
the 1973 purported collection of manganese nodules from the deep ocean floor by a 
specially engineered U.S. ship, the Glomar Explorer. In the spring of 1975, news broke 
that the real mission of the ship was to recover a Russian nuclear submarine sunk 
approximately 750 miles northeast of Hawaii on April 11, 1968, and mining was only a 
39 
cover story. 
Unlike the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences, the UNCLOS III adopted 
an informal political consensus-building approach around particular issues rather than 
working over a pre-existing document or report.40 The open-ended and contentiously 
normative approach of UNCLOS III greatly complicated and extended adoption and 
ratification of the convention. 
Even with the principles and norms explicit in the conventions, mounting 
incidents at sea between U.S. and Soviet navies and the grave potential for escalation led 
to a 1972 agreement between the superpowers to prevent and mitigate such incidents.41 
This level of cooperation among potential adversaries occurred against the backdrop of 
cooperation in the nuclear domain addressed below, including the 1963 establishment of 
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982. 
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a direct communications link, or "hot line" to prevent miscommunication in a crisis42 and 
1971 measures to prevent the escalation of potential nuclear incidents.4 A less 
prescriptive U.S.-China commitment to engage in consultations was established in 
1998.44 
The Air Domain 
With the development of the airplane, states recognized a new dimension to 
transportation which could no longer be contained within strictly national confines. 
World Wars I and II demonstrated the ugly potential of aviation requiring international 
attention. International collaboration in aviation matters born out of military necessity 
during and immediately following both wars led to the development of post-war civil 
aviation based on a belief that aviation had to be international or it would not be possible 
to use aviation as one of the principal elements in the economic development of the 
world. 
Regime development in the air domain resulted in a permanent international 
organization centrally managing generally applicable rules and regulations requiring 
uniformity on a global scale. Regional offices manage practical application of specific 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, June 20, 1963. 
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areas where operating conditions and other relevant parameters are comparable, 
providing they do not conflict with the world-wide activities of the organization. 
These experiences are similar to the current situation in cyberspace, and two 
sources of security regime development in the air domain inform the current inquiry in 
cyberspace. The international law of armed conflict as it applies to aircraft has been 
sufficiently covered in the previous sections. The second area of interest is the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO). 
In the early years of aviation, before World War I, states recognized the advent of 
the airplane added a new dimension to transportation which could no longer be contained 
within strictly national confines. France convened the first important conference on an 
international air law code in Paris in 1910, attended by 18 European states. The 
conference successfully documented a number of basic principles governing aviation. 
World War I introduced the destructive potential of aviation. Technical 
developments in aviation arising out of the war also created a new situation with regard 
to the safe and rapid transport of goods and persons over prolonged distances. A special 
Aeronautical Commission born from the 1917 Inter-Allied Aviation Committee 
addressed aviation matters at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Civil air transport 
enterprises were concurrently created in many European states and in North America, 
some of which were already engaged in international operations. 
International collaboration in aviation matters born out of military necessity 
during and immediately after World War I, led to the development of post-war civil 
aviation out of a belief that aviation had to be international or not at all. This 
collaboration resulted in the French-led International Air Convention, signed by 26 of the 
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32 Allied and Associated powers represented at the Paris Peace Conference, and 
ultimately ratified by 38 states. The Convention consisted of 43 articles addressing all 
technical, operational and organizational aspects of civil aviation formulated by the 1910 
Paris conference. The Convention also foresaw the creation of an International 
Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) to monitor developments in civil aviation and to 
propose measures to states to keep abreast of developments. A permanent Secretariat 
was established in 1922 to assist the Commission under the direction of a General 
Secretary. 
The interwar period exhibited continuous growth of civil aviation in both the 
technical and the commercial fields. Aviation during World War II not only resulted in 
horror and human tragedies, but also significantly advanced the technical and operational 
possibilities of air transport. For the first time large numbers of people and goods were 
transported over long distances in an orderly and expeditious manner. In 1943, the U.S. 
initiated studies of post-war civil aviation problems that again confirmed the belief they 
needed to be tackled on an international scale or it would not be possible to use aviation 
as one of the principal elements in the world's economic development.45 
The studies and subsequent consultations between the major allies led the U.S. 
government to invite 55 states or authorities to attend the November 1944 International 
Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago. Fifty-four states attended, with 52 states 
ultimately signing the Convention on International Civil Aviation, establishing the 
permanent ICAO to secure international cooperation and the highest possible degree of 
45
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uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures and organization regarding civil 
aviation matters. The most important work accomplished by the Chicago Conference 
was in the technical field. It established rules and regulations regarding air navigation as 
a whole to significantly advance flight safety and pave the way for a common, global air 
46 
navigation system. 
In view of the inevitable delays in Convention ratification, the Conference signed 
an Interim Agreement creating a technical and advisory Provisional International Civil 
Aviation Organization (PICAO) to collaborate in the field of international civil aviation. 
PICAO operated from August 1945 to April 1947 when the permanent IC AO came into 
being, little more than a formality. By agreement, ICAO succeeded ICAN which was 
then dissolved. 
The ICAO Secretariat covers two major activities. First, the Secretariat directly 
manages generally applicable rules and regulations that require uniformity on a global 
scale to make international air navigation possible. Second, regional offices manage the 
practical application of air navigation services and facilities by states and their 
coordinated implementation in specific areas where operating conditions and other 
relevant parameters are comparable. These regional offices were divided by regions with 
distinct and specific air navigation problems of a similar nature. For example, the North 
Atlantic Region primarily addresses problems concerning long-range overseas 
navigation, while the European-Mediterranean region focuses the coordination of trans-
European operations with domestic and short-range international traffic. ICAO adopted 
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the concept of regions and regional offices on the understanding that any regional 
activities could only be undertaken provided they did not conflict with the world-wide 
activities of the organization. Activities were allowed to vary from region to region, 
however, taking into account the general economic, technical or social environment of 
the region concerned.47 
The Nuclear Domain 
When we think of deterrence, the basis of our interest in attribution, our natural 
proclivity is to consider the specific case of nuclear deterrence, especially as experienced 
through the Cold War. Because much of deterrence thought grows from that literature, 
this section considers this specific case. 
As in the cyber domain, even the more determinant nuclear domain required 
international cooperation beyond national self-help through technical means. Just as the 
window of opportunity to preemptively address the cyberspace attack problem may be 
closing, the extreme consequences of nuclear war elevated the issue to that of high 
politics, forming the basis for international arms control and monitoring agreements. 
Even under this general threat, a specific catalyst in the form of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
was required for the parties to initiate formal communications and cooperation to mitigate 
risks including timely and accurate attribution. No cyberspace crisis has yet served as a 
catalyst commensurate with the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the Y2K challenge perhaps 
the most poignant candidate. 
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The nuclear arms control regime did not develop overnight, but rather over many 
years as the primary actors learned their own lessons of nuclear deterrence, identified the 
need for agreements beyond tacit communications, and developed confidence in 
adversary reciprocity. Agreements in the nuclear domain were not only achieved over 
time, but also with significant and observable benefits at modest cost to national 
sovereignty and self-action. We should expect the same to be true for a cyberspace 
security regime. 
Alexander George and Richard Smoke documented the general lack of any 
overarching deterrence theory or regime in the first five years of the nuclear age, 1945-
1950.48 The primary catalyst for international cooperation in the nuclear domain was the 
overwhelming consequences of use; a premise reinforced through the preamble to the 
U.S.-USSR September 1971 agreement on measures to prevent the escalation of potential 
nuclear incidents. 
"Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would 
have for all mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to 
avert the risk of outbreak of such a war, including measures to guard 
against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons... The Parties 
undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of... "49 
Even under this general threat, a specific catalyst was required in the form of the 
October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis for the parties to initiate formal communications and 
cooperation in the nuclear domain. The U.S. and Soviet Union agreed in June 1963 to 
establish a direct communications link, or "hot line" to prevent miscommunication in a 
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crisis.50 The utilization of this link was further reinforced through September 1971 
measures to prevent the escalation of potential nuclear incidents,51 and a 1973 general 
agreement to prevent nuclear war. 
A 1987 U.S.-USSR agreement further established Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers (NRRC) in both capitals for the express purpose of supplementing existing 
means of communication and providing direct, reliable, high-speed systems to transmit 
notifications and communications at the government-to-government level. The NRRCs 
may also be used by either side to transmit additional communications as a display of 
good will and to build confidence.54 In 1988, an agreement was reached between the 
superpowers to provide advanced intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic 
missile launch notifications.55 In June 2000, the adversaries established a joint center for 
the exchange of data from early warning systems and notifications of missile launches. 
A second hot line was subsequently established between the U.S. and China in 1998.57 
It is important to note these agreements formed the basis for cooperation between 
principal adversaries in order to avoid miscommunication in a domain with the highest of 
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stakes, a considerable benefit exchanged for a modest cost of sovereign self-action. 
International cooperation was also achieved on a multilateral basis to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology as evidenced in the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty,58 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty,59 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty,60 and other agreements. 
While these treaties focused on containing nuclear weapons technology and 
contributing to international peace and security, they also provided for specific and 
observable security guarantees at the national level while reinforcing the great power 
status quo at the systemic level. These incentives again provided sufficient multilateral 
incentives in exchange for modest encroachment on national security and sovereignty. 
Paradigmatic arguments continue to complicate international dialogue and 
cooperation even today. Well after the height of the cold war, scholars continued to 
debate issues such as the impact of nuclear proliferation by Kenneth Waltz and Scott 
Sagan.61 In addition to being a lively debate, this book is a classic representation of two 
sides arguing past each other, as they were both working under different paradigms. 
Concentrating on systemic analysis of the increased consequences of war and actor 
rationality, Waltz argued more was better, while Sagan, concentrating on the competence, 
motives, and rationality of individual states, contended more was worse. 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Julyl, 1968. 
59
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Although there is great potential for indiscriminate effect, there are no specific 
prohibitions on the use of nuclear weapons under the international law of armed conflict. 
The general rules related to necessity and proportionality apply. The only treaty 
prohibitions regarding nuclear weapons relate to the placement of these weapons in 
certain areas. 
International forums have sought to further restrict nuclear weapons technology 
from entire regions altogether, including Antarctica,63 Africa,64 Latin America,65 South 
Pacific,66 and Southeast Asia,67 with similar efforts underway in Central Asia, Central 
Europe and the Mideast.68 These agreements sought to specifically minimize the 
attribution requirement in observable ways. Given that participants to these agreements 
were not giving up nuclear weapons capability, but rather agreeing not to pursue it, 
observable regional security guarantees were achieved at little cost. 
As an extension of nuclear ethics,69 self-defense in the cyber domain should be 
considered a just, but limited cause (motives). Due to the risk of collateral effects, cyber 
attacks should not be treated as normal weapons, and the risk of collateral effects to 
innocent people should be minimized (means). Steps to reduce risks of cyber war in the 
near term, and reduce the reliance on cyber weapons over time (consequences) should 
also be taken. 
The Antarctic Treaty, June 23, 1961. 
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The Space Domain 
The space domain has been an important venue for global telecommunications 
development, as well as the corresponding principles and norms addressed in the next 
section. Several observations warrant review for the current assessment. The 
capabilities, principles and norms that support global information sharing through space 
were again developed over several decades, and much was left intentionally undefined in 
order to advance the regime. Just as there is wide variance in views over the limits of 
control in cyberspace, the limits of the commons and sovereign space did not have to be 
rigidly agreed upon for the two concepts to work in harmony. The legal domain of space 
and associated principles and norms established through state practice and opinio juris 
were accepted as customary international law for a decade until documented by treaty in 
1967. Nations recognized the utility of the law of the commons when concepts based 
more heavily on national sovereignty were shown to not be viable. 
With the 1957 USSR launch of the first earth satellite, Sputnik, the competition 
and cooperation defining the space domain burst forth with relative speed. The concept 
of space as commons (see discussion on the sea domain above) was initially challenged 
by the concept that nations maintained sovereignty over territorial airspace to an 
unrestricted extent (usque ad coelum); however, this was not considered viable. Beyond 
the separation of airspace and space, generally considered at some point between 50 and 
100 miles, nations have generally agreed to apply the law of the commons (res 
communis). Out of concern of prematurely surrendering valuable sovereign rights in 
light of future technological development, nations have generally agreed to not 
specifically delimit this particular frontier. Also, while the law of the commons is 
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generally applied to low- (LEO) and mid-earth orbits, the high, geosynchronous earth 
orbit becomes another region of the domain that comes under dispute. UN General 
Assembly resolutions adopted in 1963 identified corresponding legal principles expressed 
in state practice, opinio juris, and accepted as customary international law. The legal 
domain of space was clarified in a 1967 Treaty. Further Agreements followed in 
1968,71 1972,72andl975.73 
Simply having agreements in place and the technical capability to track objects in 
space is not to infer all problems are solved. The number of objects in Earth orbit has 
increased steadily. The United States and the Soviet Union tested anti-satellite 
technology in the 1980s, and the United States shot down one of its orbiting satellites in 
1985. Partially as a result of the debris problem, both sides stopped the programs.74 The 
annual growth rate of tracked debris began to decrease in the 1990s, largely due to 
national debris mitigation efforts, but has been growing again since 2004. 
Cooperative efforts do not always restrain aggressive powers.75 The January 11, 
2007 Chinese test of an anti-satellite (AS AT) weapon against one if its own satellites in 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, October 10, 1967. http://www.islandone.org/Treaties/ 
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2009). 
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LEO created the largest man-made debris field in history, largely contributing to a 20 per 
cent increase in traceable space debris in 2007 alone. While initial international 
reaction focused on the shared threat to space assets,77 subsequent international concern 
shifted to focus on the implications of the massive amounts of space debris caused by the 
satellites destruction.78 The massive amounts of space debris can feasibly limit future 
launches, and existing space asset maneuverability in LEO, resulting in a form of denial 
of space access. 
Space telecommunications were specifically addressed in the 1971 INTELSAT 
Agreement79 and 1976 INMARSAT Convention (with 1981 Protocol and 1985 
Amendment). The 1971 Agreement established an international telecommunications 
satellite organization INTELSAT, to design, develop, construct, establish, operate and 
maintain the space segment of the global commercial telecommunications satellite 
system. The INMARSAT Convention made provisions for the space segment necessary 
for improving maritime and, as practicable, aeronautical communications including 
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radio-determination capabilities. A 1972 United Nations Declaration, 1983 General 
Assembly Resolution, and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulations 
referenced therein identify principles and procedures for establishing transmission service 
and content between sending and receiving states. 
The Telecommunications Domain 
ITU regulations establish principles and procedures for establishing transmission 
service and content between sending and receiving states. These are particularly 
applicable to the cyberspace domain as they set clear precedent regarding global 
communications freedom of information and state sovereignty; however, that is not to say 
significant tension does not remain between the two.83 
Founded in Paris in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union, the ITU took its 
present name in 1934 and in 1947 became a specialized agency of the United Nations. 
Membership of the ITU includes all 191 countries that use the international telephone 
system, as well as almost 750 IT companies and other associates that are members of one 
or more of ITU's three sectors. The Radio-communication Sector, Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector, and Telecommunication Development Sector each undertake a 
range of technical, procedural and political measures related to cyber security. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Declaration of Guiding 
Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting, 1972. 
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0000/000021/002136eb.pdf (accessed March 1, 2010). 
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The ITU mission "to enable the growth and sustained development of 
telecommunications and information networks, and to facilitate universal access so that 
people everywhere can participate in, and benefit from, the emerging information society 
and global economy" embraces the issue of cyber security in direct terms. Dr. Paul 
Cornish of Chatham House has also identified ITU's relevance in cyber security85 noting 
"there is clear evidence of a practical approach which bridges gaps between the worlds of 
public policy, technology and industry, and which assists in national capacity building." 
The ITU is taking concrete steps to develop confidence in the use of cyberspace 
through enhanced online security in the form of concrete measures in its landmark Global 
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA). The GCA was launched in 2007 as a framework for 
international cooperation. In a rather complicated arrangement, the GCA is comprised of 
five strategic pillars including legal, technical, and procedural measures, organization, 
capacity building and international cooperation. 
The Trade Domain 
The majority of cyberspace development and use occurs in the public and private 
sectors, as opposed to government programs. Non-military activities comprise the bulk 
of responsibilities and authorities in cyberspace, and therefore provide both a first line of 
defense, and necessary role in response actions. International cooperation and regime 
development in relevant non-security domains such as telecommunications and trade are 
84
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therefore critical in any consideration of building an international cyberspace security 
regime. 
In addition to specific agreements regarding intellectual property rights, relevant 
observations from international cooperation in the trade domain include problems in the 
functioning of the domain leading to cataclysmic events. Addressing problems of 
military and security necessity, temporary measures emerged which survived and 
remained effective through the support of member nations who valued the benefits, and 
desired protection from other participating nations. The measures were effective despite 
the absence of a rigid structure and enforcement authority, primarily through nearly 
continual negotiating rounds and an effective dispute settlement mechanism. The 
arrangement provided for exceptions without retaliation or sanction where agreed by the 
members. 
High trade barriers among western industrialized nations were considered a 
contributing factor to both the Great Depression of the 1930s and the onset of World War 
II. U.S.-British discussions during World War II to alleviate postwar economic problems 
formulated a plan to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank by an 
International Trade Organization (ITO) capable of regulating commerce. A general 
agreement emerged from the 1947 Havana Conference as a temporary measure to 
stabilize world trade pending ITO charter. When the U.S. Senate refused to consent to 
the ITO, President Truman joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
through executive order. Twenty-two nations joined the United States in GATT which 
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incorporated many provisions of the ITO charter but without the envisioned enforcement 
powers.86 
GATT survived and remained effective through the support of member nations 
who enjoy the benefits from expanded trade, and desire to avoid retaliation from other 
participating nations. GATT effectively and significantly reduced or eliminated high 
trade barriers among western industrialized nations, despite the absence of a rigid 
structure and enforcement authority. 
The agreement's purpose to encourage member nations to lower tariffs and 
eliminate import or other regulatory quotas included nondiscrimination as a key principle. 
Nondiscrimination was operationalized through most-favored-nation provisions in tariff 
treaties, requiring that no signatory imposes greater burdens on one trading partner than 
another. A second principle is that a GATT member may not rescind any tariff 
concession without compensation for trading partners adversely affected. The agreement 
also urges all parties to rely on negotiations and consultation to resolve trade conflicts. 
The arrangement provides for exceptions seemingly in contradiction to the 
nondiscrimination principle. Developing nations may continue relations with former 
colonial powers, and groups of nations may create free-trade zones, such as the European 
Community or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) without retaliation 
or sanction from other GATT members. 
A series of five negotiating rounds followed the pattern that had characterized 
negotiations under the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Representatives 
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of the primary supplier of a commodity or product would engage in talks with a major 
consumer, each party seeking reductions in rates. Once a bilateral bargain was struck and 
added to the multinational agreement, the most-favored-nation principle extended rates to 
all parties. Applying this non-discriminatory approach, the GATT successfully reduced 
world tariffs on industrial products to 13 percent. During the sixth Kennedy Round 
(1964-1967) in Geneva the United States offered broad, across-the-board reductions, 
focusing negotiations on what commodities or items to exclude. The Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979) continued tariff reduction, leading to a general overall rate of 4 percent on 
industrial commodities. 
The first six GATT rounds were successful in reducing tariffs but less so with 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), first given serious attention during the Kennedy Round and 
dominating the subsequent Tokyo Round. Negotiations led to a series of codes of 
conduct directed at NTBs to mitigate such practices as dumping, government-subsidized 
exports, exclusionary government procurement policies, and arbitrary customs 
valuations. Most were adopted by industrialized, but not developing nations. The 
Uruguay Round concluded seven years of expanded negotiations on December 15, 1993. 
In addition to further tariff reductions, it fashioned partial agreements on agricultural 
products, services, and intellectual property rights earlier rounds had failed to address. 
The Uruguay Round also resulted in the formation of the present-day World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to embody these new trade disciplines. There are currently 145 
official member countries. 
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The Environmental Domain 
Slightly diverging from the general approach of this chapter, this section builds 
directly on previous work of international cooperation and regime-building in the 
environmental domain. Environmental regime analysts have invited application of their 
analytical models across non-environmental security domains. Their findings are 
introduced here for evaluation against the cyberspace regime. Regime formation and 
behavioral complex descriptions are not repeated here. 
Evaluation of international cooperation and regime effectiveness in the 
environmental domain includes regimes designed to address vessel-source pollution, 
Barents Sea fisheries, and acid rain in Europe and North America.88 The international 
vessel-source oil pollution case detailed changes in the international regime seeking to 
control intentional discharges of oil from ships. The analysis found broad shifts in the 
allocation of authority among coastal, flag, and port states through cooperation across a 
wide range of marine issues. These shifts supported expanded roles of port states in 
contrast to flag states, leading to oil-pollution regime effectiveness. 
New roles were also accorded to classification societies and insurance companies 
to enforce compliance with tanker equipment standards. Members of the oil pollution 
regime recognized the legitimacy of assigning such important roles to non-state actors.90 
Granting authority to classification societies and insurance companies to police standards 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
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by refusing to certify or insure ships failing to conform to equipment standards was 
effective because some of the key members of the regime were willing to ban or even 
impound non-complying tankers from their ports.91 
In this way, the regime was successful at establishing standards users were 
required to meet to conduct business profitably or at all. This was accomplished less by 
increasing incentives to comply with the rules than through eliminating opportunities to 
violate regulative prescriptions. Unlike the previous situation relying upon discharge 
standards where operators could decide whether or not to comply while engaged in 
transporting oil, owners and operators were effectively barred from transporting oil by 
sea if they were unprepared to accept the requirements of the equipment standards. The 
equipment standards were effective because they coerced a variety of non-state actors to 
play by the rules of the regime, avoiding manipulative tactics often accompanying 
national regulatory efforts.92 
Large costs of tanker building and retrofitting required owners and operators to 
anticipate and adopt probable equipment standard developments over several decades at a 
time. The decision of tanker owners and operators to adopt the technology of segregated 
ballast tanks appears to have reflected an assessment on their part of the probable 
evolution of the rules governing marine pollution, reinforcing the commitment to 
equipment standards and advancing the oil-pollution regime effectiveness. Informing 
assessments of decision-makers illustrated a tendency of regimes to influence behavior 
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by shaping expectations of various parties about rules and procedures likely to be adopted 
in the future, even when they do not mandate specific actions at the time of their creation. 
Influencing behavior through shaping expectations was particularly true where key actors 
were required to make large investment decisions with extended amortization schedules, 
such as production facilities or research and development initiatives. Shaping 
expectations highlights the role of assessments of current and future trends in the 
development of international regimes to inform decision-making under uncertainty by 
those responsible for investment decisions. 
The case of international vessel-source oil pollution showed unambiguous 
evidence of links among domestic politics and the operation of regimes. A diffuse public 
concerned with marine pollution pressured a powerful and highly organized industry to 
accept equipment standards; despite evidence this solution was not an efficient one in the 
purely economic sense.94 
Similar to the authority allocation tendency in the oil-pollution regime, the 
Barents Sea Fisheries95 case demonstrated the expansion of regulatory authority of 
coastal states over living resources located in marine areas adjacent to their coastlines. In 
this case, the authority allocation was critical to the ability of Norway and Russia to 
establish a bilateral management system for the Barents Sea and to phase out third-party 
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fishing. This shift also derived its legitimacy from a broader shift in the allocation of 
authority over marine areas.96 
By treating the area known as the Grey Zone as a management unit and 
differentiating it from the area of the Barents Sea subject to conflicting jurisdictional 
claims, the regime encouraged cooperation while avoiding the hardening of jurisdictional 
claims.97 Recognition of jurisdictional limits in this case is similar to the observation 
from the space domain that clear delineation between sovereign and common elements or 
aspects of the domain is not a prerequisite to cooperation. 
The Barents Sea fisheries regime also describes an evolutionary process of 
pursuing conventional fisheries management approaches. The concept of maximum 
sustainable yield was recognized as inadequate to manage fish stocks, leading to a 
growing awareness of the interdependence offish stocks and the idea of multispecies 
management. Continued recognition of shortcomings with these approaches and a 
growing interest in holistic ecosystem perspectives, allow the regime to further address 
problems in this area. This evolutionary regime tendency was termed a step-wise 
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process. 
There is again unambiguous evidence of links among domestic politics and the 
operation of regimes. The Barents Sea fisheries regime subjected the actions of 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
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bureaucratic managers to greater public scrutiny, and also institutionalized the role of 
scientists as contributors to the decision-making process established by the regime." 
Regimes can clearly shape actors behavior. In the Barents Sea case, the regime 
was able to overcome collective-action problems through the operation of a routine 
decision-making procedure that reduced transaction costs and promoted transparency. 
These decision-making procedures made it increasingly difficult to cheat,100 not unlike 
evidence of regimes shaping behavior in the other domains. 
The case study on acid rain in Europe and North America101 describes the 
evolution of the regime from the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and its subsequent protocols. The regime has 
been successful without proscribing many clear cut rules or behavioral prescriptions, but 
rather through the establishment of a joint mechanism for information sharing regarding 
the problem areas and encouraging member nations to make general pledges on the 
understanding each government be free to fulfill the pledges any way it sees fit.102 The 
LRTAP regime showed clear examples of shaping actors behavior,103 reinforcing the 
observations in other domains that attribution is partially achieved through cooperative 
measures including observable agreements and dedicated communications mechanisms. 
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Similar to the tanker owner and operator situation in the vessel-pollution case, 
chemical manufacturers also faced similar choices about long-term investments in the 
production of alternatives to chlorofluorocarbons. Decision-making over extended 
amortization schedules again illustrates the tendency of regimes to influence behavior by 
shaping expectations of various parties about rules and procedures likely to be adopted in 
the future, even when they do not mandate specific actions at the time of their creation.104 
The LRTAP regime provided further evidence of links among domestic politics 
and the operation of the regime. LRTAP and its North American counterpart empowered 
domestic critics of prevailing environmental policies, helping to create domestic 
constituencies capable of bringing pressure to bear on relevant government agencies. 
Empowerment of domestic constituencies was largely accomplished through interest 
groups or communities working in legislative settings and broader forums influencing 
public opinion to build political coalitions.105 
The LRTAP regime demonstrated a particular tendency of launching relatively 
uncontroversial or seemingly unimportant programmatic activities rather than 
preliminarily laying down regulatory prescriptions. Over time the regime became 
increasingly influential as its core issues gained political prominence and the participants 
found themselves in a web of institutionalized activities from which they could not easily 
extricate themselves. The case demonstrated a regime can lend credence or authority to a 
set of broader principles while mandating a process that keeps the issue before national 
104
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policymakers in a politically potent manner. In this way, the regime drew governments 
into normatively grounded social practices they could not ignore in political terms, albeit 
more so for some states than others.106 
Summary 
International cooperation arises for a variety of reasons in response to particular 
problems. With the rise of the nation-state, leaders came to recognize the stake they held 
in their nascent international system, setting in motion the principles and norms codified 
in the laws of land warfare and eventually expanded to cover other domains. The advent 
of new technologies in new domains and their corresponding destructive potential led to 
new venues for competition and potential cooperation. States recognized emerging 
regimes could no longer be contained within strictly national confines. Wars also 
demonstrated the destructive potential of the domains requiring international attention. 
International collaboration born out of military necessity led to the belief that domain 
management had to be international or it would not be possible to use the emerging 
domains for purposes of global economic development. 
In the nuclear domain, extreme consequences elevated the attribution issue to that 
of high politics, forming the basis for international arms control and monitoring 
agreements. Even under such a general threat, a specific catalyst was required for the 
parties to initiate formal communications and cooperation to mitigate risks including 
timely and accurate attribution. 
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Problems in the functioning of the trade domain were deemed to have contributed 
to the cataclysmic events of the great depression and World War II. Addressing 
problems of military and security necessity for post-war reconstruction, a general trade 
agreement emerged as a temporary measure which survived and remained effective 
through the support of member nations who valued the benefits, and desired protection 
from other participating nations. The arrangement provided for exceptions without 
retaliation or sanction where agreed by the members. 
Successful formulation of principles and norms tend to focus on descriptive 
practice complementing other generally accepted principles, rather than normative goals 
except where specifically agreed for good reason. Attempts to establish normative 
procedures impractical in conflict prosecution lead to numerous exceptions establishing 
alternative customary international law. Successful implementation of international 
agreements in the land domain includes remedies to force adherence, including reprisals 
and war crimes. 
Self-defense is a just, but limited cause. The distinction between neutrals and 
belligerents, and combatants and non-combatants and the methods for so designating will 
continue to be instrumental in achieving attribution, although the methods may be unique. 
Defensive actions designed to prevent or mitigate an attack are justified as long as the 
general principles of necessity and proportionality are met. Protected signs, symbols and 
electronic signals used to identify personnel, objects and activities entitled to protected 
status, and the use of exclusion zones promulgated via notices to airmen and mariners 
(NOTAMS) may be useful metaphors for methods to distinguish and attribute combatant 
status and activity in cyberspace. 
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Normative instruments should provide clear benefit at minimal cost. As the 
nuclear domain demonstrated, agreements and cooperative procedures required 
significant and observable benefits at modest cost to national sovereignty and self-action. 
Management structures are most successful when organizational tasks and 
authorities are well aligned with capability and perspective. In the case of the air 
domain, ICAO directly manages generally applicable rules and regulations requiring 
uniformity on a global scale, leveraging regional offices managing practical application 
of regional services. 
Agreements and procedures generally require years, even decades to form and 
the necessary catalyst to initiate them may not be present in the cyberspace domain to 
date. The broad and amorphous nature of cyberspace leaves significant room for 
paradigmatic arguments, complicating the development of international dialogue and 
cooperation. Negotiations gain the best traction when initiated by a few principle actors. 
Draft documents or provisional organizations are beneficial to begin negotiations and 
eventual implementation. 
Well aware of the inevitable delays associated with Convention ratification, the 
November 1944 International Civil Aviation Conference signed an Interim Agreement 
creating a technical and advisory PICAO which easily transitioned to the permanent 
ICAO. Conversely, in the sea domain, the open-ended and contentiously normative 
approach of the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) greatly 
complicated and extended adoption and ratification of the convention. The GATT was 
effective despite the absence of a rigid structure and enforcement authority, primarily 
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through nearly continual negotiating rounds and an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
Clear delineation between sovereign and common elements or aspects of the 
domain is not a prerequisite to cooperation. The definition of space is clearly vague, and 
the parsing of the geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) is a notable compromise. 
Confidence-building measures are necessary. Several principles and norms, and 
reasons for abiding by them presume future actions. The assumption that violations, real 
or perceived, lead to the loss of domestic and international support is true only if 
violations have a significant chance of being detected, attributed back to, and result in 
unfavorable consequences for the offender. Similarly, victim or community actions 
actually need to demonstrate a capability and willingness to respond to attacks to 
establish a reasonable expectation of reciprocity. If hostility in the cyberspace area is not 
expected to spill into other areas, such as economics, an important incentive for 
cooperation will be absent. 7 
The assumption of an eventual return to peace is particularly applicable to 
cyberspace, as attacks may occur during times of no stated conflict engaging the formal 
international law of armed conflict. In the absence of attacks, positive reciprocity can be 
exhibited through peaceful confidence-building measures. Improved coordination and 
technical detection capability to attribute attacks, and such responses either through 
retribution or peaceful confidence-building measures may be the most promising avenue 
Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 176-178. 
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for extending the shadow of the future and aligning mutual interests among an optimal 
number of actors. 
ACHIEVING ATTRIBUTION 
This section reviews lessons from other domains addressing attribution as a 
collective action issue. While confident attribution is required for military action 
consistent with the international laws of armed conflict, principles and norms established 
in other domains provide a guide for how to proceed in the face of insufficient attribution, 
or for cooperative activities focused on attaining it. 
For example, low transaction costs of entry, general freedom of the environment 
(high seas), and the concept of commons in the sea domain provide useful constructs 
such as the MDA CONOPS and multinational task forces. The trade domain relies upon 
negotiations and consultation to resolve conflicts. Significant time is allowed to make a 
claim, even longer for specific findings through arguments, and both well in advance of 
known total damage, significantly extending the shadow of the future for rational 
decision-makers. 
The Land Domain 
Deterrence and attribution in the land domain date back to the earliest recorded 
history. Thucydides documents the use of walls around cities as a deterrent measure in 
the Peloponnesian war. Throughout history, deterrence was a function of offensive and 
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defensive capabilities and alliances. Principles and norms took the form of military 
principles for objective achievement under such pens as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, 
Clausewitz, and Jomini. 
The general deterrence decision calculus of perceived benefits and costs for acting 
or not acting apply, with a rich historical record. For example, Paris' abduction of Helen 
had several precedents. Io was taken from Mycenae, Europa was taken from Phoenicia, 
Jason took Medea from Colchis, and the Trojan princess Hesione had been taken by 
Heracles, who gave her to Telamon of Salamis. According to Herodotus, Paris was 
emboldened by these examples to steal himself a wife from Greece, and expected no 
retribution, since there had been none in the other cases. To the extent attribution was a 
requirement, it was generally easily achieved. Even King Menelaus of Sparta sought to 
confirm the elopement of Paris and Helen before asking King Agamemnon to call upon 
all the Achaean kings to attack Troy. 
Several observations from the international law of armed conflict in the land 
domain are applicable for consideration in our assessment of the cyber domain. 
Distinctions are made between belligerents and neutrals, and combatants and 
noncombatants, to the effect that noncombatants and neutrals are spared as much as 
possible. These principles of distinction inherently require attribution of belligerent or 
combatant status to provide the protection required by the law of armed conflict to 
noncombatants and their property. 
Special restrictions such as exclusion, or "free fire" zones, and NOTAMS are used 
to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. The international law of armed 
conflict recognizes protected signs, symbols and electronic signals such as "SOS" or 
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"May Day" to identify personnel, objects and activities entitled to protected status. These 
include the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Medical symbols); prisoner of war and civilian 
internment camps; cultural, historical, educational activities; or the white flag. 
Only combatants may participate directly in hostilities. Noncombatants refrain 
from hostile acts, and noncombatants may not be the object of intentional attack. It is 
prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such, and undefended 
places are protected. The law provides for the recognition, protection and responsibilities 
of neutrals and neutrality. Responsibilities of the protected are specified, such as 
marking protected places, not commingling activities, and not to resist or arm themselves 
but to cooperate with attackers. Certain conventions prohibit or restrict of certain 
weapons, material, and methods of warfare by principle or treaty, however, none 
specifically address cyberspace. 
In general, deception is permitted under the law of armed conflict, to include 
those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or 
falsification of evidence to induce them to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. 
The law of armed conflict permits deceiving the enemy through stratagems and ruses of 
war designed to mislead, deter, or induce the enemy to act recklessly, provided the ruses 
do not violate rules of international law applicable to armed conflict. Permitted 
deceptions include such deceptions as camouflage, deceptive lighting, dummy ships and 
other armament, decoys, simulated forces, feigned attacks and withdrawals, ambushes, 
false intelligence information, electronic deceptions, and use of enemy codes, passwords, 
and countersigns. 
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There are specifically prohibited deceptions, referred to as perfidy, which are 
designed to invite the confidence of the enemy to lead him to believe he is obliged to 
accord to the opposing force protected status under the law of armed conflict, with the 
intent to betray that confidence. Such acts are prohibited because they undermine the 
effectiveness of protective signs and thereby jeopardize the safety of noncombatants and 
the immunity of protected structures and activities. 
The Sea Domain 
From existing international law, enemy warships and military aircraft, including 
naval and military auxiliaries, are subject to attack, destruction, or capture anywhere 
beyond neutral territory. Enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft may be captured 
wherever located beyond neutral territory. The targeting and lawful attack upon such 
vessels and aircraft depends on the circumstances on which these objects are 
encountered. As in the land domain, the principles of attributing belligerent or neutral, 
and combatant or non-combatant status apply. 
The London Protocol provided that except in the case of persistent refusal to stop 
on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether 
surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant 
vessel without having first placed the passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of 
safety. Defensive arming and counter submarine tactics by merchant vessels during 
World War II led to widespread departures from the London Protocol. 
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Numerous exceptions to the rules became customary practice so that today a 
vessel may become a target subject to attack if it: 
• refuses to stop when duly summoned; 
• resists visit and search or capture; 
• sails under convoy with warship protection; 
• is armed, even for defensive purposes only; 
• incorporates into, or assists in any way, the intelligence system of the 
enemy's armed forces; 
• is acting in any way as a naval or military auxiliary, or is integrated into the 
enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort; and 
• if compliance with the London Protocol would, under the circumstances of the 
encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise 
preclude mission accomplishment. 
Refusal by civilian passenger vessels at sea and civil airliners in flight to provide 
immediate identification upon demand is ordinarily sufficient legal justification for 
capture or destruction. 
A defender may always exercise the right of self-defense if attacked or threatened 
with attack while in neutral territory or from neutral territory. This includes the 
launching of an attack by an opposing belligerent while in mere transit of a neutral's 
territorial waters. 
Neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft acquire enemy warship character and 
may be treated as such if they engage in direct hostilities on the side of the enemy, or act 
in any capacity as a naval auxiliary, including intelligence collection. Neutral merchant 
ships may acquire enemy merchant character when engaged in acts such as operating 
directly under enemy control, resisting visit and search, or failing to establish its identity. 
Naval mines are lawful weapons, but their potential for indiscriminate effects has 
led to specific regulation of their deployment and employment. The extensive and 
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uncontrolled use of naval mines during the Russo-Japanese War inflicted great damage 
on innocent shipping both during and long after the conflict. More recently, the use of 
naval mines in the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated the potential for indiscriminate effects. 
The 1907 Hague VIII delineates the rules for use of naval mines. During 
wartime, a nation is required to provide international notice to prevent indiscriminate 
effect on neutral shipping. It may not mine neutral waters. A nation may mine both its 
own territorial sea and the territorial sea of opposing belligerents, as well as international 
waters, or even international straits for the purpose of channeling shipping, but it may not 
cut transit passage through the strait. Torpedoes must also be designed to become 
harmless when they have missed their mark, such as being designed to sink to the bottom 
and become harmless upon the completion of their propulsion run. 
One case in point is the Corfu Channel Incident, actually three separate incidents 
in 1946 early in the Cold War involving Royal Navy ships in the Channel of Corfu. The 
second incident involved Royal Navy ships striking mines and the third incident occurred 
when the Royal Navy conducted mine-clearing operations in the Corfu Channel, but in 
Albanian territorial waters, resulting in a diplomatic note to Albania. The December 21, 
1946 Albanian government reply denied the British allegations and went on to elaborate 
that the whole affair was the work of countries which did not wish to see a normalization 
of relations between Albania and Britain. The reply went so far as to state vessels from 
Greece and other countries had trespassed recently in the area where the mines were 
discovered. 
Albania complained about the mine-clearing operation to the United Nations 
leading to the Corfu Channel Case, where the United Kingdom brought a case against the 
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People's Republic of Albania to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It was the first 
case adjudicated by the ICJ, and in December 1949 the court awarded the British the sum 
of £843,947 or U.S. $2,009,437. The court found that, irrespectively of who laid the 
mines, the Albanians ought to have observed any such action, since the minefield was so 
close to their coast, and thus they failed to inform the British of the danger. A similar 
1986 case involving the U.S. mining of Nicaraguan waters resulted in a judgment against 
the U.S., although the U.S. blocked any resulting action in the UN Security Council. 
Within the immediate area or vicinity of operations, a belligerent may establish 
special restrictions upon the activities of non-belligerent ships and aircraft and may 
prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. Exclusion zones are 
justified on the basis that they are reasonable measures used to contain the geographic 
area of the conflict or to keep neutral shipping at a safe distance from areas of actual or 
potential hostilities. Such exclusion zones are normally promulgated through NOTAMS. 
To the extent that such zones serve to warn neutral vessels and aircraft away from 
belligerent activities and thereby reduce their exposure to collateral damage they are 
lawful. The establishment of such a zone, however, does not relieve the proclaiming 
belligerent of the obligation under the Law of Armed Conflict to refrain from attacking 
vessels and aircraft which do not constitute lawful targets. In short, an otherwise 
protected platform does not lose that protection by crossing an imaginary line drawn in 
the ocean by a belligerent. 
Digest of International Cases on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Office of Legal 
Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, (New York, NY: UN Press, 
2007), 32-37. 
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As in the land domain, the principles of attributing belligerent or neutral, and 
combatant or non-combatant status apply. The London Protocol attempted to establish 
normative procedures impractical in conflict prosecution. Numerous exceptions to the 
rules became customary practice so that today a vessel may become a target subject to 
attack if it refuses to so much as provide immediate identification upon demand 
(attribution), let alone operate under enemy control or resisting visit and search. 
As with tools used in cyberspace attacks, naval mines and torpedoes are lawful 
weapons, but their potential for indiscriminate effects has led to specific regulation of 
their deployment and employment. Neutral waters may not be mined and international 
lines of communication such as straights may not be cut. 
The Air Domain 
Two technical developments from World War II were specifically designed to 
address attribution and carried forward into civil air operations. One was the advent of 
radar and an associated command and control (C2) system to detect and identify between 
or attribute friendly and enemy aircraft. The other was the use of secondary radars to 
identify friend or foe (IFF) by assigning unique identifier codes to friendly aircraft 
transponders. The term is a bit of a misnomer, as IFF can generally only positively 
identify friendly targets but not hostile ones. If an IFF interrogation receives no reply, 
the object can only be treated as suspicious but not as a positively identified foe. It has 
"Technical Surveillance Countermeasures," Granite Island Group, http://www.tscm.com/iff.pdf 
(accessed July 2, 2009). 
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evolved such that the term "IFF" commonly refers to all modes of operation, including 
civil and foreign aircraft use.111 
The Nuclear Domain 
Several observations from the nuclear domain are applicable for consideration in 
our assessment of the cyber domain. The lack of confidence in adversary relations and 
detection systems require the problem of attribution to be addressed. The attribution 
issue in the nuclear domain has been substantively mitigated through observable 
agreements and dedicated communications mechanisms between adversaries. 
Traditionally, the attribution problem in the nuclear domain remained somewhat 
dormant due to the relative confidence of cold war adversary relations and detectable 
delivery systems such as heavy bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles. Early 
warning also enabled limited defensive responses, although only the U.S. and Russia can 
reliably detect rocket launches. U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites provide 
early warning of conventional and nuclear ballistic missile attacks. Russia began 
rebuilding its aging system in 2001 by upgrading its Oko series satellites. France is 
developing two missile-launch early-warning satellites—Spirale-1 and -2. 
Nuclear detection and attribution capabilities were further developed over 
decades, eventually including satellites capable of detecting and locating nuclear 
detonations worldwide, 24 hours a day, providing a highly survivable capability to detect, 
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locate, and report any nuclear detonations in the earth's atmosphere or near space in near 
realtime.113 
For consequences as significant as nuclear war, confidence in attribution certainly 
does and should receive the highest of scrutiny, in accordance with the just war 
tradition.114 Changes in the post-cold war, and especially post-9/11 security environment 
and the increasing threat of terrorist use of a man-portable "loose nuke" have forced the 
underlying nuclear attribution problem to resurface. Tracking, detecting, tracing and 
ultimately attributing a terrorist-employed nuclear device to the known producer, supplier 
and employer presents a similar, albeit more constrained problem than that faced in 
cyberspace. 
The Space Domain 
As in cyberspace, states expend significant resources to establish attribution of 
objects and activities in space. One result of these efforts has been to expand and even 
shift concerns from the threat of direct attack to that of collateral effects. 
Articles VI-VIII of the 1967 Treaty115 sought to establish strict attribution of 
objects and activities in space through registries and corresponding procedures. The 
1972116 and 1975117 agreements specifically address the attribution issue by identifying 
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all state objects in space. The 1972 Convention specified legal terms and definitions for 
state space objects and damages. It further established a claims process for compensation 
which provided the victim state a period of one year from the time it learned of the 
damage to establish such a claim, even if the full extent of damage is not known. The 
1975 Convention further detailed the requirements for both state registries and a UN 
Secretary General register with free and open access. 
Objects are operationally tracked by states to maintain attribution of space 
objects. For example, in the United States, U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) 
Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-Space) maintains space 
situational awareness of over 17,000 man-made objects in space 10 cm or larger through 
its Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). It is estimated that there are over 300,000 
objects measuring between 1 and 10 cm in diameter, and billions smaller. Traveling at 
speeds of up to 7.8 kilometers per second, space debris poses a significant threat to 
spacecraft. 
JSpOC utilizes a worldwide Space Surveillance Network (SSN) of 29 military 
and civilian, radar and optical telescope space surveillance sensors to observe the objects. 
These updates form the Space Catalog, a comprehensive listing of the numbers, types, 
and orbits of man-made objects in space,119 a significant level of effort to establish 
confident attribution. The U.S. has moderated access to its data since 2004 out of 
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concern for national security. Russia maintains a Space Surveillance System using its 
early-warning radars and monitors some 5,000 objects (mostly in LEO), but does not 
widely disseminate data. The EU, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Japan are all 
developing independent space surveillance capabilities.120 
The Trade Domain 
Although the focus of this paper is cyberspace as a security domain, the vast 
majority of the Internet is civil, commercial and recreational in nature. Impacts of attacks 
in cyberspace are felt across commerce and industry, and non-military activities comprise 
the bulk of responsibilities and authorities. The public-private sector, therefore, provides 
both a first line of defense, and necessary role in response actions. Addressing 
cyberspace from a purely security perspective is therefore misleading, unhelpful and 
insufficient for formulating recommendations. 
One example of a problem arising from this disconnect is the relevant time-
horizon between cyberspace as a security domain and a tool of commerce. While the 
WTO provides an effective dispute settlement mechanism, significant time is allowed to 
make a claim, even longer for specific findings through arguments, both well in advance 
of known total damage. Whereas recent attacks occur in terms of millibytes per second 
(mps), and responses over the course of hours, days and weeks, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides a mechanism encompassing months and years. 
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Should attacks violate WTO agreements, the DSU may provide recourse for 
compensation completely outside of traditional security channels. 
The WTO serves as a platform for countries to raise their concerns regarding the 
trade policies of their trading partners. The DSU is a legal text containing the rules for 
dispute settlement in the WTO.121 Article 2 of the DSU establishes a Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) to administer the rules, procedures, and consultation and dispute settlement 
provisions. The DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and appellate 
reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and 
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements. 
A panel is restricted to addressing only those claims that are specifically set out in 
a Member's panel request with sufficient precision. The complainant must, therefore, 
include all the claims it wants the panel to address in the request for the establishment of 
the panel as the panel is precluded from ruling on subsequent claims. There is a 
significant difference, however, between the claims identified in the panel request, and 
the arguments supporting those claims. 
A claim is an assertion the respondent has violated, nullified or impaired benefits 
accruing under an identified provision of a covered agreement. Arguments are put 
forward by the complainant to demonstrate that the respondent has indeed infringed the 
identified provision or otherwise nullified or impaired benefits. Arguments are not 
required to be included in the request for the establishment of the panel. Rather, the 
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parties usually develop extensive legal arguments only in the further stages of the 
proceedings in their written submissions and oral statements to the panel. 
A panel is not limited to using the parties' arguments. Rather, a panel is free to 
accept or reject such arguments and has the discretion to develop its own legal reasoning 
to support its findings and conclusions. In other words, a panel can develop its own 
autonomous reasoning. 
Summary 
Attribution is a problem when there is lack of confidence in adversary 
identification and technical detection of attacks. As the nuclear domain discussion 
illustrated, knowing who your adversaries are coupled with detection technologies may 
be sufficient at a point in time; however, as relations improve or sour, new actors such as 
terrorists come to light, or new technologies such as stealth bypass detection systems, the 
attribution issue will resurface. 
Attribution is achieved through a combination of detection technology and 
cooperative measures including observable agreements and dedicated communications 
mechanisms. Significant technical investment should be expected to address the 
attribution problem at the technological level as has been invested in maritime, sea, space 
and nuclear domains. IFF and airspace management tools, maritime and space 
surveillance capabilities, and nuclear detection capabilities are all critical in establishing 
attribution in other domains. 
Any plausible path to meaningful defense in cyberspace must include a significant 
element of international cooperation and regime formation. Just as technological 
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solutions were required in these domains, however, they were also insufficient. MDA 
CONOPS, space and airspace management procedures and associated international 
cooperative agreements are as important as the technologies themselves. In the nuclear 
domain, the attribution problem is specifically mitigated through observable agreements 
and dedicated communications mechanisms between adversaries. Given the goal of 
preserving non-attribution in the case of benign use, the concept of a claims approach 
similar to that adopted in the telecommunications, space and trade domains may be more 
applicable to cyberspace than that of persistent surveillance. 
Behavior alone indicates intent sufficient for attribution of combatant or 
belligerent status in other domains. For example, a maritime vessel may become a target 
subject to attack if it refuses to so much as provide immediate identification upon 
demand. Few weapons are restricted, rather the use of certain weapons exhibiting the 
potential for indiscriminate effects are regulated where agreed. Few cyberspace 
technologies are inherently malicious. Malicious activity in cyberspace is the product of 
using otherwise benign technology. 
Changing the focus from directly detecting and attributing attacks in cyberspace, 
to that of identifying the impact of collateral effects for a claims-type process may be one 
avenue to facilitate international dialogue in existing venues, extending the shadow of the 
future for rational decision-makers. One result of attribution efforts in the space domain 
has been to expand and even shift concerns from the threat of direct attack to that of 
collateral effects. 
As in the space and nuclear domains, activities with the potential for 
indiscriminate effects should not be treated as normal operations, and the risk of 
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collateral effects should be minimized. Constraining attacks in cyberspace should focus 
on malicious activities and effects, rather than weapons per se. This is one area worth 
exploring for specific discourse and possible agreement. Steps might be taken to reduce 
the risks of cyber war in the near term and reduce reliance on cyber attacks over time. 
The significant grey area between peace and war provides a notable quandary for 
operations in cyberspace, and difficulty in attributing belligerent and combatant status. 
Rules differ when in a stated conflict than during normal peacetime. Under recognized 
conflict, deception is permitted to include the use of feigned attacks, false intelligence 
information, electronic deceptions, and use of enemy codes, passwords, and countersigns. 
There is much room for improvement in interpreting and applying these principles in 
cyberspace. Few nations have even publicly defined what they consider to be a 
cyberspace attack. Recommendations in subsequent chapters therefore focus on moving 
the cyberspace domain out of the grey area between peace and war where irregular 
warfare thrives. 
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CHAPTER III 
ATTRIBUTION AS A COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEM IN CYBERSPACE 
The nature of cyberspace attacks constitute a collective-action problem in which 
the uncoordinated actions of each player may not result in the best outcome each can 
1 99 
achieve. A general discussion of information warfare provides important historical 
context to highlight specific attribution issues encountered during four recent attacks. 
Together, the cases are used to evaluate the ability of the emerging regime to mitigate 
attacks through improved international cooperation. 
The Internet was built with the goals of openness and decentralization. Security 
was not a priority, and the current version of the address assignment system, IP V4, 
provides ample opportunities for perpetrators to mask their real identity or location. 
"Packet flows and connections can be masked and redirected through multiple servers. A 
clever attacker can often highjack a machine belonging to an otherwise innocent 
organization and use it as a base for launching attacks."123 
In addition, the recent shift in strategy by hackers from a central command-and-
control model for controlling botnets, large numbers of hijacked computers, to a peer-to-
peer (P2P) model utilizing a distributed command structure capable of spreading to 
computers around the world is particularly troubling. "When several hijacked computers 
and networks that have been compromised spread over many countries and are used to 
launch cyber attacks using a decentralized model (based on peer-to-peer arrangements), 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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no national or regional legal framework can adequately deal with such a problem. This 
challenge can only be addressed globally."124 
Traditional methods for establishing attribution include passive post-attack 
methods to reconstruct and recreate the chain of events. These include digital forensic 
methods such as log inspection and reverse engineering,125 as well as actively marking 
packets traveling through the network126 through attack traceback operations including 
attack tree construction, attack path frequency detection, and packet to path 
association.127 
Even in the exceptional example where every machine involved in an attack is 
positively identified, attribution efforts must reach beyond the digital realm to identify 
the operator. Even if the operator is identified, it must be determined that they were 
responsible for, or even aware of, the attack and even further if they were acting at the 
direction or acquiescence of a national government. While confident attribution is 
considered a requirement for a military response under the law of armed conflict, other 
measures and strategies may be pursued in the face of imperfect attribution. Thus, cyber 
warfare attribution moves from the digital realm to the legal realm, in which there is no 
uniform international framework for dealing with international acts of cybercrime, let 
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alone cyber warfare. Current prosecutions of attacks across international borders, 
therefore, rely on cooperation between nations in order to investigate, extradite and 
1 28 
prosecute. 
Achieving attribution is further complicated by the difficulty of identifying 
motivating factors behind a cyber attack. Attacks which may seem to benefit one or more 
states may actually be the work of third-party actors driven by a wide range of 
motivations. "[The] challenge of identifying perpetrators and understanding their 
motives gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to officially 
distance themselves from attacks."129 Even when states do obtain a level of technical 
attribution, the desire to secure state secrets for methods of doing so inhibit the sharing of 
information with others or taking actions based on it. This concern with surrendering 
relative gains in the technical area of attribution serves to further exacerbate the security 
dilemma fundamental to the problem. 
Relatively low barriers130 to this kind of activity mean that cyber riots or 
campaigns can take on a life of their own exponentially increasing the level of 
uncertainty of the attacker(s) and the unpredictability of the outcome.131 Once an attack 
has occurred, current approaches to attribution accomplish little toward defending or 
mitigating the attack. The purpose in obtaining attribution is presently viewed from the 
perspective of preventing or deterring future attacks; however, "[as] the critical nature of 
Internet-based applications and services continues to increase, the ability to deter, 
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prevent, or interrupt attacks in progress will be of greater value to society than assigning 
blame and collecting damages after a disaster has occurred."132 
It is important to emphasize the underlying purpose for establishing attribution in 
this approach is to justify actions against the perpetrators, the head or catalyst of the 
attack in order to deter future attacks. Decentralized organizations, however, have no 
head. In fact, trying to attack the head will be shown to be one of the worst possible 
strategic moves. Moving forward, it is important to differentiate between technically 
decentralized attacks made possible by the nature of the Internet with the fact that 
someone is in fact behind them. Beyond the technical response, actions against the head 
may be effective unless the attack is spawned or supported by a similarly decentralized 
political movement. 
The decentralized nature of cyberspace attacks over open networks pose 
significant issues for states to effectively cooperate on the problem. These features of the 
Internet mean that states possess limited control to directly negotiate, agree to, or enforce 
Internet behavior. While they certainly have a role to play and are ultimately responsible 
for the security of their citizens, much depends upon the Internet and its users directly. 
Issues fundamental to Internet governance such as transparency as opposed to 
anonymity, capacity, and cost are compounded by significant technical and legal issues. 
Regardless of how or to what extent answers to these issues are found, there are also 
security related issues of competitiveness, uncertainty, and increasingly high stakes 
leading to a very real collective-action problem of relative gains. 
Howard F Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy 
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This security dilemma resulting from real or perceived relative gains for one actor 
leading to real or perceived decrease for others makes international cooperation even 
more problematic.133 In what can only be seen as an ironic illustration of this problem, 
Moscow proposed a United Nations resolution calling for new international guidelines 
and the banning of particularly dangerous information weapons. The Clinton 
administration rejected the resolution on the basis that any attempt at that time to draft 
overarching principles on information warfare would be premature.134 While this 
position may have been partially concerned with prematurely surrendering valuable 
leverage, or relative gains, in light of current capabilities or future technological 
development,135 it also recognized the prima facie impossibility of enforcement, a 
recognition still held to this day. 
"in every example of alleged [Russian Federation, RF] involvement in 
cyber attacks launched against other nations (Chechnya, Krygyzstan, 
Estonia, and Georgia), the RF Armed Services were not involved; Non-
state hackers were. And any attempt by the U.S. or other nations to 
prosecute Russian hackers engaged in cross-border attacks is rejected out 
of hand by the Kremlin. In other words, The Kremlin will negotiate on 
military capabilities that they haven't used but will not negotiate on their 
civilian hacker "assets" that they have used."136 
Attempts to address these threats have lingered at the private, public, domestic 
and international levels. While law enforcement agencies would prefer greater 
transparency to prosecute cyber crime, companies are concerned with charges of 
colluding with police and intelligence agencies, providing information that could 
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subsequently be obtained through legal channels such as the U.S. Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA), as well as unwanted publicity of serious intrusions. And, of course, civil 
liberties lawyers are concerned with Orwellian approaches to the Internet. Indeed, 
concerns with overreach of government control of the Internet are viewed by many as the 
principle threat.137 
Responses on the continent have echoed those in the United States. The Council 
of Europe drafted a treaty in April 2000, and the G-8 held a Dialogue between the Public 
and Private Sectors on Security and Confidence in Cyberspace the following month. 
Although neither resulted in decision or formal adoption, a dialogue was established. 
Peter Ford described the varying perspectives complicating a formal consensus:138 
• Transparency. Law enforcement officers want transparency in cyberspace to 
find out who did what and when. 
• Anonymity. Human rights advocates and civil liberties lawyers want total 
anonymity in cyberspace, usually through development of secure 
cryptography. 
• Capacity. Internet service providers (ISPs) lacked the capability to retain the 
data governments wanted them to retain. 
• Universality. Legal and intelligence officials were concerned a single 
international strategy for combating cyber crime would conflict with laws of 
particular nations. 
• Cost. Industry executives were concerned government attempts to secure 
cyberspace would stifle growth. 
Ford summarizes part of the collective-action problem from a civil-government 
and legal-non-legal perspective. Clearly, the open nature of the Internet is fundamental 
to addressing the problem. The collective-action problem he describes is further 
magnified when viewed from the international security perspective. 
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Franda concluded all four of Jervis' security dilemma factors have been prominent 
in international efforts toward securing cyberspace: 
• Competitiveness. Security issues often involve greater competitiveness than 
do those related to economics and other non-security aspects of human 
behavior. 
• Relative Gains. Protection of one's interests in non-security areas is usually 
costly, but it does not necessarily harm or menace others, as is often the case 
where security is involved. 
• High Stakes. The stakes are higher in security areas, since security is usually 
the most highly valued goal, is a prerequisite for so many things, and is 
unforgiving (e.g., the costs of living up to the rules of a security regime are 
extremely high if other actors are not living up to the rules; even temporarily 
falling behind others can produce permanent harm). 
• Uncertainty. Detecting what others are doing and measuring one's own 
security are much more difficult than gaining such intelligence in other (e.g. 
economic or environmental) fields; this creates much higher degrees of 
uncertainty and distrust in security-related areas. 
Recent attacks inform an assessment of the cyberspace attack attribution regime 
based on security regime formation and maintenance criteria.139 First, the great powers 
must want to establish such a regime. To this end, the cases inform an assessment as to 
what extent great powers statements and actions demonstrate a preference for a more 
regulated environment; as compared to one in which all states behave individualistically. 
Also, to what extent they are reasonably satisfied with the status quo and whatever 
alterations can be gained without resort to the use or threat of unlimited war, as compared 
with the risks and costs of less restrained competition. 
Second, the cases inform an assessment as to the extent to which actors believe 
others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. To what extent do 
the powers perceive other powers as an aggressor? 
Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 176-178. 
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Third, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe security is 
best provided for by expansion. War and the individualistic pursuit of security must be 
seen as costly. For effective cooperation, war must not be desired; or at least unlimited 
war or the use of certain weapons without restrictions for more limited cooperation 
addressing just those areas. If hostility in cyberspace is not expected to spill into other 
areas, such as economics, an important incentive for cooperation will be absent. 
As recent attacks illustrate, uncoordinated behavior by governments leads to 
worse results than coordinated action, and the resulting cyberspace norms appear to be 
self-reinforcing, often in a negative fashion. Ultimately, it appears cyberspace security is 
an area where each government would prefer to cooperate except itself, resulting in the 
collective-action problem of relative gains in an issue fundamentally requiring 
coordinated global action. 
INFORMATION WARFARE AND RECENT ATTACKS 
There are numerous threats in cyberspace including technical, criminal, and non-
state-sponsored political activists using cyberspace as a tool. The scope of this research 
is focused on political strategies to help attribute attacks in support of deterrence, or 
identify mitigations for proceeding in the face of continued lack of attribution. Although 
information warfare is a concept as old as deception in war, the concept of network 
warfare dates back to at least 2001 when John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt coined the 
term.1 Capabilities for such malicious activity date back to early Internet protocols 
predating the World Wide Web and cyberspace as we know it today. One historical 
1
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incident of a high-school student hacking into the North American Air Defense 
(NORAD) computer network was significantly glamorized in the 1983 movie 
WarGames. Other notable incidents include a 1986 infiltration into the Lawrence 
Livermore Berkeley computers ultimately providing sensitive information related to 
munitions, weapons systems, and technical data to the KGB.141 
"By 1995 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported more 
that 250,000 "suspected attacks" on U.S. Defense Department computers, 
with approximately two-thirds resulting in computer network entry, 
although the Pentagon claims there were "only" 500 attempts that year."142 
By 1997, information warfare was viewed as a major security problem, and a May 1999 
FBI report detailed Chinese efforts to attack U.S. government information systems 
through the Internet. Before September 11, 2001, the highest annual figure for cyber 
attacks against the Pentagon was 250,000. Attacks proliferated on such a scale that on a 
single day in 2008, the Pentagon was hit by would-be intruders six million times in a 
single day.143 
The seminal event for Pentagon awareness and eventual response to the problem 
was a February 1998 widespread systemic penetration into the Pentagon's Solaris 
operating system. Two California youths conducted an apparently coordinated attack on 
the defense information infrastructure at the direction of an Israeli code-named 
"Analyzer." In May 2000 Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky warned the U.S. 
that "we will bring the entire West to its knees with our Russian computer specialists."144 
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A 1999 strategy for unrestricted war proposed by two Chinese colonels included the use 
of cyber terrorism, computer virus propagation, and disruptive penetration of strategic 
computer websites.145 The U.S. briefly considered the use of cyber attacks against 
Serbian targets in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, however, was quickly dissuaded from doing 
so. A 19-page General Counsel's paper cautioned against the use of such weapons within 
international law and the possibility of being considered and charged with war crimes. 
It is apparent information warfare is considered a legitimate form of warfare by 
numerous great powers, even if concerns of collateral damage may deter its use. This of 
course only applies to cases where attacks may be confidently attributed back to a state 
actor in a manner they can and will be held accountable. Therefore deterring its use as a 
form of plausibly deniable irregular warfare or espionage is even more problematic. 
Cyberspace attacks have become a matter of daily front page news. Operation 
Aurora, the December 2009 to January 2010 cyber attack on Google subsequently 
attributed to servers in China is an excellent case in point.146 Further vulnerabilities and 
attacks against the U.S. electrical power grid raise the stakes even further, invoking the 
specter of a cyber 9/11 or even World War III.147 Loss of confidence in financial 
transactions and other secure communications could set global society back to the pre-
information age. Although timing is difficult to predict, the growing frequency and 
scope of cyber attacks indicate the window of opportunity to address the problem before 
some form of cataclysmic event is closing. 
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The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identified 26 significant 
cyber attacks between May 2006 and June 2009.149 Recent attacks in cyberspace 
demonstrate a growing level of international cooperation to attribute and mitigate. The 
recent attacks detailed below illustrate specific aspects of this maturation. Attempts to 
mitigate and attribute the attacks, however, also demonstrate clear gaps in cooperation 
when compared to that observed in other domains. International responses to the attacks 
collectively highlight cooperation shortfalls emanating from, and contributing to the 
security dilemma in cyberspace. It is this lack of cooperation that ultimately creates the 
attribution vulnerability space. 
Estonia - The Preemptive Strike15 
Estonia has been a world leader in public and private sector information security 
efforts. While Estonia is one of the smallest NATO countries, it is also one of its most 
advanced in the use of Information Technology (IT). Estonians conduct nearly all of 
their banking over the Internet and have participated in the world's highest per capita 
online voting processes. The robust nature of Estonia's wired society means that the 
country is also IT-dependent, and therefore dependent on IT security. 
Prior to the country's official accession to NATO in 2003, Estonia proposed the 
creation of a cyber excellence center. The 2006 Riga summit listed possible cyber 
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attacks among the asymmetric threats to the common security and acknowledged the 
need for programs to protect information systems over the long term. ' 
Political events culminating in the relocation of a Soviet war memorial monument 
in Estonia precipitated an unattributed April 27 - May 18, 2007 cyber attack on Estonian 
political, services, personal and other random targets including on-line banking, media, 
and ISP's. The attack, come to be known as CyberWar I, included denial of service 
(DoS), distributed denial of service (DDoS, overloading servers due to the influx of 
traffic), webpage defacement, e-mail and comment spam, targeted exploitation hacks, and 
attempts to use Structured Query Language (SQL) injections152 to exploit security 
vulnerabilities in the database layer of applications. The cyber attacks went on for weeks, 
although the vast majority of the DoS attacks lasted less than an hour and only 5.5% over 
ten hours.153 
Defensive actions responding to the attack included international cooperation 
between the Estonian computer emergency response team (CERT-EE) and an 
international network of specialists. Responses also included political and media 
coverage, law enforcement actions and technical counter-measures.154 Estonia pushed to 
elevate the attack to the top of the EU-Russia summit agenda.155 
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Konstantin Goloskokov, a commissar with the pro-Kremlin Nashi youth group, 
claimed responsibility156 for the attack on May 2, 2007,157 calling it a "defensive act [to] 
teach the Estonian regime a lesson." Although Nashi activist Anna Bukovskaya 
acknowledged that the group was paid by Moscow to spy on other youth movements,15 
the involvement of the Russian government in the affair could not be confirmed. The 
failure or unwillingness of the Russian authorities to stop the cyber riot against Estonia 
for over three weeks after the initial attack, however, continued to raise speculation.159 
The use of Nashi as a cyberwarfare arm illustrates the problem of attribution. 
While the nominally independent group does the Kremlin's bidding, Nashi's funding 
comes from pro-business owners looking to ingratiate themselves with the regime. Even 
if they claim credit for the attacks, they are still one level removed from the Russian 
government, however implausible that seems.160 
For nominal costs to volunteers and their computers, minimal coordination 
requirements primarily across web forums frequented by Russian hackers, and low risk of 
attribution and punishment (one hacker living in Estonia was identified and fined about 
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1,620 USD),161 the attackers probably inflicted costs on the order of tens of millions of 
dollars in financial losses. 
The cyber attacks against Estonia in April 2007 showed that cyber defense issues 
are critical to address, and that an entire nation can, in fact, become the target of a cyber 
attack.163 It also demonstrated that a skillful response, including public and private sector 
partnership at the international level, could substantially mitigate the effect of such cyber 
attacks. These conclusions led to yet one other response important to note regarding 
international cooperation. The attacks highlighted for the first time the potential 
vulnerability of NATO countries, their institutions and societies, and even NATO itself to 
disruption or penetration of their information and communications systems.1 4 
Estonia's proposals for a NATO cyber excellence center received strong support 
from the alliance's Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. NATO completed an 
assessment of the situation, partly in light of Estonia's experience in October 2007, and 
approved a NATO policy on cyber defense in January 2008. NATO's summit 
communique in Bucharest in April announced NATO's readiness to "provide a capability 
to assist allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack."165 The Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) was established with seven NATO 
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nations and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Tallinn, Estonia on May 14, 
2008. 
To further reinforce the lack of attribution surrounding the attack, in March 2009, 
Sergei Markov, a State Duma Deputy from the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, 
surprisingly stated: "About the cyberattack on Estonia.. .don't worry, that attack was 
carried out by my assistant. I won't tell you his name, because then he might not be able 
to get visas."166 Markov, a political analyst and Putin supporter, went on to explain that 
this assistant happened to be in "one of the unrecognized republics" during the dispute 
with Estonia and had decided on his own that "something bad had to be done to these 
fascists,"167 so he went ahead and launched a cyberwar. "[It] turns out it was purely a 
reaction from civil society," Markov reportedly said, adding ominously, "and, 
incidentally, such things will happen more and more."168 
A July, 2008 Nashi Innovation Forum suffered a 50% drop in attendance from the 
year before, possibly coming off a high surrounding the Estonian cyberwar the previous 
year, or perhaps they were simply busy. On July 20, 2008, the day before this Nashi 
event, anonymous Russian hackers coincidently launched a DDoS attack that took the 
President of Georgia's website offline. Nineteen days later, a Russian sea, air, and land 
assault was launched against Georgia while nationalistic Russian hackers engaged their 
Georgian counterparts in cyber warfare.169 
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Georgia - Improved Coordination 
The cyber attack on Georgia occurred within the broader conflict between Russia, 
Georgia and South Ossetia, an autonomous and de jure demilitarized Georgian region on 
the border of Georgia and Russia, and recognized as part of Georgia by the international 
community. On July 19-20, 2008, the website of the President of Georgia came under a 
DDoS attack. The main attack came a few weeks later. A CCDCOE report included 
technical details of the attack and effected websites, government, news and media, and 
financial institutions. 
"On August 7, 2008, following separatist provocations, Georgian forces 
launched a surprise attack against separatist forces, ignoring the Russian-
mediated ceasefire between the two sides. Russia responded by military 
attack and intense international propaganda. Simultaneously, cyber 
attacks were launched against Georgia's websites - On August 8, 2008, a 
large number of Georgian websites, both government and non-
government, came under attack."170 
Ossetian, Abkhazian, and Russian websites were also affected. The attacks used 
methods similar to those used in Estonia the year prior, defacement of public websites 
and launch of DDoS attacks against numerous targets. According to the analysis of the 
Swedish National Defence University, stopgeorgia.ru provided DDoS attack tools for 
download and showed a number of Georgian .ge websites as a priority for attack. There 
seems widespread consensus the attacks appeared coordinated. 
Attacks expanded to Turkey and the Ukraine, where servers routing traffic to 
Georgia were commandeered by the Russia Business Network (RBN), a multi-faceted 
cybercrime organization. Physically based in St. Petersburg, Russia, RBN specializes in, 
and in some cases monopolizes, personal identity theft for resale. It is the originator of 
170
 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Runnimeri, Mari Kert, Ann-Maria Taliharm, and Liis Vihul, Cyber 
Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCDCOE, August, 2008), 3. 
87 
the now commercially available MPack malware and an alleged operator of the Storm 
botnet, or controlled network of zombie computers. The RBN originated as an Internet 
service provider for child pornography, phishing, spam, and malware distribution, and is 
notorious for hosting illegal and dubious businesses.171 
The attacks left the United Telecom of Georgia router incapable of providing 
service for several days. The main commercial Internet service provider Caucasus 
Network Tbilisi was flooded with traffic, possibly also affecting smaller Internet 
providers as traffic was rerouted. This problem was escalated by physical disconnections 
in the war activity zone. As a consequence of the attacks, the National Bank of Georgia 
ordered all banks to stop offering electronic services for ten days, August 9-18. 
Georgia received timely international cooperation to respond to the attacks. 
CERT Georgia, organized as an academic CERT, started to function like a national 
CERT and coordinated attack mitigation. CERT Poland (CERT-PL) analyzed IP data 
and sent out abuse messages. CERT France (CERT-FR) collected the log files. Estonian 
authorities pledged to provide Georgia assistance in handling the cyber incidents. 
Several sites under attack had to be temporarily moved to servers outside of 
Georgia. The Office of the President of Poland provided their website 
(www.president.pl) for dissemination of information and helped to get Internet access for 
Georgia's government after the breakdown of local servers caused by cyber attacks. The 
interpress.ge news portal moved to Servage (www.servage.net), a worldwide hosting 
platform provider. The websites of the Ministry of Defence and the president to Tulip 
Systems, Inc. were relocated to Atlanta, Georgia. The websites of Georgia's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and news portal civil.ge were hosted on Estonian servers. "According to 
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the information exchanged in a meeting in Estonian [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] MFA, 
the initiative of the Estonian MFA to host the Georgian MFA website could not have 
happened without Estonia learning lessons from 2007. Later, the Georgian MOD site 
1 T) 
was also moved to Estonia." Finally, websites hosted on Russian domains with 
addresses ending in .ru, and some pro-Russian sites in other zones were reportedly briefly 
blocked from Georgia. 
As a result of questions arising from its support to the Georgian government, 
NATO's CCDCOE conducted a thorough legal review of the cyber attacks on Georgia.173 
Facts were gathered from CERT-EE and distinguished IT security websites, verified with 
the Georgian Embassy in Estonia, and compared with international media. Except where 
otherwise annotated, the relevant facts and activities of this attack are summarized from 
the CCDCOE report. 
Regarding origin and attribution of the attacks, the CCDCOE report concluded: 
"[the] major DDoS attacks observed were all globally sourced, suggesting a botnet (or 
multiple botnets) behind them."174 As in the Estonian case, there was no actual proof of 
who was behind the DDoS attacks. The C2 servers used in the attacks possessed 
seemingly bogus registration information but did tie back to Russia. There was some 
indication of RBN involvement, however, perhaps no more than providing hosting 
services to the botnet C2 and did not commit the DDoS attacks itself. "There seems to be 
a rather widespread consensus that the attacks appeared coordinated; however from all 
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the evidence available, the participation of the Russian government cannot be 
concluded."175 
On August 22, 2008, a U.S. open source intelligence (OSINT) initiative named 
Project Grey Goose was launched to examine how the Russian cyber war was conducted 
against Georgian websites and if the Russian government was involved or if it was 
entirely a grass roots movement by patriotic Russian hackers. In October 2008, the 
project assessed that: 
• The Russian government would likely continue its practice of distancing itself 
from the Russian nationalistic hacker community thus gaining deniability 
while passively supporting and enjoying the strategic benefits of their actions. 
• Nationalistic Russian hackers are likely adaptive adversaries engaged in 
aggressively finding more efficient ways to disable networks. 
• A journeyman-apprentice relationship will continue to be the training model 
used by nationalistic Russian hackers. 
• Hacker forums engaged in training Russian cyber warriors will continue to 
evolve their feedback loop which effectively becomes their Cyber Kill 
Chain.176 
Kyrgyzstan - The Unnoticed Cyber Attack 
Less than five months later in December 2008, opposition groups forming a new 
coalition in the United Peoples Movement (UPM) were seeking a new political system 
for Kyrgyzstan and the removal of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev from office. The UPM 
was planning a series of protests for February and March against political corruption, 
increasing human rights abuse, and the deterioration of living standards. The coalition 
had been coming under increasing pressure from authorities, with the state general 
Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Riinnimeri, Mari Keit, Ann-Maria Taliharm, and Liis Vihul, Cyber 
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prosecutor launching criminal investigations involving a number of the opposition leaders 
in weeks leading up to the attack, a move analysts labeled as politically motivated.177 
Opposition party parliament deputies had not been allowed to use the parliament's press 
center to brief journalists, and the ensuing attack was perceived as an extension of the 
same repression of dissent.178 
On January 18, 2009, a massive DDoS attack against Kyrgyzstan ISPs www.ns.kg 
and www.domain.kg essentially shut them down. As there are only four ISP providers 
for the entire country, this attack was clearly sending a message. Since the attacking 
Internet protocol (IP) addresses were Russian, and since the Russian government 
supported the standing Kyrgyzstan President, the attacks were seemingly intended to send 
a message to the UPM. Pressure from Russia towards Kyrgyz President Bakiyevk to 
close U.S. access to the key Manas airbase also intensified on the same day as the DDoS 
attacks. 
Without network sensors similar to those used in more developed nations, and 
without clear security ties such as NATO for assistance, unfortunately little else has been 
done or written regarding the attacks. With the ruling party still in power and aligned 
with their supposed attacker, the Kyrgyzstan attack provides little more than a stark 
example that technologies and global cooperation are absolutely instrumental to 
defending, mitigating, attributing and ultimately responding to cyber attacks. 
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July 4, 2009 Attack 
On July 4, 2009, a distributed denial of service attack coming out of South Korea 
coincided with a round of North Korean missile launches and a corresponding UN 
decision to impose new sanctions. The attacks appeared to have originated out of 
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Pyongyang, and were reminiscent of an earlier 2007 attack. The DDoS attacks were 
a series of coordinated cyber attacks against major government, news media, and 
financial websites in South Korea and the United States, involving the activation of a 
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botnet that maliciously accessed targeted websites. Most of the hijacked computers 
were located in South Korea.184 The estimated number of the hijacked computers varies 
widely; around 20,000 according to the South Korean National Intelligence Service, 
around 50,000 according to Symantec's Security Technology Response group,185 and 
more than 166,000 according to a Vietnamese computer security researcher who analyzed 
the log files of the two servers the attackers controlled.186 Although the timing and 
targeting of the attacks suggest they may have originated from North Korea, it has not 
been substantiated. 
The first wave of attacks occurred on July 4, 2009 (Independence Day holiday in 
the United States), targeting both the United States and South Korea. Among the 
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websites affected were those of the White House and the Pentagon.187 An investigation 
revealed that 27 websites were targets in the attack based on files stored on compromised 
systems.' 
The second wave of attacks occurred on July 7, 2009, affecting South Korea. 
Among the websites targeted were the presidential Blue House, the Ministry of Defense, 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the National Intelligence Service and 
the National Assembly.189 A third wave of attacks began on July 9, 2009, targeting 
several websites in South Korea, including the country's National Intelligence Service as 
well as one of its largest banks and a major news agency.190 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to U.S. federal 
departments and agencies to take steps to mitigate attacks. Despite the fact that the 
attacks targeted major public and private sector websites, the South Korean Presidential 
office suggested the attacks were meant to cause disruption, rather than steal data. The 
attack is estimated to have produced only 23 megabits of data per second, not enough to 
cause major disruptions.191 
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It is not known who is behind the attacks, although data generated by the 
attacking program appeared to be based on a Korean-language browser. According to the 
South Korean National Intelligence Service, the source of the attacks was tracked down 
and the government activated an emergency cyber-terror response team. The team 
blocked access to five host sites containing the malicious code and 86 websites that 
downloaded the code, located in 16 countries, including the United States, Guatemala, 
Japan and the People's Republic of China, but North Korea was not among them. It 
was later determined the malicious code responsible for causing the attack, W32.Dozer, 
re-used code from the Mydoom worm193 and was programmed to destroy data on infected 
computers and to prevent the computers from being rebooted.194 South Korean police 
stated there was various evidence of North Korean involvement, but said they may not 
find the culprit.195 
The investigation itself is suspect, however, providing an excellent illustration of 
the complexity of attribution, and the current state of international cooperation in 
attaining it. The Korean CERT (KrCERT) copied the Hanoi Institute of Technology's 
Bach Khoa Internetwork Security Centre (BKIS) in an email to the Vietnamese CERT 
(VNCERT), requesting suppression of some IP addresses in Vietnam. Having been 
infected with the virus, the addresses had joined the DoS attack on websites in South 
Korea and the U.S. A July 10, 2009 email from KrCERT urgently requested members of 
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the Asia-Pacific CERT (APCERT) to help discover the source of the DDoS attack. 
KrCERT conducted its own independent research activities, providing the denial of 
service malware codes to BKIS only after they requested it. 
BKIS analysts tracked the command and control (C2) servers to the UK. At the 
time BKIS made the analysis, hacking servers were sending malware to the group of 
robot servers, or botnet they controlled. BKIS surveyed the eight slave servers that 
participated in the attack and discovered two servers provided resource-sharing web 
services. BKIS gained control of both of the servers, subsequently finding a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) tunnel from the UK to a master server in Miami: 
"In order to locate the source of the attacks, we have fought against [C2] 
servers and have gained control of 2 in 8 of them. After analyzing the logs 
of these 2 servers, we discovered the IP address of the master 
server.. .located in UK. The master server is running on Windows 2003 
Server Operating System.. .After being requested by the Korean Computer 
Emergency Response Team (KrCERT), we used a method to trace back 
the source code of the virus and detected eight [C2] servers.. .We attacked 
them back and after we identified eight slave servers, we seized control of 
two of them. Through the counterattack, our experts collected useful 
information for analyzing and defining the master server that controlled 
the attacks on the websites of the South Korean and American 
governments. This master service has an IP address in the UK."196 
BKIS announced on a July 12 blog that it had identified two servers located in the 
UK as the source of the attack, which was then reported by newspapers around the world. 
"Korean agency accuses BKIS of violating local and int'l law," Bach Khoa Internetwork Security Centre 
(BKIS), http://english.vietnamnet.vn/reports/2009/07/859068/ (accessed January 6, 2010). 
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Remarkably, Korean CERT (KrCERT) later accused BKIS of acting without its 
permission in uncovering the location of the servers:197 
"On July 16, the Vietnam Computer Emergency Response Team 
(VNCERT) informed the Hanoi University of Technology that it had 
received an 'offical complaint' from its Korean counterpart, KrCERT. 
Reportedly, [KrCERT].. .had never requested BKIS to help investigate the 
attack...The KrCERT complaint alleged that the BKIS announcement of 
attacking and controlling two servers in the UK for analysis is a "serious 
violation of Vietnamese and international laws," compounded by the 
BKIS announcement, which caused the public to misunderstand that 
KrCERT and APCERT participated in this "illegal activity." VNCERT 
forwarded the KrCERT complaint to the Hanoi University of Technology, 
asking it to remind BKIS to report to VNCERT when it participates in 
international computer emergency response activities and to maintain 
secrecy. It should only provide information to related agencies based on 
rules agreed by the world network of computer emergency response 
agencies. [BKIS] said [KrCERT] did not know how BKIS succeeded in 
gaining control two servers in the UK, so [the] statement that the BKIS 
attacks "violated Vietnamese and international rules" is not accurate. He 
said BKIS "will work with KrCERT about this." "This is a perfectly 
ordinary diagnostic service, which anyone can use.. .Through it, BKIS 
acquired information that enabled us to analyze and locate a ninth, master 
server, that was the commander-in-chief of all the attacks on websites of 
the South Korean and American governments. This process obeyed 
Vietnamese and international rules." [BKIS] stated that seizing control of 
two servers used by hackers to launch DDoS attacks "doesn't require 
anyone's permission and anybody can do it" [and] defended [the] decision 
to 'go public' by quoting Article 43 of the Vietnamese government's 
Decree 64/2007: "In urgent cases which can cause serious incidents or 
network terrorism, competent agencies have the right to prevent attacks 
and report to the coordinating agency later" to explain for BKIS' not 
reporting to VNCERT. "The South Korean and American government 
websites were attacked and paralyzed for nearly ten days but the source of 
attack was not detected. This was an urgent case, which could threaten the 
world, including Vietnam.. .BKIS was allowed to hunt the source of 
attacks and report to the coordinating agency. We are investigating the 
case so we haven't time to report yet. We will perform this task after this 
job is accomplished."198 
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The KrCERT accusation regarding the BKIS exercise of self-help is reminiscent 
of the Corfu Channel Case regarding naval mining discussed in the previous chapter. 
Recall the ICJ found that, irrespectively of who laid the mines, the Albanians ought to 
have observed any such action, since the minefield was so close to their coast, and thus 
they failed to inform the British of the danger. The corollary to the KrCERT-BKIS case 
would include state culpability for illegal activity under their sovereign jurisdiction, as 
well as state responsibility to take reasonable action to confront or mitigate such activity. 
Finally, precedent for international jurisdiction over security issues where attribution is in 
question has been established. 
Summary 
Every case demonstrated coordinated attacks, but no evidence of coordination 
between national governments. None of the attacks were perceived to have constituted 
an attack under international law. While ever-increasing coordinated behavior by 
governments certainly contributed to mitigating attacks in the case of Estonia, Georgia 
and the July 4, 2009 attacks, none were successful in attaining confident attribution in 
time and through a mechanism effectively enabling a meaningful response. 
The Kyrgyzstan attack serves to show the importance of global coordination, 
capacity building, and that a lack of cooperation does in fact lead to worse results. The 
other cases all show that beyond the obvious incentives for victim states to cooperate, 
other states and organizations also appeared very willing to cooperate. With no surprise, 
supposed attacker states, however, were not, and no clear incentives for them to do so 
were evident. While some pressure was applied on Russia at the EU summit, any 
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corresponding pressure in the case of Georgia was trivialized by the world response to 
their military operations in general. No clear pressure against the DPRK in the case of 
the July 4, 2009 attacks was apparent. 
While individual states may desire a more regulated environment and proposals 
for international agreements evidence collective desires, there remains no significant 
effort between the major powers or seemingly most egregious violators to cooperate in 
any meaningful way. No incentives for states significant enough to justify exposing 
themselves to supposed or potential adversaries were readily apparent. In this situation 
conflict and the individualistic pursuit of security in cyberspace are not currently seen as 
costly, with apparently little to no risk of major war or spilling into or being linked with 
other areas, such as economics. Without meaningful incentives for cooperation, nations 
proliferating or protecting cyberspace attackers seem more satisfied with the status quo 
than with negotiating away any potential leverage they currently enjoy, or expect to enjoy 
in the future. These states seem to be enjoying the fruits of their expansion in 
cyberspace, and believe it provides the best prospects for their security. 
Any plausible path to meaningful defense in cyberspace must include a significant 
element of international cooperation and regime formation. This assessment forms the 
basis for addressing the effectiveness and direction of international cooperation in regards 
to the attribution issue. The next chapter will describe the Internet and nascent 
cyberspace attack attribution regimes, relevant organizations, and identified agendas to 
confront this collective-action problem. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CYBERSPACE 
REGIME ORIGINATION 
The Internet grew out of a U.S. Department of Defense program based on the 
fundamental principles of decentralized authority and inclusive technical standards, 
providing the scalability necessary for universal connectivity and ease of expansion. The 
U.S. continues to hold authority over the majority of the servers and many networks 
comprising the physical backbone of the Internet, and a correspondingly dominant role in 
Internet governance decision-making. With the arrival of the World Wide Web in the 
1990s, however, cyberspace as we know it today burst into the open, public sphere. 
The creation and evolution of international management and technical governance 
arrangements that have enabled the interconnection of geographically dispersed computer 
networks over much of the globe within complex commercial and legal frameworks 
advanced relatively smoothly. As the borderless activity of this new information domain 
confronted traditional political, market, legal and military boundaries, however, all have 
been challenged as never before. 
Day to day operations in cyberspace transformed from a free and open 
technological breakthrough to an increasingly controlled public institution. Thousands of 
corporate and government-run ISPs established rules for users of their services within the 
boundaries of network agreements providing global access. Many ISPs joined to create 
regional associations forming a basis for international cooperation. 
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Responsibility for the Internet's technical infrastructure gradually moved from the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) Internet Architecture Board (IAB) to the totally private international 
organization, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 
1999.199 The U.S. Commerce Department white papers leading to ICANN's mandate 
typified three principles for Internet governance: openness, representation, and due 
process. To the extent security and attribution of attacks might have been considered 
under this mandate, it appears the Commerce Department and ICANN envisioned a 
claims process conforming to due process and other democratic norms,200 similar to the 
WTO DSU claims and appellate process.201 
Other relevant international organizations include the: 
• World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Internet Trademark 
Association concerned with intellectual property matters; 
• Internet Society (ISOC) and subordinate Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) and IAB concerned with technological growth of the Internet; 
• ITU and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) for international 
standards, coordination and settlements; and 
• WTO regarding matters of global e-commerce. 
The roles of the ITU and WTO have already been addressed for the roles they have 
played in the formation of principles and norms in other domains. 
This list is illustrative and not exhaustive as other organizations and forums have 
certainly played extensive roles, particularly with respect to engineering advancements. 
These include a number of vendor-driven forums and consortiums instrumental in setting 
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early standards. Similarly, Switzerland's Centre Europeen pour la Recherche Nucleaire 
(CERN) Laboratories contributed significant work to develop major building blocks of 
the World Wide Web including Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Hypertext Markup 
Language (HTML), and Universal Resource Locator (URL). In coordination with 
CERN, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed new protocols including 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) and Hardware Markup Language (HML).202 
In the aftermath of the 1998 Morris worm incident, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency charged the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon 
University, to establish a capability to coordinate communications among experts during 
computer security incidents and prevent future incidents. The result was the Computer 
Emergency Response Team, CERT (later renamed CERT® Coordination Center, 
CERT/CC), whose mission is: "[To] work with the Internet community in detecting and 
resolving computer security incidents as well as taking steps to prevent future 
incidents."203 
CERT/CC has built a solid reputation for objectivity and discretion based on the 
center's proven ability to keep identities and sensitive information confidential. The 
level of trust is evident in its receipt of over 235,000 e-mail messages, 16,200 hotline 
calls, 17,800 computer security incidents, and more than 1,100 vulnerability reports in the 
first decade of its existence.204 CERT/CC grew from handling six security incidents in 
1998 to 52,658 in 2001, and had handled over 73,000 for 2002 by the end of September 
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alone. J CERT/CC is an excellent example of the importance of trust and ability to 
protect confidential information to effectively coordinate responses to cyberspace attacks. 
The Y2K Challenge 
The first global test of responding to a failure in cyberspace was focused on an 
internal engineering threat rather than an attack per se. The public-private and 
international cooperation experienced in its mitigation was the most significant to date, 
laying the groundwork for current cooperation in the area of attack attribution. The year 
2000 date conversion (Y2K) was a result of how dates were entered into computers, 
resulting in a variety of computer malfunctions. States identified national Y2K 
coordinators and at the First Global Meeting of National Y2K Coordinators at the United 
Nations in December 1998, coordinators from over 120 countries advocated for the 
creation of an International Y2K Cooperation Center (IY2KCC). The IY2KCC was 
established in February 1999 under the auspices of the UN with funding from the World 
Bank to "promote increased strategic cooperation and action among governments, 
peoples, and the private sector to minimize adverse Y2K effects on the global society and 
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Activities of IY2KCC were conducted in six areas before closing down in March, 
2000: 
• National Readiness to promote Y2K programs worldwide; 
• Regional Cooperation to promote and support coordination within defined 
geographic areas; 
• Sector Cooperation to promote and support coordination within and across 
defined economic sectors; 
• Continuity and Response Cooperation to promote and support coordination to 
ensure essential services and provisions for emergency response; 
• Information Cooperation to promote and support international information 
sharing; and 
• Publicity, and Facilitation and Assistance responsible for organizing global 
meetings of Y2K coordinators and to identify resources.207 
A U.S. Senate special committee identified ascertaining the status of international 
preparation their greatest challenge in the months leading up to the Y2K conversion and 
the IY2KCC created a useful mechanism for governments from member countries to 
share information and lessons learned.208 The committee's final report noted some type 
of similar international coordination mechanism could be useful in addressing future IT 
issues. 
Y2K preparations also formalized domestic cyber incident monitoring and 
response procedures. Within the U.S., CERTs and international Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams (FIRST) provided the national information coordination 
center (ICC) reports on incidents in their respective areas. The Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation (FBI), National Security Council (NSC), DOD Decision Support Activity 
and other agencies similarly reported to the ICC. 
More generally, the massive effort to address the Y2K problem forged new 
relationships and partnerships among industry and government sectors, particularly in the 
areas of critical infrastructure. The U.S. alone estimated to have spent $100 billion on the 
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problem. Again, the Senate found it important that domestic and international industry 
and government partnerships nurtured during Y2K preparations were maintained and 
continued to grow. The final committee report starkly identified examples of Y2K 
glitches around the globe representational of the potential impact of a concerted attack in 
cyberspace.212 
The Decentralized Nature of Cyberspace 
This description of cyberspace origination so far is informative from a traditional 
organizational, rational utility point of view; however, it would be deeply flawed and 
skewed to discuss the story from only this perspective. For while governments and 
institutions spawned the Internet and have worked to subsequently control and manage it, 
decentralized forces have revolutionized not only the world of cyberspace, but through it 
the world we live in. "The absence of structure, leadership, and formal organization, 
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once considered a weakness, has become a major asset. Seemingly chaotic groups have 
challenged and defeated established institutions. The rules of the game have changed."213 
From the Internet's inception in the mid-1990s with the first popular web 
browser, grass-roots movements with no strategic plan collectively advanced in a newly 
decentralized fashion. With no one in charge, individuals throughout the net contributed 
as they were able creating not only the industry standard, but a new standard of industry. 
These standards outpaced development efforts by large actors such as Microsoft and 
Netscape, circumventing a major clash, an important note for addressing collective-action 
relative gains problems in cyberspace. 
Decentralization powered by the Internet soon expanded beyond technical web 
development, shifting underlying power structures within numerous industries. This shift 
is evidenced in areas as diverse as: 
• Information sharing (e.g. Wikipedia); 
• Telecommunications (e.g. Skype and other voice over Internet protocol 
(VOIP) companies); 
• Music (e.g. Napster and Apple's iTunes); 
• Marketing (e.g. eBay, CraigsList, and Amazon); 
• Environmental activism (e.g. ALF); and even 
• Conflict (e.g. al Qaeda).214 
Wikipedia demonstrates one of the key aspects of cyberspace development lost in 
a purely organizational-perspective discussion: "There's no schedule, there's no direction 
for these people at all. Nobody's the boss of anybody. People just pick up projects and 
work on them. They remotely log into servers to work on them when they need 
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maintenance. They reconfigure the networks when they need reconfiguring. It's all done 
completely willy-nilly, I mean with no organization at all. And yes, it works."215 
Another aspect of Wikipedia is important to note for this topic. Not only are the 
quality of articles outstanding, but users police the sites from malicious or erroneous 
entries with incredible diligence, speed, and accuracy. "[An] investigation led by Nature 
magazine found that Wikipedia and the Encyclopedia Britannica are almost equally 
accurate. Like concerned and thoughtful neighbors, members of the Wikipedia 
community care enough to contribute regularly and are mindful to keep the content 
accurate." Some users even volunteer as Wikipedia cops. Additionally, Wikipedia can 
lock down certain pages exceptionally prone to vandalism perhaps due to its controversial 
nature until a compromise is reached among users, or the controversy subsides.217 
This highlights an important conclusion for the current study: "Open systems can't 
rely on a police force.. .there's freedom to do what you want, but [you] become 
responsible for your own welfare and that of those around you."218 While this may have 
disturbing consequences for states and organizations responsible for providing stability 
and security, we should not lose sight of the fact that differences across domains require a 
similar variance in potential solutions. Models that would clearly be unacceptable in 
more centralized domains exhibiting high transaction costs of entry, such as nuclear or 
major war, might be those that should in fact be embraced, at least to some extent, in 
more decentralized domains. Domains with low costs of entry are strongly represented 
Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The starfish and the spider: the unstoppable power ofleaderless 
organizations (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 112. 
Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The starfish and the spider: the unstoppable power ofleaderless 
organizations (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 74. 
Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The starfish and the spider: the unstoppable power ofleaderless 
organizations (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 16-11. 
Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The starfish and the spider: the unstoppable power ofleaderless 
organizations (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 80. 
106 
by society, and policing mechanisms reflect similarly decentralized approaches ranging 
from civil air patrols, merchant marines, paramilitary forces, and even neighborhood 
watches. This may also mean what is acceptable for some open democracies may be the 
most feared by more authoritarian regimes. 
Another relevant point to make is that when attacked, a decentralized organization 
tends to become even more open and decentralized. When established institutions took 
early P2P music sharing entities such as Napster to court, they only exacerbated the 
problem. As it turned out, waging this battle was the worst strategic move the music 
labels could have made. Each successive court case simply contributed to the 
proliferation of P2P services, as well as their level of decentralization making each 
successive case more difficult than the previous one. Further, those convicted often 
became heroes of the movement. Removing the catalyst only shifts the power in circles, 
further decentralizing the organizations and making them stronger.219 
The Internet has drastically lowered the barrier to entry to numerous domains in 
this way, irrevocably shifting power to the people. In the above example, not only did 
the P2P industry become more decentralized, revenues among the four leading record 
labels dropped 25% between 2000 and 2001. This revenue did not shift to the P2P 
players; it simply disappeared from the industry. From a government perspective, such 
a loss may or may not equate to lost revenues (e.g. taxes), but almost certainly to a 
corresponding loss of control over the domain. 
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In decentralized societies, the power resides with the individual, resulting in 
flexibility, shared power and ambiguity. Everyone becomes a leader, spawning 
accountability and self-policing among peers, and so it is with the Internet. It is not like a 
spider with a centralized nervous system, but rather like the neural net of a starfish. If 
you cut off a leg, or even all five legs, a new starfish will grow from each. "[It's] easy to 
mistake starfish for spiders."221 
It is important to acknowledge decentralized organizations do not necessarily 
make better decisions; however, those decisions are better informed and the organizations 
are able to adapt more quickly to external and internal stimuli. In this way, it can grow 
very rapidly. "Since the industrial revolution, people had communicated by mail, 
telegraph, or telephone, but the Internet changed everything in less than a decade." 22 
In decentralized organizations, the people who use the site are also responsible for 
it. Craigslist is an example of such a site, promoting and relying almost entirely upon a 
culture of trust and community. No one tells anyone else what they can or cannot do. If 
something is offensive, users themselves can take it down. "It's a fully user-controlled 
democratic system."223 In an open system, what matters most is leadership trusting 
members enough to leave them alone. People remain happy as long as they're given 
freedom to do what they want to do. Again, sites such as Craigslist have had a similarly 
devastating impact on newspaper revenues. Major newspapers responded in the same 
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fashion as the music industry becoming more centralized and suffering similarly negative 
224 
strategic consequences. 
The simple mechanism of feedback, for example through eBays user ratings, was 
a simple, but crucial innovation to developing trust and confidence on the part of users. 
"In empowering the community, eBay shifted the burden of policing from 
the company to its users—knowledge and power became distributed 
throughout the network... [Sellers] gained a huge incentive to stay honest 
and trustworthy.. .Items sold by users with an established record of 
positive feedback fetched an 8.1 percent premium over identical items 
sold by nonestablished sellers."225 
Although eBay hosts P2P interactions and relies on a decentralized user rating 
system, it retains important centralized organizational aspects. EBay also relies on a 
subsidiary PayPal based on rigid controls and secure interaction to allow users to transfer 
funds to one another via a trusted intermediary. As it turns out, when it comes to money, 
people want structure, safety and accountability.226 
EBay is a hybrid organization. A hybrid organization operates in both the public 
and private sectors, simultaneously fulfilling public duties and developing commercial 
market activities. It deliberately mixes organizational forms in an attempt to blend the 
advantages of two or more different types or because the organization changing. Hybrid 
organizations include both decentralized aspects more attuned to the decentralized nature 
of cyberspace, as well as traditional centralized features that allow for the provision of 
security, authority, and accountability. 
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Ultimately, Apple cashed in on the power shift in the music industry brought 
about by P2P services through its iTunes software, allowing consumers to buy and share 
(e.g. podcast) individual songs as opposed to entire albums. This also combined the 
features of a decentralized marketplace with accountable and revenue-producing 
structures of a centralized company in a safe and legal environment, providing premium 
services with security. This type of hybrid organization is one possible adaptation 
approach for addressing cyberspace attacks and attribution. 
There are two recognized approaches to forming hybrid organizations, centralized 
organizations that decentralize the customer experience and those that decentralize 
internal parts of themselves. In the case of the former, organizations introduce 
decentralized elements by giving their users a role. For example, eBay introduced user 
ratings. Amazon incorporated a similar feature allowing users to review books. Some 
have gone even farther inviting users to actually make the products themselves. Google 
relies upon user input. The more it is used, the more feedback is provided and the more 
accurate its popularity-based search engine becomes, making it more useful for the 
customer. As the 2005 Intuit-launched TaxAlmanac.org (a Wikipedia equivalent for tax 
issues) site explains: "One of the things we've learned is that the community wants to 
interact with one another."227 
The second type of hybrid organization need not radically change its structure. 
Although it may mean separating units into distinct organizations, it may be as simple is 
incorporating a form of appreciative inquiry to spread information, and therefore 
ownership around the organization. 
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What does this portend for efforts toward attack attribution? In order to continue 
to provide premium services with security, states would do well to not only recognize the 
loss of control over the domain, but to embrace it through hybrid organizations. States 
should focus controls toward specific areas where it is desired by users, such as monetary 
transactions and official information content, allowing and empowering Internet users 
themselves to help police the rest. Passing this information exchange and ownership to 
the broader Internet community as opposed to individual states may in fact be 
instrumental in circumventing clashes between major actors and addressing the problem 
of relative gains. 
Such a state-sponsored hybrid approach might be accomplished through 
continued decentralization and improvement to the user experience, promoting feedback, 
ownership, and direct interaction among Internet users themselves. At the very least, 
such a cyber-civil air patrol approach will spread information and ownership around the 
Internet, allowing them to adapt more quickly to stimuli, such as an attack. 
Cyberspace as a Security Regime 
International cooperation in the security arena, however, is more problematic due 
to the security dilemma resulting from a real or perceived relative gain in security for one 
actor leading to the real or perceived decrease in security of others.228 Marcus Franda 
conducted the first, and perhaps most significant research for this current study. He 
specifically inquired how such activity might inform current theories of international 
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relations through the concept of international regimes,229 as espoused by Robert 
Keohane,230 Stephen Krasner231 and others. 
One representational area squarely in the crosshairs of this debate was control of 
country code top level domains (ccTLD, such .uk, .il, .pt, etc.) identified through ITU 
country codes. This sovereign vs. common space issue was exacerbated in an October 
1998 letter to the Commerce Department stating it would "respect each nation's sovereign 
control over its individual top-level domains." The debate ultimately favored a counter 
position that: "It was never intended that just because it had a two-letter country code that 
the computers were in that country, much less under some sort of sovereign 
ownership.. .In fact, the sovereign ownership concept doesn't make sense because this is a 
shared computer network." This concept of cyberspace as international commons is 
instrumental to its nature as a domain as established in others, notably the sea and space 
domains. The negotiation process between ICANN and individual government or private 
ccTLD managers continues to this day as continually documented through the exchange 
of letters and agreements.233 
The test of whether agreed upon technical principles and norms can survive as a 
bona fide international regime will depend upon global leaders' ability to adapt to rapid 
change while managing divergent cultural, political, social, and economic behavior and 
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practices with divergent expectations of the Internet.234 In the absence of a formal ITU-
like intergovernmental institution, ICANN may be "the most acceptable organization for 
carrying out negotiations for the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of a new 
governance regime for the Internet simply because it already exists."235 
The decentralized nature of the Internet yields specific consequences and 
evidence for recommendations in addressing relative gains in cyberspace. Are ICANN 
and other relevant intergovernmental institutions passing information exchange and 
ownership to the broader Internet community as opposed to states to address the problem 
of relative gains and circumvent clashes between major actors? Are they promoting 
premium services with security, recognizing and addressing the loss of control over the 
domain through hybrid organizations? Are controls focused toward specific areas where 
desired by Internet users, such as monetary transactions and official information content, 
allowing and empowering users themselves to help police the rest? If so, are hybrid 
organizations decentralizing to continually improve the user experience, promoting 
feedback, ownership, and direct interaction among users themselves? Are they spreading 
information and ownership around the Internet, allowing users to adapt more quickly to 
stimuli, such as an attack? The rest of the chapter explores these questions. 
REGIME MATURATION 
For some of the reasons related to decentralization and relative gains discussed 
above, the cooperation exhibited in addressing the Y2K problem did not directly translate 
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into addressing the threat or attribution of cyberspace attacks. In 2002, Dr. Howard 
Lipson of the CERT®/CC in a special report for the U.S. Department of State noted: 
"[The] current state of the practice regarding the technical ability to track 
and trace Internet-based attacks is primitive at best. Sophisticated attacks 
can be almost impossible to trace to their true source using current 
practices. The anonymity enjoyed by today's cyber-attackers poses a 
grave threat to the global information society, the progress of an 
information-based international economy, and the advancement of global 
collaboration and cooperation in all areas of human endeavor." 
Numerous organizations have since attempted to advance security in cyberspace since 
then, with mixed accomplishments. 
OECD and COE Roles, Agendas and Accomplishments 
In August 2002 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) released revised Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and 
Networks. The guidelines sought to increase public awareness, education, information 
sharing, and training to promote a better understanding of online security and the 
adoption of best practices. The Guidelines represented consensus views of all 30 OECD 
member countries toward "A Culture of Security,"237 replacing similar guidelines 
previously issued in 1992. 
The Council of Europe (COE) continued to press forward with the convention on 
cybercrime,238 which entered into force in July 2004, and is the only binding international 
treaty on the subject to have entered into force. It identifies guidelines for all 
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governments wishing to develop legislation against cybercrime, and is open to signature 
by non-European states, providing a framework for international cooperation.239 
Internet Governance and ICANN, ITU and WSIS Roles, Agendas and Accomplishments 
In January 2002, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a proposal for a 
global summit on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) issues. The 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) took the lead in organizing the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), including the participation of more than 50 
heads of state. 
The summit process began with a preparatory committee, or Prepcom, in July 
2002 for the first phase in December 2003 in Geneva. The last Prepcom, held in 
September 2005 in Geneva, ended without securing final agreement on Internet 
governance, and with the U.S. rejecting a European Union proposal to relinquish control 
of ICANN. The dominant role of U.S. policy making in Internet governance was at the 
crux of the issue with alternatives put forth as radical as adopting a civil society approach 
to Internet governance.240 Such an approach would be composed of the totality of 
voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a 
functioning society as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state (regardless of that 
state's political system) and commercial institutions of the market. In essence, this would 
completely decentralize Internet governance as opposed to creating hybrid organizations, 
inhibiting capacity to provide secure services where desired. 
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In 2003 at Geneva, delegates from 175 countries took part in the first phase of 
WSIS where they adopted a Declaration of Principles as a road map for achieving an 
information society accessible to all and based on shared knowledge: 
"Strengthening the trust framework.. .is a prerequisite for the development 
of the Information Society and for building confidence among users of 
ICTs. A global culture of cyber-security needs to be promoted, developed 
and implemented in cooperation with all stakeholders and international 
expert bodies.. .supported by increased international cooperation.. .to 
enhance security and to ensure the protection of data and privacy, while 
enhancing access and trade. [We] support the activities of the United 
Nations to prevent the potential use of ICTs for purposes that are 
inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and 
security, and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure within 
States, to the detriment of their security. It is necessary to prevent the use 
of information resources and technologies for criminal and terrorist 
purposes, while respecting human rights.. .Cyber-security should be dealt 
with at appropriate national and international levels."241 
A Plan of Action set the goal of bringing 50 percent of the world's population 
online by 2015, but did not spell out any specifics of how this might be achieved. The 
Geneva summit also left unresolved more controversial issues, including the question of 
Internet governance and funding. 
When the 2003 summit failed to reach agreement, the Working Group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG) was formed to develop ideas on the future of Internet governance. 
Civil society delegates from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) produced a 
document titled "Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs,"242 assembling a wide 
range of issues under a human rights and communication rights umbrella. 
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In a document released on December 3, 2003, the United States delegation to the 
WSIS advocated a strong private sector and rule of law as the critical foundations for 
development of national ICT efforts. Ambassador David Gross, the U.S. coordinator for 
international communications and information policy, outlined the three pillars of the 
U.S. position, identifying specific focus areas for Internet state control and security 
through ostensibly hybrid organizations: 
• Commitment to the private sector and emphasis on the rule of law, so that 
countries can attract the necessary private investment to create the 
infrastructure as nations attempt to build a sustainable ICT sector; 
• Content creation and intellectual property rights protection in order to inspire 
ongoing content development; and 
• Ensuring security on the Internet, in electronic communications and in 
electronic commerce. "All of this works and is exciting for people as long as 
people feel that the networks are secure from cyber attacks, secure in terms of 
their privacy."243 
Gross stated the United States was achieving broad consensus on the principle 
that a culture of cyber security must develop in national ICT policies to continue growth 
and expansion in this area. He related considerable national legal and international 
information sharing advances towards addressing exponentially increasing criminal 
threats in cyberspace to make his case. 
Many governments expressed concern that various groups used U.S.-based 
servers to spread anti-Semitic, nationalist, or regime critical messages. This controversy 
is, at its root, a consequence of the American position on free speech which does not 
consider speech as criminal without direct appeals to violence. The U.S. argued that 
giving the control of Internet domain names to international bureaucrats and governments 
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may lead to massive censorship that could destroy the freedom of the Internet as a public 
space. This would seem to reinforce the earlier assertion that rules for open, 
decentralized systems acceptable for some open democracies may also be the most feared 
by more authoritarian regimes, and demonstrates a significant variance of views over the 
limits of control of the Internet. On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
made it clear it intends to retain control of the Internet's root servers indefinitely. 
The second WSIS phase took place in November 2005 in Tunis, Tunisia. The 
Association for Progressive Communications (APC), an international network of civil 
society organizations, participated extensively in the Internet governance process at the 
WSIS. APC attended with the stated goal of empowering and supporting groups and 
individuals working for peace, human rights, development and protection of the 
environment through the strategic use of ICT, including the Internet. On the eve of the 
Tunis event, the APC proposed specific actions in each of the following five areas:244 
• The establishment of an Internet Governance Forum; 
• The transformation of ICANN into a global body with full authority over DNS 
management, and an appropriate form of accountability to its stakeholders in 
government, private sector and civil society; 
• The initiation of a multi-stakeholder convention on Internet governance and 
universal human rights that will codify the basic rights applicable to the 
Internet, which will be legally binding in international law with particular 
emphasis on clauses in the universal declaration of human rights specifically 
relevant to the Internet, such as rights to freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and privacy; 
• Ensuring Internet access is universal and affordable; and 
• Measures to promote capacity building in developing countries with regard to 
increasing developing country participation in global public policy forums on 
Internet governance. 
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APC argued: "The Internet is a global public space that should be open and 
accessible to all on a non-discriminatory basis. The Internet, therefore, must be seen as a 
global public infrastructure. In this regard we recognize the Internet to be a global public 
good related to the concept of the common heritage of humanity and access to it is in the 
public interest, and must be provided as a global public commitment to equality."245 
A dispute over control of the Internet threatened to derail the conference; 
however, a last-minute decision to leave control in the hands of the U.S.-based ICANN 
for the time being avoided a major clash. The conference resulted in agreement on the 
Tunis Commitment, and a compromise to establish the called for international Internet 
Governance Forum, with a purely consultative role. The Commitment specifically 
recognized "the involvement, cooperation and partnership of governments and other 
stakeholders, i.e. the private sector, civil society and international organizations, and that 
international cooperation and solidarity at all levels"246 were indispensible in addressing 
achieving their goals. 
The IGF similarly addressed security, however with an emphasis on protecting 
children, and child pornography in particular. The IGF recognized other security issues 
to include cyber-terrorism, hacking, and other virus and cyber threats, and resulted in the 
formation of a wide number of Dynamic Coalitions. These coalitions are relatively 
informal, issue-specific groups consisting of stakeholders that are interested in the 
particular issue, and most coalitions allow participation of anyone interested in 
contributing. Thus, these groups gather not only academics and government 
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representatives, but also members of the civil society interested in participating on the 
debates and engaged in the coalition's works. None of the dynamic coalitions, however, 
specifically address cyber attacks or attack attribution within the context of this paper.247 
As of May 2009 there continued to be calls for the U.S. to give up control of 
ICANN;248 however, as recently as August, 2009 a U.S. Senate version of the Cyberspace 
Security Act of 2009 continued to advocate the counter position, going so far as to 
provide the President essentially emergency control of the Internet and the ability to shut 
down online traffic by seizing private networks. The legislation would allow the 
President to declare a cybersecurity emergency, which remained undefined, related to 
nongovernmental computer networks and respond to the danger. 4 
On May 17, 2007, the ITU launched the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA), to 
provide a comprehensive framework to coordinate and address international responses to 
growing cybersecurity challenges. The ITU Secretary-General benefited from the advice 
of an expert panel, the High-Level Experts Group, representing expertise in policy 
making, government, academia and the private sector. This advisory group met for the 
first time in Geneva on October 5, 2007, to develop strategies to combat cybercrime and 
promote cybersecurity, formulating proposals to the ITU Secretary-General in a Global 
Strategic Report. 
In September 2008 the ITU and the International Multilateral Partnership Against 
Cyber-Threats (IMPACT) entered into an agreement collocating the ITU Global 
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Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) with IMPACT headquarters in Cyberjaya, Malaysia to 
provide ITU membership with the expertise, facilities and resources to effectively address 
the world's most serious cyber-threats. The partnership was intended to provide: 
• Real-time analysis, aggregation and dissemination of global cyber-threat 
information; 
• Early warning system and emergency response to global cyber-threats; and 
• Training and skills development on the technical, legal and policy aspects of 
cybersecurity. 
IMPACT is an international public-private initiative dedicated to enhancing the 
global community's capacity to prevent, defend and respond to cyber threats. The Global 
Response Centre (GRC) plays a pivotal role in realizing ITU GCA's objective of putting 
technical measures in place to combat new and evolving cyber-threats, and the ITU 
maintains a virtual showcase in Geneva of the early warning system, crisis management 
and real-time analysis of global cyber-threats available in Cyberjaya. 
The two prime highlights of GRC are Network Early Warning System (NEWS) 
and Electronically Secure Collaboration Application Platform for Experts (ESCAPE). 
Working with leading partners in the industry, academia, and governments, NEWS 
provides the global community with a real time early warning system, serving as a 
vehicle for information sharing and collaboration of up to date information on security 
trends. NEWS features include: 
• Real time threat monitoring and assessment whereby member countries can see 
the global severity threat level and solutions to mitigate the threat; 
• Statistical cyber threat trend analysis whereby member countries can see minute 
views of current cyber trends and threats around the world, presented as a 
collection of easy to read charts, graphs, maps and tables; and 
• Malware threat centre where members can upload malware and receive 
feedback on the full technical details of the malware analysis. 
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IMPACT also provides its member countries with ESCAPE, an electronic tool 
that enables authorized cyber experts across the different countries to pool resources and 
remotely collaborate with each other in a secure and trusted environment. ESCAPE 
features a comprehensive and growing database of key resources around the world -
including IT experts, empowered persons (e.g. government regularity officials), and other 
trusted bodies (e.g. CERTS), who can be called in to assist during a crisis. Thus, 
members can rapidly create a response team to deal with almost any emerging cyber 
threat. ESCAPE enables GRC coordination and response for countries during 
emergencies, enabling swift identification and the sharing of available resources across 
borders. 
The ITU provides crucial expertise, both in its research on cyber security as well 
as its experience with developing online collaborative platforms. With a state of the art 
team collaboration platform and access to experts from government, academia and 
private industry, IMPACT represents a significantly empowered hybrid organization for 
global emergency response. 
The ITU Centre for Policy & International Cooperation partners with United 
Nations agencies, Interpol, Council of Europe, OECD and others to contribute to the 
formulation of new policies and the harmonization of national laws around a variety of 
issues relating to cyber-threats, including cybercrimes. The Centre provides advisory 
services to interested ITU Member States on policy and regulatory matters for 
cybersecurity. With the support of ITU, the Centre fosters international cooperation 
through specific programs such as coordinated cyber-drill exercises between countries. 
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IMPACT'S Centre for Training & Skills Development also provides world-class cyber-
training in support of ITU's objective of capacity building among member states. 
Other Related Efforts and Hybrid Organizations 
Any number of related efforts and hybrid organizations may be identified around 
the globe through even a cursory survey of the community. The previous chapter alluded 
to several including the NATO CCDCOE, national CERTs, IntelFusion, and Project Grey 
Goose. Chapter seven will further describe a rather expansive organizational approach 
from a uniquely Chinese perspective. A few organizations are highlighted here for 
illustrative purposes. 
Established in 2004, the Shadowserver Foundation gathers intelligence on the 
darker side of the Internet. Comprised of volunteer security professionals from around 
the world that gather, track, and report on malware, botnet activity, and electronic fraud, 
their goal is to understand and help put a stop to high stakes cybercrime in the 
information age. Its mission is to improve the security of the Internet by raising 
awareness of the presence of compromised servers, malicious attackers, and the spread of 
malware. The Shadowserver Foundation supports: 
• Capturing and receiving malicious software, or information related to 
compromised devices; 
• Disassembling, sandboxing, and analyzing viruses and Trojans; 
• Monitoring and reporting on malicious attackers; 
• Tracking and reporting on botnet activities; 
• Disseminating cyber threat information; and 
• Coordinating incident responses. 
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The Shadowserver Foundation works alongside other security agencies to develop 
strategies against the threats and to form action plans to help mitigate the threats as they 
develop.250 
On August 22, 2008, a U.S. open source intelligence (OSINT) initiative was 
launched to examine how the Russian cyber war was conducted against Georgian 
websites and if the Russian government was involved or if it was entirely a grass roots 
movement by patriotic Russian hackers. Since that time, Project Grey Goose has evolved 
into a formal business entity providing consulting services to governments.251 GreyLogic 
represents a unified approach to collection and analysis mimicking the non-traditional, 
multi-faceted strategies used by non-state actors in cyber conflicts. 
GreyLogic applies an open innovation intelligence model focusing on identifying 
and tracking non-state hackers and the companies and governments that support them. 
The company provides a proprietary blend of social network analysis and server-level 
data, hosted on a platform provided by Palantir Technologies. GreyLogic's Hacker Alias 
Knowledge Repository (HAKR) used in the Project Grey Goose proof-of-concept 
provides a mechanism for agencies to leverage their work against present and future 
threats.252 
GreyLogic's blog, IntelFusion represents a true grass-roots effort using only open 
source data pulled from the Web. Leveraging large groups of volunteer users is 
demonstrating an ability to meaningfully supplement technical and social investigations 
Shadowserver, http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/ (accessed August 11, 2009). 
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on the part of government intelligence analysts.253 In this sense, it both leverages and 
contributes to transparency in cyberspace. 
The Canadian-based Information Warfare Monitor (IWM) is an independent and 
advanced research activity tracking the emergence of cyberspace as a strategic domain 
with a mission to educate and inform, building and broadening the evidence base 
available to scholars, policymakers, and others. IWM is a public-private venture between 
two Canadian institutions: The SecDev Group, an operational think tank based in Ottawa, 
and the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. 
The SecDev Group conducts field-based investigations and data gathering. Advanced 
research and analysis facilities are located at the Citizen Lab, and part of the Citizen 
Lab's network of advanced research projects, which include the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) 
and ONI Asia. The Information Warfare Monitor also benefits from donations from a 
variety of sponsors including Psiphon Inc, and Palantir Technologies (associated with 
GreyLogic above). IWM conducts three primary activities: 
• Case studies including field-based investigations and technical scouting and 
laboratory analysis such as the aforementioned "Tracking Ghostnet: 
Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network;" 
• Open source trend analysis; and 
• Analytical workshops and outreach.254 
Summary 
It is clear ICANN and other relevant intergovernmental institutions are embracing 
a culture of security, at least as to the extent funding is provided. It is also evident 
national and intergovernmental organizations are attempting to co-opt and empower 
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Internet users by passing information exchange and thus ownership to the broader 
Internet community through hybrid organizations with the express intent of enabling the 
community at large to react more quickly to an attack. There is, however, wide variance 
in how actors view the limits of control over the Internet and approaches to addressing it. 
Given the technical challenges of attribution highlighted in chapter three and the 
state of the community reflected here, the following emerging principles and norms 
summarize the emerging attack attribution regime: 
• State and hybrid organizations focus on mitigation as opposed to attribution; 
• States and hybrid organizations are empowered to assist in mitigation and 
attribution efforts, working together to mitigate the impact of attacks, and 
sharing attribution information where possible; and 
• Cyber attacks are considered a legitimate form of declared conflict, 
commensurate with established principles and norms of the laws of armed 
conflict (international humanitarian law). 
The following principles and norms appear to be worth pursuing to advance the 
emerging regime, pressuring states and entities to assist in mitigation and attribution 
efforts: 
• Costs are imposed for failing to assist in mitigation and attribution efforts, 
imposing de facto costs on those responsible or complicit. Such costs could 
be economic in nature, tied to current or future access to the Internet or the 
conduct of certain transactions over it, or the expectation of future cooperative 
security efforts or agreements. 
• Those states and entities not supporting mitigation and attribution efforts are 
considered complicit (or even responsible) for them, shifting the burden of 
attribution from the defender to the attacker. 
The effectiveness of international efforts to address the problem of attack attribution and 
the issue of relative gains to circumvent clashes between major actors is the topic of the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
CYBERSPACE REGIME EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING THE 
ATTRIBUTION ISSUE 
A 2002 assessment of cyberspace attack attribution through direct problem-solving 
and legal criteria reflects a collective paralysis pending improved technical attribution and 
formal legal agreements: 
"There are no universal technical standards or agreements for performing 
the monitoring and record keeping necessary to track and trace attacks. 
Moreover, there are no universal laws or agreements as to what constitutes a 
cyber-attack, and what punishments, economic sanctions, or liability should 
ensue. There are no universal international agreements for the monitoring, 
record keeping, and information sharing necessary to track and trace 
intruders. No existing privacy laws span the Internet as a whole. Existing 
international laws and agreements that might touch on these issues were not 
written for the Internet and need to be tested on cases involving Internet 
cyber-attacks."255 
Revisiting this assessment based on cyberspace attack mitigation-based objectives 
provide meaningful normative and political criteria for information sharing to empower 
states and hybrid organizations. Such normative and political criteria may even lead to the 
identification of opportunities to impose costs to shift the burden of attribution from the 
defender to the attacker, while clearly defining acceptable attacks. 
Table 1 below introduces a series of hypotheses of how regimes influence 
behavior across a range of criteria256 according to both utility and social-practice 
perspectives. Assessments of each criterion inform an assessment of regime 
effectiveness according to each hypothesis. 
Howard F Lipson, Tracking and Tracing Cyber-Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy Issues 
(Carnegie-Mellon University, November, 2002), 17. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 3-6. 
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Table 1: Cyberspace attack attribution regime effectiveness 
Perspective 
Collective-
Action 
Social-
Practice 
Regime Effectiveness Criteria 
Problem-solving (Economic) 
Degree to which a regime 
eliminates or alleviates the 
problem that prompts its creation 
(Economic criteria add the 
concept of efficiency to evaluate 
not only outcomes, but the cost) 
Legal 
Meeting of 
contractual 
obligations 
Normative 
Advancement 
of principles 
and norms 
Political 
Changes in the behavior of 
actors, interests of actors, or 
the policies and 
performance of institutions 
in ways that contribute to 
positive management of the 
targeted problem 
As a utility maximizer, how do specific rules and regime activities influence the costs and benefits 
that established actors factor into their utilitarian calculus? Have actors possessing well-defined 
utility functions altered their behavior if and when social practices made it worth their while to do 
so? 
As an enhancer of cooperation, has the regime affected behavior by mitigating these collective-
action problems standing as barriers to the realization of joint gains otherwise available to parties 
engaged in interactive decision-making? 
As a bestower of authority, have social norms rooted in considerations of legitimacy or 
authoritativeness often guided the behavior of individuals and collective entities? 
As a learning facilitator, to what extent have institutions achieved their effects by initiating 
processes giving rise to individual and especially social learning? 
As a role definer, to what extent has the regime shaped the identities and interests of actors and, in 
the process, influenced the way actors behave as occupants of the roles to which they are assigned? 
As an agent of internal alignment, to what extent does the regime affect behavior by creating new 
constituencies or shifting the balance among factions or subgroups vying for influence within 
individual states or other actors? 
Regimes influence behavior in a variety of ways, often through a complex of 
causal mechanisms rather than a single one. Regimes may alter the alternatives available 
to actors, structuring debate during negotiation about alternative policies to exclude those 
that backtrack while facilitating discussion of those advancing the regime, thereby 
preventing or deterring violations. 
Because regimes generate their effects by influencing the behavior of actors 
involved in the relevant issue areas, the evaluation focuses on the behavioral pathways 
or mechanisms through which institutions produce effects. The social-practice 
hypotheses adopted here advance the concept of behavioral complexes as "specific 
Ronald Mitchell, Moira L. McConnell, Alexei Roginko, and Ann Barrett, "International Vessel-Source 
Oil Production," in Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and 
Behavioral Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 87. 
58
 Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 20. 
constellations of actors, interests, and institutions." Relevant behavioral complexes 
taken from the accounts of recent attacks identify the stakeholders and their interests and 
resources, and the principal attributes of the regime for addressing them. Recent attacks 
are reviewed against cyberspace regime formation to date to assess the effectiveness of 
the regime toward addressing the attribution problem, and causal connections between 
the relevant behavior and the operation of the regime. 
With only a few cases to evaluate, the analysis focuses on tendency analysis as 
opposed to variation analysis framing hypotheses linking various factors to anticipated 
levels of effectiveness. The latter worthwhile evaluation is left to future research 
involving larger numbers of cases. Rather, the evaluation of recent attacks here seeks to 
identify the particular combination of forces at work in each case to show how they 
account for the outcomes. 
This analysis identifies and evaluates the significant agendas that have been 
developed for bringing into being principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures that might assure international cooperation in cyber attribution in the future. 
It considers negotiations to date and progress to move internationally toward these goals. 
There is a major division between two broad categories of processes through 
which regimes affect international cooperation. For mechanisms intended to solve 
collective-action problems, "the role of the regime is to alter incentives in such a way as 
to prevent individualistic behavior likely to lead to collective-action problems in 
situations involving strategic interaction." From a social-practice perspective, 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT', 1999). 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 269. 
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"regimes are arrangements that affect behavior through non-utilitarian mechanisms like 
inducing actors to treat prescriptions as authoritative, enmeshing actors in communities 
that share a common discourse, or stimulating processes of social learning."261 
The key point between these two perspectives is not only the research agendas, 
but also the resulting conclusions and recommendations. Recommendations from 
collective-action oriented research lead to: 
• Utilitarian assessments of regime member behavior regarding compliance 
with institutional commitments; 
• Relative merits of different policy instruments; and 
• Problems of avoiding or resolving differences on the application of rules to 
particular circumstances. 
These recommendations are more closely aligned to a formal organizational discussion of 
regime origination. 
Recommendations from social-practice oriented research lead to: 
• Sources of behavioral change in general rather than specific compliance; 
• Prospects for socializing actors to conform to rules without making conscious 
calculations concerning the benefits and costs of doing so; and 
• Processes through which regimes integrate individual actors into communities 
engaged in practices not governed by utilitarian calculations. 62 
These recommendations are more closely aligned to cyberspace regime formation from 
the perspective of more informal aspects of decentralization and hybrid organizations. 
Both perspectives are leveraged here to evaluate cyberspace regime influence on 
actor behavior. First, the regime as a utility-maximizer is assessed from a collective-
action perspective. This analysis is then extended from the social-practice perspective, 
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evaluating the regime as an enhancer of cooperation, bestower of authority, learning 
facilitator, role-definer, and agent of internal realignment. 
The Regime as a Utility Maximizer 
How do specific rules and regime activities influence the costs and benefits that 
established actors factor into their utilitarian calculus? Have actors possessing well-
defined utility functions altered their behavior if and when social practices made it worth 
their while to do so? 
Recall the examples in the form of equipment standards for oil pollution and the 
role the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) regime played in shaping 
actors behavior. The Barents Sea case demonstrated a regime overcoming collective-
action problems through the operation of a routine decision-making procedure that 
reduced transaction costs and promoted transparency making it increasingly difficult to 
cheat. While utilitarian considerations were important sources of effectiveness, each 
regime presents a complex dynamic in which several types of mechanisms operate in 
tandem to produce the observable behavioral effects. 
Accounts of the four recent attacks in chapter three provide a seemingly 
consistent answer to this question in regards to cyberspace attack attribution. While 
states and international organizations are changing their behaviors based on perceived 
costs and benefits, their lack of effectiveness continues to embolden and even entice 
violators. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 260-261. 
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In each case the actual attacker likely does not have a well-defined utility 
function, while those ultimately directing such coordinated attacks likely do. The 
inability to attribute attacks to them, however, makes this venture impractical to pursue 
except in theory. To the extent state sponsors of the attack do have reasonably well-
defined utility functions; they are able to hide behind non-state actors for plausible 
deniability. Other actors including victim states and hybrid organizations, to include 
national CERTs and other technical organizations they coordinate with, do possess 
reasonably well-defined utility functions based on constituencies, political agendas, 
formal agreements, mission statements, and in the case of industry, revenue streams. 
Recent international cooperation reflected in regime maturation and responses to 
recent attacks provide evidence states and relevant intergovernmental organizations at 
large are changing behaviors based on perceived costs and benefits. The IY2KCC proved 
useful for governments from member countries to share information and lessons learned 
while building relationships fundamental to attack response activities to this day. The 
massive effort to address the Y2K problem forged new relationships and partnerships 
among industry and government sectors, particularly in the areas of critical infrastructure. 
The Kyrgyzstan attack serves to show the importance of global coordination, 
capacity building, and that a lack of cooperation does in fact lead to worse results. 
Through continuing efforts to reform Internet governance, states and intergovernmental 
organizations are investing heavily in capacity-building measures. They also appear to 
be focusing controls toward specific areas where it is desired by users, such as monetary 
transactions and security-related issues, allowing and empowering Internet users 
themselves to help police the rest. Hybrid organizations do appear to be spreading 
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information and ownership around the Internet, allowing them to adapt more quickly to 
stimuli, such as an attack. However the lack of effectiveness of their behaviors continues 
to embolden and even entice violators. 
While ever-increasing coordinated behavior by governments certainly contributed 
to mitigating attacks in the case of the Georgian and July 4, 2009 attacks, none were 
successful in attaining confident attribution in time and through a mechanism effectively 
enabling a meaningful response. None of them were perceived to have constituted an 
attack under international law to elicit an armed response. 
With the exception of the Kyrgyzstan attack, the other cases all show that beyond 
the obvious incentives for victim states to cooperate, other states and organizations also 
appeared very willing to cooperate. With no surprise, however, supposed attacker states 
were not, and no clear incentives for them to do so were evident. While some pressure 
was applied on Russia at the EU summit, any corresponding pressure in the case of 
Georgia was trivialized by the world response to their military operations in general. No 
clear pressure against the DPRK, or any other potentially responsible party, in the case of 
the July 4, 2009 attacks was apparent. 
Does a shift in emphasis from attribution to mitigation change this assessment? It 
is clear international response and information sharing to mitigate the effects of the attack 
was superior to efforts focused specifically toward attribution. The Georgian and DPRK 
attacks demonstrated increasing cooperation between states and ever-increasing and 
empowered hybrid organizations to mitigate the impact of attacks, ostensibly sharing 
attribution information where possible. For security concerns, however, this is difficult 
to state with confidence, an illustrative implication of the security dilemma in cyberspace. 
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It is apparent states and entities voluntarily supported these mitigation efforts. 
This was likely a combination of political support for victim states, as well as collective 
interest in Internet security per se. There was, after all, no evidence of adversaries 
supporting victim states, while CCDCOE efforts in the Georgian case were tied to the 
formal NATO security umbrella. Although academic and industry members are 
relatively apolitical, they remain vested in network security. 
There was some evidence of pressure on the Kremlin in the case of the Estonian 
and Georgian attacks, as reported at the EU summit, however, no significant concrete 
costs were imposed, and once the broader Georgian conflict erupted, concerns over the 
cyber attacks faded to a distant consideration. Although the lack of response or support 
for victim states on the part of the supposed attackers fed international suspicions, there 
was no particular burden shifted to the supposed attackers to prove they were not 
complicit in the attack. 
In other words, there is little evidence to show the current regime is sufficiently 
embedded in internal state politics to appreciably enmesh state or non-state behavior. 
The current regime proved unable to impose costs to coerce compliance or eliminate 
opportunities to violate (largely non-existing) regulatory prescriptions to positively shape 
future expectations and deter future attacks. This appears to have rather emboldened 
supposed Russian attackers from one conflict to the next, and exposed continuing 
weaknesses for less capable aggressors as evidenced in the July 4, 2009 attack. 
States did seem to recognize or acquiesce to the emerging norm that cyber attacks 
are considered a legitimate form of declared conflict, commensurate with established 
principles and norms of international humanitarian law. This norm is reflected in all 
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major powers security strategies, international response to the Georgian conflict, and 
central to U.S. opposition to Russia's proposed international agreement. 
Just as an organizational, rational utility approach alone was insufficient to 
understanding the cyberspace domain in the previous chapter, this assessment is 
incomplete without considering normative and political criteria. Analysis of the 
following three models are combined as they all retain the unitary actor assumption, but 
emphasize sources of behavior difficult or impossible to interpret in utilitarian terms. 
These non-utilitarian sources of behavior and how they interact in complex ways are 
evaluated to identify findings utilitarian analyses are poorly equipped to explain. 
These variables also tend to work together to produce a combined effect, so we should 
expect similarly spurious findings in the area of international cooperation in cyberspace. 
While less analytically tractable, these models still provide ample evidence of the 
roles non-utilitarian forces play as drivers of regime behavior. The evaluation therefore 
focuses towards genetic tendencies within individual case studies as opposed to 
predictable variance between them, as we can expect the behavioral mechanisms at work 
to be closely tied to certain characteristics of the particular behavioral complex, and 
therefore situation specific.265 
The Regime as an Enhancer of Cooperation 
Rational actors engaged in interactive decision-making often fail to achieve joint 
gains or avoid joint losses due to the effects of strategic behavior. Barriers to a 
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collective-action consensus identified in chapter three identify some of the possible joint 
gains that could be realized by the community if the security dilemma could be 
overcome. These include increased capacity for global Internet access, universal legal 
instruments for combating cyber crime, and transparency to investigate and prosecute 
cyber crime while protecting anonymity of lawful users in ways as to not stifle future 
economic growth. These could include increased international cooperation to realize 
efficiencies and cost savings through global economies of scale. 
Recalling the security dilemma in cyberspace, however, while individual states 
may desire a more regulated environment and proposals for international agreements 
evidence collective desires, there remains no significant effort between the major powers 
or seemingly most egregious violators to cooperate in any meaningful way. There are no 
readily apparent incentives significant enough to justify exposing themselves to supposed 
or potential adversaries. In this situation conflict and the individualistic pursuit of 
security in cyberspace are not currently seen as costly, with apparently little to no risk of 
major war or spilling into or being linked with other areas, such as economics. Without 
meaningful incentives for cooperation, nations proliferating or protecting cyberspace 
attackers seem more satisfied with the status quo than with negotiating away any 
potential leverage they currently enjoy, or expect to enjoy in the future. These states 
seem to be enjoying the fruits of their expansion in cyberspace, and believe it provides 
the best prospects for their security. 
Has the regime affected behavior by mitigating these collective-action problems 
standing as barriers to the realization of joint gains otherwise available to parties engaged 
in interactive decision-making? The IY2KCC created a useful mechanism for 
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governments from member countries to share information and lessons learned and built 
relationships fundamental to attack response activities to this day. The massive effort to 
address the Y2K problem forged new relationships and partnerships among industry and 
government sectors, particularly in the areas of critical infrastructure. CERT/CC 
provides an excellent example of the importance of trust and ability to protect 
confidential information to effectively coordinate responses to cyberspace attacks. 
It is apparent states and entities voluntarily support mitigation efforts primarily 
for reasons of political support for victim states and secondarily out of collective interest 
in Internet security. These priorities require reversal if the collective-action problem is 
to be addressed to realize joint gains. As stated above, observed international response 
and information sharing to mitigate the effects of attacks was superior to cooperative 
attribution efforts, although for reasons implicit in the cyberspace security dilemma, this 
is difficult to state with confidence. One policy choice that could be considered would be 
to increase emphasis on securing the Internet as a priority over securing the state. Given 
the history, cooperative efforts to accomplish the former would leverage and continue to 
advance the global and apolitical nature of Internet governance and a worldwide 
information society. 
Through continuing efforts to reform Internet governance, states and 
intergovernmental organizations do appear to be focusing controls toward specific areas 
where it is desired by users, such as monetary transactions and security-related issues, 
allowing and empowering Internet users themselves to help police the rest. Passing 
information exchange and ownership to the broader Internet community does present 
opportunity for circumventing clashes between major actors and addressing the problem 
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of relative gains; however, recent attacks provide insufficient evidence to state this as a 
finding to date. Further, there remains wide variance in how actors view the limits of 
control over the Internet and approaches to addressing it. 
The Regime as a Bestower of Authority 
The normative status or authoritativeness of regime rules and activities may 
trigger the behavioral response rather than some calculation of the anticipated benefits 
and costs of different options available to decision-makers. Have social norms rooted in 
considerations of legitimacy or authoritativeness often guided the behavior of individuals 
and collective entities? 
This is clearly a major shortfall of the cyberspace attack attribution regime. 
Although international law and the chance of being considered and charged with war 
crimes deterred the United States from conducting cyber attacks against Serbian targets in 
the 1999 Kosovo conflict, this restraint on the part of the community appears short-lived. 
The EU Convention on Cybercrime remains the only international agreement to have 
entered into force, and in its current form provides minimal legislation specifically 
focused on cyberspace attacks or attack attribution within the scope of this paper. 
The ITU WSIS has demonstrated the ability to influence decisions related to 
Internet governance. IGF dynamic coalitions continue to advance specific issue areas 
through relatively informal, issue-specific groups of interested stakeholders, although 
again none specifically address cyber attacks or attack attribution within the context of 
this paper. As stated above, there is little evidence to show the current regime is 
sufficiently embedded in internal state politics to appreciably enmesh state or non-state 
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behavior. The lack of effectiveness in imposing costs to coerce compliance or positively 
shape future expectations to significantly deter future attacks appears to have rather 
emboldened attackers from one conflict to the next, and exposed continuing 
vulnerabilities for less capable aggressors. 
The Regime as a Learning Facilitator 
Regimes can facilitate learning in the form of: 
• New perspectives on the nature of a particular problem; 
• New ideas about measures likely to prove effective in solving the problem; 
• New insights into the process of implementing these measures; or 
• New solution concepts for larger classes of problems to which the specific 
case belongs. 
Social learning in the evolution of regimes may lead to devising new means with which 
to pursue unchanging objectives. It may alternatively lead to major changes in how 
regimes understand problems and, as a result, in ideas about how to cope with them.266 
To what extent have institutions achieved their effects by initiating processes giving rise 
to individual and especially social learning? 
It is clear ICANN and other relevant intergovernmental institutions are embracing 
a culture of security, at least to the extent funding is provided. It is also evident national 
and intergovernmental organizations are attempting to co-opt and empower Internet users 
by passing information exchange and thus ownership to the broader Internet community 
through hybrid organizations with the express intent of enabling the community at large 
to react more quickly to an attack. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 262. 
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The ITU WSIS enjoys broad participation and the GCA-IMPACT partnership is 
one example significantly empowering member states. The proliferation of hybrid 
organizations discussed in the previous chapter provides further evidence of expanding 
public-private partnerships. 
The Regime as a Role-Definer 
Regimes also operate at the constitutive level with actors taking on new roles 
under the terms of institutional arrangements. To what extent has the regime shaped the 
identities and interests of actors and, in the process, influenced the way actors behave as 
occupants of the roles to which they are assigned? 
As thousands of corporate and government-run ISPs established rules for users of 
their services within the boundaries of network agreements providing global access, 
many ISPs joined to create regional associations forming a basis for international 
cooperation. The IY2KCC further paved the way for organizational and institutional 
advancement based on cyberspace threats. Internet governance decisions, such as those 
over ccTLD, have established the concept of the Internet as global commons as 
formalized in the WSIS and associated commitments. The WSIS has also provided a 
venue for various interest groups such as the APC to exert influence. 
In the aftermath of the 1998 Morris worm incident CERT/CC was formed, and 
CERT/CC and national CERTs have continued to mature. In response to the Georgian 
attack, CERT Georgia, organized as an academic CERT, started to function like a 
national CERT and coordinated attack mitigation, and the OSINT Project Grey Goose 
was initiated maturing into GreyLogic. In response to the Estonian attack, NATO 
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established its CCDCOE. The GCA-IMPACT partnership has resulted in the creation of 
the GRC to address the world's most serious cyberspace threats. 
The decentralized nature and subsequent loss of centralized control of the 
Internet has spurred a decentralized approach to policing the net through hybrid 
organizations. The Internet has drastically lowered the barrier to entry to numerous 
domains, irrevocably shifting power to the people. Hybrid organizations do appear to be 
spreading information and ownership around the Internet, allowing them to adapt more 
quickly to stimuli, such as an attack. 
The Regime as an Agent of Internal Realignment 
Finally, by relaxing the unitary actor assumption, regimes may play some role in 
restructuring the alignment of domestic groups endeavoring to influence governmental 
behavior or factions seeking to redirect corporate behavior. The creation of a highly 
visible regime can have an enabling effect over time leading to the emergence of an 
associated community of governmental and nongovernmental actors. These actors can 
become a powerful pressure group dedicated to the achievement of the regime's goals. In 
this sense, the regime becomes a focal point for activities of state and non-state actors 
that act as watchdogs on key prescriptions, increasing the transparency of the behavior of 
regime members. 
Environmental regime formation demonstrated unambiguous evidence of links 
among domestic politics and the operation of regimes. A diffuse public concerned with a 
particular issue area was able to pressure a powerful and highly organized industry to 
accept equipment standards; despite evidence this solution was not an efficient one in the 
purely economic sense. Environmental regimes also empowered domestic critics, 
helping to create domestic constituencies capable of bringing pressure to bear on relevant 
government agencies. This was largely accomplished through interest groups or 
communities working in legislative settings and broader forums influencing public 
opinion to build political coalitions. Environmental regimes have proven able to subject 
the actions of bureaucratic managers to greater public scrutiny and institutionalize the 
role of scientists as contributors to the decision-making process established by the 
regime. Interactions between regimes and domestic politics are likely to vary greatly 
from one country to another and, probably, from one type of regime to another, so 
reviewing this interaction from the perspective of cyberspace bears considerable merit. 
To what extent does the regime affect behavior by creating new constituencies or 
shifting the balance among factions or subgroups vying for influence within individual 
states or other actors? The Internet grew out of a DARPA program and the U.S. 
continues to hold authority over the majority of the servers and many networks 
comprising the physical backbone of the Internet. Despite pressures from various 
domestic and international groups, the U.S. maintains a correspondingly dominant role in 
Internet governance decision-making, although responsibility for the Internet's technical 
infrastructure gradually moved to ICANN. 
Y2K preparations also formalized domestic cyber incident monitoring and 
response procedures. Within the U.S., CERTs and international FIRST provided the 
national ICC reports on incidents in their respective areas. The FBI, NSC, DOD 
Decision Support Activity and other agencies took on similar roles reporting to the ICC. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 263-264. 
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More generally, the massive effort to address the Y2K problem forged new 
relationships and partnerships among industry and government sectors, particularly in the 
areas of critical infrastructure. In the U.S., this paved the way for moving responsibility 
for Internet security from the DOD to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with 
the new U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) focused on and limited to defending 
DoD networks. 
Decentralization powered by the Internet has shifted the underlying power 
structures of numerous industries and aspects of life, irrevocably shifting power to the 
people with a corresponding loss of government control. In areas involving monetary 
transactions and issues related to security, however, users continue to desire structure, 
safety and accountability.268 The formation and proliferation of hybrid organizations 
such as GreyLogic, the Shadowserver Foundation, and others have combined features to 
provide premium services with security. There remains, however, wide variance in how 
various domestic and international actors view the limits of control over the Internet and 
approaches to addressing it. 
Summary 
An international cyberspace security regime has emerged through collective 
interests in mitigating attacks in cyberspace. Its effectiveness, however, is another 
matter. Attack mitigation-based objectives do seem to provide meaningful normative and 
political criteria for assessing and advancing cyberspace attack attribution regime 
effectiveness. From the social-practice perspective, the regime is creating arrangements 
Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The starfish and the spider: the unstoppable power ofleaderless 
organizations, (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 164-165. 
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that affect some behaviors such as stimulating processes of social learning. Other non-
utilitarian mechanisms, however, to induce actors to treat prescriptions as authoritative, 
or enmesh actors in communities that share a common discourse have so far been 
ineffective at imposing costs to shift the burden of attribution from the defender to the 
attacker. While states and international organizations are changing their behaviors based 
on perceived costs and benefits, their lack of effectiveness continues to embolden and 
even entice violators. 
While individual states may desire a more regulated environment and proposals 
for international agreements evidence collective desires, there remains no significant 
effort between the major powers or seemingly most egregious violators to cooperate in 
any meaningful way. There are no readily apparent incentives significant enough to 
justify exposing themselves to supposed or potential adversaries. In this situation conflict 
and the individualistic pursuit of security in cyberspace are not currently seen as costly. 
States and hybrid organizations are focusing on mitigation as opposed to 
attribution. States and a growing number of hybrid organizations are increasingly 
empowered to assist in mitigation and attribution efforts, working together to mitigate the 
impact of attacks, and share attribution information where possible. In apparent support 
for the U.S. position, cyber attacks do appear to have gained legitimacy in declared 
conflict, commensurate with established principles and norms of the laws of armed 
conflict. 
States and entities appear to voluntarily support mitigation efforts primarily for 
reasons of political support for victim states and secondarily out of collective interest in 
Internet security. These priorities require reversal through mechanisms sufficiently 
embedded in internal state politics to appreciably enmesh state or non-state behavior if 
the collective-action problem is to be addressed to realize joint gains. 
The regime currently brings little pressure to states and entities to assist in 
mitigation and attribution efforts. This has created the situation that when states and 
entities do not support mitigation and attribution efforts or are even considered complicit 
or even responsible for them, the burden of attribution remains on the victim, with no 
power to shift the burden of attribution from the defender to the attacker. 
There still remains wide variance in how various domestic and international 
actors view the limits of control over the Internet and approaches to addressing it. The 
current regime has not been successful at imposing, or even identifying, costs for failing 
to assist in mitigation and attribution efforts, and by extension those responsible or 
complicit in instigating the attacks in the first place. Such costs could be economic in 
nature, tied to current or future access to the Internet or the conduct of certain 
transactions over it, or the expectation of future cooperative security efforts or 
agreements. 
This assessment informs prospects for socializing actors to conform to rules 
without making conscious calculations concerning the benefits and costs of doing so, and 
processes through which the regime might integrate individual actors into communities 
engaged in practices not governed by utilitarian calculations. Advancing the domain in 
these areas requires a nuanced appreciation for the maturity of the emerging regime, and 
practical approaches successfully applied in other domains. These approaches are 
explored in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
CYBERSPACE ATTACK ATTRIBUTION REGIME MATURITY 
"[The] process through which new institutional arrangements come into 
existence virtually always encompasses several distinct stages...Only by 
successfully navigating all three stages can a regime that has real 
consequences for the nature of collective outcomes come into 
existence." 
Various stages of regime formation involve differing political dynamics. Efforts 
to explain regime formation require evaluating discrete influences across several stages 
of the overall process.270 Evidence of cyberspace regime formation and effectiveness to 
date is now applied against a three-stage model of international regime formation to 
assess the maturity level of the current regime. Table 2 provides a roadmap to the 
assessment based on six hypotheses relating to the stages of regime formation: agenda 
formation, negotiation, and operationalization. 
Table 2. Hypotheses relating to the stages of regime formation' 
Driving Forces 
Players 
Collective-Action 
Problems 
Context 
Tactics 
Design Perspectives 
Agenda Formation 
Ideas 
Intellectual leadership 
Miscommunication 
Broad changes in the 
political environment 
Efforts to influence the 
framing of the problem 
Focus on the big picture 
Negotiation 
Interests 
Entrepreneurial leadership 
Stalemate or gridlock 
More specific exogenous events 
Classic concern with threats and 
promises 
Focus on agreement language 
Operationalization 
Material conditions 
Structural leadership 
(all stages) 
Asymmetries in levels 
of effort 
Domestic constraints 
Administrative or 
bureaucratic politics 
Focus on domestic concerns 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
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Informed by this assessment, the chapter then inquires: "How might maturing 
international cooperation mitigate the problem of cyber-space attack attribution?" The 
inquiry incorporates security regime formation criteria and observations from 
international cooperation in other domains to formulate a policy approach tailored to the 
maturity level of the regime. 
Stages of Regime Formation 
The agenda formation stage "encompasses the processes through which an issue 
initially finds its way onto the international political agenda and rises to a sufficiently 
prominent place on this agenda to justify the investment of time and political capital 
needed to embark on explicit negotiations."272 It is at this point issues are often adopted 
by actors, or champions, that push the issue to the top of their own priorities and expend 
political capital in an effort to persuade others to see them as priority agenda items.273 
The dominant political dynamic that sets the agenda formation stage apart from the others 
is an atmosphere of openness and fluidity. "Issues are not cast in concrete at this stage; 
the identity of those who will play major roles in subsequent stages is not fully 
determined, and the timing (or even the likelihood) of a move to the front burner of the 
policy agenda is difficult to predict."274 
The negotiation stage is dominated by institutional bargaining, beginning with the 
initiation of direct and focused negotiations and ending with the signing of an agreement. 
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While international regimes typically emerge from explicit negotiations between two or 
more actors, unrecorded secret side agreements, informal deals and tacit understandings 
are also prolific. These also become important to the success of the resultant social 
practices over time. Negotiations regularly involve hard bargaining among participants 
to best exploit whatever bargaining leverage is available to them. At this stage, 
participants seldom have a clear picture of the payoff structure and much of the 
negotiation process is exploratory in nature to expand the range of available possibilities. 
Unlike bargaining in other settings, the negotiation stage of regime formation 
seeks to build a consensus among as many participants as possible rather than assembling 
a winning coalition. This provides every potential participant real bargaining power as 
the ability of each participant to hold out for preferred provisions greatly exceeds the 
ability of individual participants to get their way. Although the negotiation stage is 
considerably more structured than the agenda formation stage, the process of institutional 
bargaining at the international level is multidimensional and open-ended. Further, 
governments simply do not act as rational utility maximizers as they are subjected to 
pressures from a variety of domestic and international interest groups.275 
The operationalization stage advances the provisions of an international regime 
from paper to practice. This includes domestic actions such as treaty ratification within 
the political systems of prospective regime members, and international actions like 
setting up the administrative apparatus called for in the relevant agreement.276 This 
process is distinct from other stages as it involves the commitment of material resources 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1998), 11-15. 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1998), 16-20. 
as opposed to agreement language. The operationalization stage therefore typically 
involves representatives from implementing agencies in addition to foreign service 
personnel. These additional actors often have different incentives than those handling 
negotiations, meaning material resources may not be as forthcoming as envisioned during 
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negotiation. 
Assessment 
What stage of maturity is the cyberspace attribution regime? As Table 3 below 
illustrates, while evidence of various stages of regime formation are evident throughout 
chapters two and three, the weight shows those criteria specific to attack attribution 
cooperation remain in the agenda formation stage. We must be careful to differentiate 
this from Internet governance negotiations, and cooperative attack mitigation efforts 
which, managing to ride on the governance negotiation stage have entered into day-to-
day operations. 
Driving Forces 
Regarding driving forces, it is clear ICANN and other relevant intergovernmental 
institutions are embracing a culture of security, at least as to the extent funding is 
provided; however, this culture of security, and related agreements and declarations focus 
on cybercrime and not state-sponsored attacks. This has meant that even the rare 
instances of formal agreements, such as the COE Convention on Cybercrime, have not 
provided a venue for negotiation over state-sponsored cyberspace attacks or attack 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1998), 5. 
attribution. As the previous chapters demonstrated, while individual states may desire a 
more regulated environment and proposals for international agreements evidence 
collective desires, there remains no significant effort between the major powers or 
seemingly most egregious violators to cooperate in any meaningful way. 
Table 3. Cyberspace attack attribution regime formation evidence 
Driving Forces 
Players 
Collective-Action 
Problems 
Context 
Tactics 
Design Perspectives 
Agenda Formation 
Ideas: 
-Culture of security focused on 
cybercrime 
-Focus on mitigation and securing 
critical infrastructure 
Intellectual leadership: 
-WSIS IGF Dynamic Coalitions 
Miscommunication: 
-Wide variance in views over the 
limits of control over the Internet and 
approaches to addressing it 
-Focus on state security as opposed to 
securing the Internet 
Broad changes in the political 
environment: 
-Lowered the barrier to entry in 
numerous domains, broadly 
decentralizing numerous power 
structures 
-Terms still largely undefined 
internationally 
Efforts to influence the framing of the 
problem: 
-Tacit bargaining to increase leverage 
Focus on the big picture 
Negotiation 
Interests 
Entrepreneurial leadership: 
-Hybrid organizations 
-ITU GCA GRC 
-NATOCCDCOE 
Stalemate or gridlock: 
- Violators believe 
expansion best provides foi 
security 
More specific exogenous 
events: 
-Recent attacks 
Classic concern with threat 
and promises 
Focus on agreement 
language 
Operationalization 
Material conditions 
Structural leadership 
(all processes): 
-State and non-state 
actors 
-ICANN 
-ITU 
-CERTs 
Asymmetries in levels 
of effort: 
-Inability to impose 
costs 
Domestic 
constraints 
Administrative or 
bureaucratic politics 
Focus on domestic 
concerns 
States and hybrid organizations are focusing on mitigation as opposed to 
attribution. Attribution efforts continue to focus on protecting the individual state and 
critical infrastructure (the target) as opposed to securing the Internet (the attack vector, or 
domain). Further, unlike the mitigation challenge spurred by the Y2K threat to mature, at 
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this point it is unlikely the attribution issue will be championed as a priority agenda item. 
The political dynamic regarding attack attribution remains one of openness and fluidity, 
the identity of actors who will play major roles in subsequent stages is not fully 
determined, and the timing, or even the likelihood, of a move to the front burner of the 
policy agenda is difficult to predict. 
Players 
Recent attacks portray the primary actors in the current attribution regime. These 
included state security agencies and state and distributed non-state actors that provided 
the plausible deniability at the root of the attribution problem. Cyberspace regime 
formation also identified the numerous players involved in Internet governance and 
attack mitigation efforts. Governance and mitigation efforts have demonstrated 
entrepreneurial leadership in assembling innovative and hybrid organizations such as the 
ITU GCA GRC, NATO CCDCOE, and GreyLogic. Formal attribution efforts, however, 
largely remain firmly within closely held state security organizations. So far, other 
analysts from academia and industry that may participate in attribution efforts from an 
academic perspective lack the capacity of state intelligence and security agencies to move 
to a more entrepreneurial stage. 
Collective-Action Problems 
Attribution efforts continue to focus on protecting the individual state and critical 
infrastructure as opposed to securing the Internet. This exacerbates the collective 
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security problem rooted in the wide variance of how various domestic and international 
actors view the limits of control over the Internet and approaches to addressing it. 
Attribution efforts are a largely relative gains approach. There is no benefit for 
the attacker to be identified. Joint gains can only be realized when identifying attackers 
is in all states best interests, such as non-state-sponsored cyber attacks, crime or 
terrorism. This implies a largely unwelcome level of persistent surveillance and state 
control or oversight over Internet activities, as the next chapter will detail in the case of 
China. Focusing on mitigation efforts leverages more mature efforts and organizations 
while circumventing the relative gains issue. It provides opportunities for broad 
participation in activities without disclosing state secrets that may be involved in 
attribution efforts. 
Without meaningful incentives for cooperation or ability to impose costs, nations 
proliferating or protecting cyberspace attackers seem more satisfied with the status quo 
than with negotiating away any potential leverage they currently enjoy, or expect to enjoy 
in the future. As long as states believe their expansion in cyberspace provides the best 
prospects for their security, there remains insufficient interest to move to the next stage of 
domain formation. To posit miscommunication over attribution describes the current 
regime would be to imply there is any communication at all. Focusing on mitigation 
efforts through hybrid organizations may be the most promising approach to negotiating 
this obstacle to regime formation. 
152 
Context 
The Internet has drastically lowered the barrier to entry to numerous domains, 
irrevocably shifting power to the people. The world has had to come to terms with the 
impact of decentralization powered by the Internet shifting underlying power structures 
within numerous industries. This is clearly a broad change in the political environment 
indicative of the agenda formation stage. 
Recent attacks have provided more specific exogenous events forcing actors to 
address the problem within a more defined context. This has led to some specific actions 
such as pressure on Russia at the EU summit following the Estonian attacks. The only 
draft agreement addressing the scope of this paper, however, is the stillborn Russian 
proposal which focuses on information weapons rather than securing the domain. The 
further inability to so much as agree upon definitions of cyberspace, and attacks and 
attribution therein continues to retard cooperative action on the issue. 
The lack of domestic constraints that would be indicative of a more mature 
regime provides a partial answer to the noted lack of ability to enmesh actors identified in 
chapter four. Without specific issues championed to an elevated place on the agenda, or 
specific agreements to negotiate and base cost-benefit analysis on, there is little substance 
or power to enmesh any actor. The next three hypotheses of regime maturation reinforce 
this point. 
Tactics 
Current attribution tactics portrayed in recent attacks include passive post-attack 
digital forensics, and attack trace back operations. Recent attacks also introduced the 
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limitations of current legal instruments and the resulting reliance upon cooperative 
efforts. Given the scope of the current collective-action problem evidenced in 
cyberspace, tacit bargaining best describes attribution negotiation tactics to date. These 
include attacks showcasing certain capabilities while leaving significant doubt as to 
others. This is again consistent with the agenda formation stage of regime formation. 
The lack of regime maturity to enmesh actors is again evidenced by the absence of 
bureaucratic politics. 
Design Perspectives 
With no plausible draft agreement in sight, the attack attribution regime is clearly 
at a big picture stage of design perspective. This lack of definition of the regime also 
leads to the lack of domestic concerns with the power to enmesh actors over this issue 
area. 
MATURING THE REGIME 
The purpose in languishing over the lack of maturity of the attack attribution 
regime serves more than academic interest. Understanding the regime with respect to 
various hypotheses of regime formation leads to specific recommendations tailored to the 
maturity level of the regime. For where there is lack of progress, lies opportunity. Given 
the regime is still immature and in the agenda formation stage, how might the regime be 
matured? 
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Factors in Regime Origination 
What factors determine whether issues rise to the point parties are willing to 
commit resources?278 There is no accepted single causal mechanism for international 
regime formation. Lessons learned from other domains identify numerous origins. 
While early work favored hegemonic theories, subsequent knowledge-based theories 
emphasizing the role of technological epistemic communities are most cited for 
explaining the origin of the Internet: 
"[the] development of broad rules of governance for the Internet fits the 
definition of an international regime in many ways, but the Internet has no 
central governing authority and the principles, norms, rules and 
decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations are 
converging to manage it are evolving from the interaction of, among 
others, a wide variety of private business firms, governments, universities, 
and scientific, professional, and epistemic communities spread across the 
Recall, however, the collective-action problem experienced in recent attacks based 
on Krasner's criteria for security regime formation and maintenance. While individual 
states may desire a more regulated environment and proposals for international agreements 
evidence collective desires, there remains no significant effort between the major powers or 
seemingly most egregious violators to cooperate in any meaningful way. There are no 
readily apparent incentives significant enough to justify exposing themselves to supposed 
or potential adversaries. 
In this situation conflict and the individualistic pursuit of security in cyberspace are 
not currently seen as costly. There is apparently little risk of being linked with other areas, 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
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such as economics. Without meaningful incentives for cooperation, nations proliferating or 
protecting cyberspace attackers seem more satisfied with the status quo than with 
negotiating away any potential leverage they currently enjoy, or expect to enjoy in the 
future. These states seem to be enjoying the fruits of their expansion in cyberspace, and 
believe it provides the best prospects for their security. 
This stark assessment makes prospects for a formal agreement to advance to the 
negotiation stage of regime formation highly unlikely. Prospects for advancing the regime 
therefore reside in social-practice perspectives to advance cooperative efforts focused on 
attack mitigation. Historical lessons from other domains highlight specific considerations 
for advancing cyberspace attack mitigation and attribution cooperation during the agenda 
formation stage. States and organizations across the globe have come to recognize the 
stake they hold in Internet security, and as a new technology the world has discovered a 
new venue for competition and cooperation. With the recognition of cyberspace as global 
commons, states understand it cannot be contained within strictly national confines, and 
that it must be viewed internationally to use cyberspace as a principal element in global 
economic development. 
Unlike other domains, however, the world has yet to experience or accept the 
ramifications of a cataclysmic cyber attack to elevate the issue to that of high politics. The 
community lacks such a catalyst to form the basis for international arms control and 
monitoring agreements, or initiate formal communications and cooperation to mitigate risks 
including timely and accurate attribution. 
Numerous temporary measures have emerged, of which some such as CERTs and 
hybrid organization development and coordination have survived, and others such as the 
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formal IY2KCC have not. Further advancement of the regime in this way will require such 
temporary measures to gain the support of member nations who value their benefits or 
desire protection from other participating parties. Given the wide variance of views over 
the limits of control of the Internet, exceptions where agreed by the members should be 
considered without retaliation or sanction. 
Attribution in other domains is achieved through a combination of detection 
technology and cooperative measures including observable agreements and dedicated 
communications mechanisms. Significant technical investment should be expected to 
address the attribution problem at the technological level as has been invested in 
maritime, sea, space and nuclear domains. IFF and airspace management tools, maritime 
and space surveillance capabilities, and nuclear detection capabilities are all critical in 
establishing attribution in other domains. Just as technological solutions were required in 
these domains, they were also, however, insufficient. MDA CONOPS, space and 
airspace management procedures and associated international cooperative agreements are 
as important as the technologies themselves. 
The attribution problem is specifically mitigated through observable agreements 
and dedicated communications mechanisms between adversaries. Given the goal of 
preserving non-attribution in the case of benign use, the concept of a claims approach 
similar to that adopted in the telecommunications, space and trade domains may be more 
applicable to cyberspace than that of persistent surveillance. 
One result of attribution efforts in the space domain has been to expand and even 
shift concerns from the threat of direct attack to that of collateral effects. Changing the 
focus from directly detecting and attributing attacks in cyberspace, to that of identifying 
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the impact of collateral effects for a claims-type process may be one avenue to facilitate 
international dialogue in existing venues. This could prove to be a significant variable in 
extending the shadow of the future for potential rational attackers. 
The significant grey area between peace and war provides a notable quandary for 
operations in cyberspace, and difficulty in attributing belligerent and combatant status. 
Rules differ when in a stated conflict than during normal peacetime. Even under 
recognized conflict, deception is permitted to include the use of feigned attacks, false 
intelligence information, electronic deceptions, and use of enemy codes, passwords, and 
countersigns. 
In other domains, behavior alone indicates intent sufficient for attribution of 
combatant or belligerent status. Few weapons are restricted, rather the use of certain 
weapons exhibiting the potential for indiscriminate effects are regulated where agreed. 
Malicious activity in cyberspace is the product of using otherwise benign technology. 
Few technologies are inherently malicious. Just as a maritime vessel may become a 
target subject to attack if it refuses to so much as provide immediate identification upon 
demand, a vessels actions may provide sufficient justification for attack. 
Activities with the potential for indiscriminate effects should not be treated as 
normal operations, and the risk of collateral effects should be minimized. This is one 
area worth exploring for specific discourse and possible agreement. Steps might be taken 
to reduce the risks of cyber war in the near term and reduce reliance on cyber attacks over 
time. Constraining attacks in cyberspace should focus on malicious activities and effects, 
rather than weapons per se. 
158 
Lessons from other domains reinforce the point that management structures are 
most successful when organizational tasks and authorities are well aligned with capability 
and perspective. The sea domain has created a need for MDA and multinational naval 
98 1 
task forces not unlike the current situation experienced in cyberspace. The MDA 
concept leverages sensors, analytical fusion, international cooperation through regional 
hubs, not unlike International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regional offices in the 
air domain, or ccTLD managers and hybrid organizations in cyberspace. Activities are 
allowed to vary from region to region taking into account the general economic, technical 
or social environment of the region concerned.282 
Decentralizing management of certain issues may be another approach to 
addressing the wide variance of views over the limits of control of the Internet. Potential 
solutions to issues of significant variance might include granting exceptions to technical 
standards, operating procedures or Internet governance where agreed by the members 
without retaliation or sanction. 
Confidence-building measures are necessary. Several principles and norms, and 
reasons for abiding by them presume future actions. The assumption that violations, real or 
perceived, lead to the loss of domestic and international support is true only if violations 
have a significant chance of being detected and attributed back to, and result in unfavorable 
consequences for the offender. Victim or community actions actually need to demonstrate 
a capability and willingness to respond to attacks to establish a reasonable expectation of 
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reciprocity. If hostility in the cyberspace area is not expected to spill into other areas, such 
as economics, an important incentive for cooperation will be absent. 
In the absence of attacks, positive reciprocity can be exhibited through peaceful, 
confidence-building measures. The assumption under the international law of armed 
conflict of an eventual return to peace is particularly applicable to cyberspace, as attacks 
may occur during times of no stated conflict engaging the formal international law of 
armed conflict. Improved coordination and technical detection capability to attribute 
attacks, and such responses either through retribution or peaceful confidence-building 
measures may be the most promising avenue for extending the shadow of the future and 
aligning mutual interests among an optimal number of actors. 84 
Addressing Decentralization 
Advancing the regime through agenda formation should leverage the 
proliferation and empowerment of hybrid organizations. Decentralized organizations are 
not invincible, however, defeating them require new strategies. Decentralization through 
hybrid organizations includes empowering regular Internet users and especially trusted 
circles to assist in mitigation, attribution and response. By placing Internet users in a 
position of trust and power, hackers will be ostracized as opposed to glorified. 
Empowering users further leverages hybrid organizations as catalysts to plant the 
principle and champions to proliferate the norm. Hybrid organizations should consider 
recruiting hackers into new and independent virtual watchdog organizations. Maturing 
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hybrid organizations to advance cyberspace security principles and norms is a long-term 
strategy. Changing people's ideology will take time. 
Hybrid organizations provide the opportunity to create small circles, recruiting 
and utilizing people well-trained in conducting network operations, defense, and attack to 
combat would-be attackers. Circles should be empowered through resources 
commensurate with the level of trust in and within the circle, and then allowed a level of 
autonomy consistent with the role of a catalyst. Circle members do not need to know 
how many other circles there are, or their membership. Feedback mechanisms develop 
trust and confidence in circles and their members over time. 
Decentralization shifts the burden of policing from the organization to its users, is 
already prevalent on the Internet, and may be leveraged by centralized governments to 
various extents. Organizations that want to preserve the freedom and utility of the 
Internet from a position of anonymity, and agencies that want to police cyberspace from a 
position of transparency can both create such movements. Because they share the similar 
ideology of preserving the Internet, the two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. In 
fact, while decentralization encourages creativity, it also increases variance, increasing 
odds of the community having the necessary tool or access to attribute and respond to 
future attacks. 
Decentralizing the user experience may also provide the opportunity for the 
global Internet community to swarm around an attack, helping to defend, mitigate, 
attribute and ultimately even respond. It brings the collective knowledge of world to 
bear. Providing information to power holders rapidly arms them with information to 
Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, The starfish and the spider: the unstoppable power ofleaderless 
organizations (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 144-151. 
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respond or to demand answers from those facilitating or acquiescing to the attack.286 
Consider for example Emergency Services integrators' (ESi) software WebEOC, a crisis 
information management system that enables a decentralized community of first 
responders and managers. Open communication on the scene provides information from 
the edge of the network.287 
Decentralization should mitigate the relative gains problem by substantially 
increasing capacity and transparency while reasonably preserving anonymity, and 
decreasing cost while leveraging existing technical and legal expertise. Formal and 
informal communication mechanisms within and between circles provides an important 
confidence-building measure, and facilitates others. Through increased transparency, 
states are kept more honest, moving state-sponsored cyber warfare out of the grey area 
between peace and war. Because so much cyberspace development and attack analysis 
and mitigation happens in the open, previously perceived relative gains are recognized as 
joint gains by Internet users in a non-threatening way. Attacks and attackers are 
ostracized as Internet users are empowered to police the net on their own. 
As achieved in other domains, such a strategy provides numerous incentives while 
ceding little, if any sovereignty. Cyberspace attack capabilities can still be developed. 
Cyberspace attacks may even be employed when in a stated conflict. Although attacks 
come increasingly at risk of attribution, clearly detrimental to criminal attacks, attacks 
during a stated conflict are simply restrained within other generally recognized laws of 
war. 
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While decentralization is a core element of hybrid organizations, centralization is 
good in many areas to include security and finances. Search for a centralized-
decentralized sweet spot should be a continuing priority to remain competitive.288 
In order to centralize hacker organizations, incentives should be considered to 
shift hackers' power from symbolic to material. Hacker organizations gaining material 
resources provide leaders power to reward and punish by giving or withholding 
resources. The power to reward and punish shifts once flat power structures into 
hierarchical, centralized organizations, able to be identified, targeted, and ultimately 
controlled. 
Centralizing hacker organizations is also a difficult task. Offering lucrative 
property rights to hacker tools might be one method in confronting the problem. "The 
moment you introduce property rights into the equation, everything changes.. .with power 
over property rights, the catalyst turns into a CEO and circles become competitive."289 In 
cases where organizations are so decentralized there is no one to grant property rights to, 
other financial incentives should be considered for hackers to keep things legal. 
Variables in Regime Formation 
Ideas, power, cooperative efforts, and non-state actors290 all play a role in shaping 
expectations and advancing institutional learning to enmesh and coerce actors. 
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Table 4 below illustrates how stepwise processes might be applied to enmesh actors and 
coerce compliance in this case. 
Table 4. Recommendations for regime maturation 
Ideas 
Power 
Cooperative 
Efforts 
Non-State 
Actors 
Shaping Expectations 
-Focus on descriptive 
practice 
-Address de-
centralization 
-Use future Internet 
versions to inform future 
investments and adopt 
specific measures to 
shape decision-making 
under uncertainty 
-Leverage sensors, 
analytical fusion, 
international cooperation 
through regional or 
domain hubs, such as 
ccTLD managers and 
hybrid organizations 
-Promote confidence-
building measures 
focusing on relatively 
uncontroversial 
programmatic activities 
rather than preliminarily 
laying down regulatory 
prescriptions 
Institutional Learning 
-Understand clear 
delineation between 
sovereign and 
common elements 
or aspects of the 
domain is not a 
prerequisite to 
cooperation 
-Shift emphasis on 
attribution to justify 
action to effects to 
support claims 
-Use negotiating 
rounds to recognize 
joint gains and 
advance the regime 
piecemeal 
-Leverage venues 
such as WSIS 
dynamic coalitions 
-Place Internet users 
in position of power 
and trust to change 
ideology 
Enmeshing Actors 
-Allow activities 
across regions or 
domains to vary 
taking into account 
the general 
economic, 
technical or social 
environment of the 
region concerned 
-Create 
transparency to 
elicit compliance in 
cases where actors 
have incentives to 
violate rules 
-Incorporate 
property rights and 
financial incentives 
to centralize hacker 
organizations 
-Advance 
temporary 
organizations 
operating under 
loose authorities 
-Align 
organizational 
tasks and 
authorities with 
capabilities and 
perspectives 
Coercing Compliance 
-Extend the shadow 
of the future through 
dispute settlement 
mechanism(s) 
-Focus on effects as 
opposed to 
technologies 
-Include remedies to 
force compliance 
-Secure international 
funding to spur 
development and 
provide a tool to 
enmesh actors 
through bureaucratic 
bargaining and 
impose costs through 
the withholding of 
funds to detractors 
and non-participants 
-Focus on behavior in 
addition to technical 
attribution 
-Incorporate 
improved technical 
standards such as new 
versions of the 
Internet, and ISP 
requirements to 
operate over it to 
inform investment 
decisions and shape 
decision-making 
-Proliferate and empower hybrid organizations 
164 
Coercing Compliance 
Environmental regimes were successful at establishing standards users were 
required to meet to conduct business profitably or at all. This was accomplished less by 
increasing incentives to comply with the rules than through eliminating opportunities to 
violate regulative prescriptions. The use of standards was effective because they coerced 
a variety of non-state actors to play by the rules of the regime, avoiding manipulative 
tactics often accompanying national regulatory efforts.291 
In cyberspace this approach would incorporate improved technical standards 
such as new versions of the Internet, and ISP requirements to operate over it. Given 
current Internet governance arrangements, ICANN may be in the best position to advance 
this approach. The combination of particular technical standards and operating 
requirements might be taken up by a WSIS IGF dynamic coalition to achieve greater 
international consensus and capital. 
Similarly, the trade domain relies upon negotiations and consultation to resolve 
trade conflicts. Significant time is allowed to make a claim, even longer for specific 
findings through arguments, and both well in advance of known total damage. While such 
a feature does little to mitigate an attack in progress, the prospect of lengthy litigation and 
significant penalties in the face of world opinion may serve to significantly lengthen the 
shadow of the future, impacting the cost-benefit analysis of prospective rational 
aggressors. Either approach provides a mechanism to impose costs through operating 
authorities or dispute settlement. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 265-266. 
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Coercing compliance with international agreements in the traditional security 
domains includes remedies to force adherence, including reprisals and war crimes 
tribunals. Defensive actions designed to prevent or mitigate an attack are justified as 
long as the general principles of necessity and proportionality are met. 
Distinctions between neutrals and belligerents, and combatants and non-
combatants, and the methods for so designating continue to be instrumental in achieving 
attribution, although the methods in cyberspace may be unique. Protected signs, symbols 
and electronic signals used to identify personnel, objects and activities entitled to 
protected status. The use of exclusion zones promulgated via NOTAMS may be useful 
metaphors for methods to distinguish and attribute combatant status and activity in 
cyberspace. Just as CERTs and other Internet security organizations send out alerts, 
specific mitigation procedures based on current practice and authorized in the event of a 
cyber attack might provide enhanced ability to mitigate and attribute the attack, while 
preserving normal Internet operations over the rest of cyberspace. 
Enmeshing States 
Regimes tend to launch relatively uncontroversial or seemingly unimportant 
programmatic activities rather than preliminarily laying down regulatory prescriptions. 
Over time the regime becomes increasingly influential as its core issues gain political 
prominence and the participants find themselves in a web of institutionalized activities 
from which they cannot easily extricate themselves. In this way, the regime draws 
governments into normatively grounded social practices they cannot ignore in political 
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terms, albeit more so for some states than others.292 Again, WSIS dynamic coalitions 
provide one such venue for this approach. 
Temporary organizations operating under loose authorities serve to advance 
regimes in the absence of formal agreements. As one example from the air domain, in 
view of the inevitable delays in ICAO Convention ratification, the Chicago Conference 
signed an Interim Agreement creating a technical and advisory PICAO to collaborate in 
the field of international civil aviation. This is similar to the current status of ICANN or 
WSIS IGF in Internet governance. 
Shaping Expectations 
Another tendency of regimes is to influence behavior by shaping expectations of 
various parties about rules and procedures likely to be adopted in the future, even when 
they do not mandate specific actions at the time of their creation. Regimes influencing 
behavior through shaping expectations is particularly true where key actors are required 
to make large investment decisions with extended amortization schedules. Shaping 
expectations highlights the role of assessments of current and future trends in the 
development of international regimes to inform decision making under uncertainty by 
those responsible for investment decisions. 
Shaping expectations is an especially insightful consideration for the current 
stage of agenda formation as new versions of the Internet are being considered. A 
specific engagement plan and metrics based on actors consideration or adoption of 
292
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specific measures might be a useful mechanism to inform decision-making under 
uncertainty and track regime maturation progress. 
Institutional Learning 
Cooperative efforts might leverage existing venues such as WSIS dynamic 
coalitions to place Internet users in a position of power and trust, and to advance certain 
ideas fundamental to addressing the relative gains dilemma over cyberspace attacks. 
Regimes tend to initiate stepwise processes leading to desired results over time. For 
example, clear delineation between sovereign and common elements or aspects of 
cyberspace is not a prerequisite to cooperation. The use of negotiating rounds advances 
the regime piecemeal to recognize joint gains. One of the goals of such a stepwise 
process would be to shift the dialogue from one of attribution in order to justify military 
action, to identifying effects of cyberspace attacks to support a civil claims process. 
Significant Intervening Variables 
Any number of intervening variables may enter the equation in specific cases. 
The influence of intervening variables requires viewing regime effectiveness through the 
linkages or interactions among the institutional properties of regimes and sources of 
behavior, as well as various features of the specific behavioral complex. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 268. 
Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral 
Mechanisms (MIT, 1999), 271-272. 
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Key variables that seem to apply to the current situation in cyberspace, include: 
• The extent to which victims were able to acquire jurisdiction over those 
responsible for the problem; 
• The willingness of national governments to translate regime rules, procedures, 
and programmatic commitments into practices successful in directing the 
behavior of the right set of subjects; and 
• The presence and importance of a variety of non-state actors other than those 
whose behavior was the source of the problem itself. 
Perhaps the most poignant intervening variable in cyberspace is its level of 
decentralization addressed in the hybrid organization strategies above. 
Mitigating Cyberspace Attack Attribution through Agenda Formation 
A concerted effort leveraging hybrid organizations during agenda formation can 
significantly shape the character of the discourse employed in subsequent stages. In 
designing effective institutions, environmental regimes were more effective when they 
were able to:297 
• Embed themselves in the internal political dynamics of member states, as their 
effectiveness varied considerably among issue areas, cases, and even time; 
• Contribute to an improved understanding of the problem to be solved and to 
evolve the handle new tasks was similarly instrumental to regime 
effectiveness; 
• Create transparency to elicit compliance in cases where actors have incentives 
to violate rules; 
• Redirect the interplay of political forces within the domestic policymaking 
arenas of key members, especially key members critical to the success of the 
overall arrangement and arrangements involving large numbers of members; 
• Maximize their force in a number of different domestic political settings; and 
• Focus on the behavior of actors giving rise to problems, commensurate with 
the extent to which behavioral change serves to alleviate the problems. 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1998), 196. 
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Maturing international cooperation to mitigate the problem of cyber-space attack 
attribution may best be approached along the following policy approach based on Table 4 
recommendations: 
• Cooperative technical development through joint investment allowing for 
variance in views over control of the Internet across technical, economic, 
social and political regions; 
• International funding tied to improved technical and legal standards to spur 
development and provide a tool to enmesh actors through bureaucratic 
bargaining and impose costs through the withholding of funds to detractors 
and non-participants; 
• Empowerment of hybrid organizations cooperating in practical areas of global 
Internet security in order to: 
o Advance cooperative Internet sensing and analysis through regional or 
domain hubs incorporating behavioral analysis, activities and effects; 
o Place Internet users in a position of power and trust, capitalizing on 
temporary organizations; and 
• International consultations, such as the current IGF dynamic coalitions, in the 
form of negotiating rounds to: 
o Initially focus on descriptive practice as opposed to normative efforts 
such as addressing the wide variance in views over control of the 
Internet, and delineate between sovereign and common elements, or 
agree to the limits of such delineation; 
o Promote regulatory prescriptions in a stepwise approach as identified 
through cooperative efforts, such as property rights and penalties for 
software and malware, and Internet crime legislation and recourse; and 
o Develop a dispute settlement mechanism focusing on effects, again 
allowing for variance across technical, economic, social and political 
regions. 
Such an approach recognizes that formal agreements and procedures generally 
require years, even decades to form and the necessary catalyst to initiate them may not be 
present in the cyberspace domain to date. The broad and amorphous nature of 
cyberspace leaves significant room for paradigmatic arguments, complicating the 
development of international dialogue and cooperation. Keeping in mind negotiations 
gain the best traction when initiated by a few principle actors, draft documents or 
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provisional organizations will be beneficial to begin negotiations and eventual 
implementation. 
Normative instruments should provide clear benefit at minimal cost. Agreements 
and cooperative procedures require significant and observable benefits at modest cost to 
national sovereignty and self-action for adoption. 
Finally, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between conflicts of interests and 
misunderstandings arising out of differences in the political structure and policy culture 
of participants during the agenda formation stage. This requires an analysis of the links 
between interests and policy preferences, and the relative contributions of problem 
structures and processes.298 These are matters of comparative politics left for limited 
analysis in the next chapter in the case of China. 
Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
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CHAPTER VII 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN 
THE CASE OF CHINA 
Cyberspace attacks in the form of espionage have become a matter of daily front 
page news. Operation Aurora, the December 2009 to January 2010 cyber attack on 
Google subsequently attributed to servers in China is an excellent case in point. 
A March 2009 Information Warfare Monitor report promulgated findings of a 10-
month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against Tibetan institutions. The 
investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, 
discovered much more, including a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries. 
Targets included computers located at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, 
international organizations, news media, and NGOs. 
"Significantly, close to 30% of the infected computers can be considered 
high-value and include the ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, 
Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados and Bhutan; 
embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, 
Thailand, Taiwan, Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development 
Bank; news organizations; and an unclassified computer located at NATO 
headquarters.. .Documentation and reverse engineering of the modus 
operandi of the GhostNet system—including vectors, targeting, delivery 
mechanisms, data retrieval and control systems—reveals a covert, 
difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage system capable of taking 
full control of affected systems."300 
From the evidence at hand, however, it was not clear whether the attacker(s) 
really knew what they had penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for 
Kim Zetter, "Google hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show," Wired, January 14, 
2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora (accessed February 20, 2010). 
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commercial or intelligence value. While some may conclude the evidence points 
definitively to China as the culprit, attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or 
targeted intelligence gathering operations by the Chinese state would be wrong and 
misleading. The numbers can tell a different story. China is presently the world's largest 
Internet population. The sheer number of young digital natives online can more than 
account for the increase in Chinese malware. With more creative people using 
computers, it is expected that China, and Chinese individuals, will account for a larger 
proportion of cybercrime. 
China is particularly susceptible to being used as a platform for third country 
attacks as its networks are especially vulnerable for a variety of reasons. Chinese 
networks often employ legacy equipment, poor security practices, and perhaps most 
important, the widespread use of pirated software. "[Up] to 90% of the software (such as 
operating systems) used in China is pirated."301 
The threshold for engaging in cyber espionage is falling. Cybercrime kits are now 
available online, and their use is clearly on the rise, in some cases by organized crime and 
other private actors. Socially engineered malware is the most common and potent; it 
introduces Trojans onto a system, and then exploits social contacts and files to further 
propagate infections. 
Certainly Chinese cyber espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities 
have made it clear they consider cyberspace a strategic domain, which helps redress the 
military imbalance between China and the rest of the world, particularly the U.S. They 
301
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have correctly identified cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. military 
and economic dominance depends.302 
In 2007 it was reported: "Chinese hackers, some believed to be from the People's 
Liberation Army, have been attacking the computer networks of British government 
departments."303 An April 2009 article identified no less than eight significant cyber 
espionage U.S. government breaches, including the Analyzer attacks mentioned in 
chapter two, e-mail invasions of the Obama and McCain campaign systems and White 
House e-mail archives in 2008, as well as the following:304 
• A 1999 case dubbed "Moonlight Maze" involved Russian hackers accessing 
Department of Defense computers for an entire year before being detected. 
The cyber thieves stole mountains of sensitive data, including information 
from nuclear weapon labs, NASA, and various defense contractors' networks. 
• In 2004, a group of Chinese hackers called "Titan Rain" started making their 
way into U.S. military systems. It is believed the cybercrooks gained access 
to all sorts of sensitive information, including military vehicle plans and the 
Army and Air Force's flight-planning software. Investigators think their 
techniques were used at the U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering 
Command at Fort Huachuca, AZ; the Defense Information Systems Agency in 
Arlington, VA; the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego; and the U.S. 
Army Space and Strategic Defense installation in Huntsville, AL. 
• The first week of April 2009, someone breached the U.S. electrical grid and 
left behind malware meant to shut down power service. The cyberspies, 
thought to have been from China and Russia, installed software tools that 
could potentially disable parts of the grid system. 
• Also in April 2009 it was discovered cyberspies hacked into government 
computers and stole sensitive information on a next-generation stealth fighter, 
lifting terabytes of data on the Pentagon's $300 billion Joint Strike Fighter 
project, including details about the aircraft's design that could expose 
vulnerabilities. The hack is believed to have happened through a hole in a 
contractors' network including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and 
BAE Systems. 
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The recommendations identified in the previous chapter are now applied in a 
notional thought experiment against China's information war theory and strategy 
development over the years 1995-2003, and their resulting rampant intrusions into United 
States networks.305 As such, the assessment complements the earlier case studies through 
counterfactual reconstruction of the flow of events in the relative presence or absence of 
cyberspace regime cooperation. The evaluation reviews the decision-making process of 
key actors at critical junctures including Chinese assessments of U.S. operations in 
Kosovo in 2000 and Iraq in 2003. 
The previous chapter also identified the need to clearly distinguish between 
conflicts of interests and misunderstandings arising out of differences in the political 
structure and policy culture of participants during the agenda formation stage. 
Understanding the influence of Chinese political structures and policy cultures requires 
an exhaustive review of source literature beyond the scope of this current study to 
compare to the primarily U.S. perspective of regime formation and maturation presented 
in chapter four. Fortunately, such an effort has been undertaken by the Fort Leavenworth 
U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). FMSO researches, writes, and 
publishes from unclassified sources about the military establishments, doctrines, and 
practices of selected foreign armed forces, and studies a variety of civil-military and 
transnational security issues affecting the U.S. and its military forces. Timothy Thomas 
completed such an exhaustive compilation, translation with the assistance of the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and analysis over the years 1995-2003 in his 2004 
book, Dragon Bytes, Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice. The following 
305 «yg warned of China 'cyber-spying,'" British Broadcasting Corporation, November 20, 2008. 
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thought experiment applies the recommendations against major tenants of Thomas' 
research in the area of Chinese computer confrontation operations, augmented with 
supporting references where appropriate. 
Chinese Information Warfare Theory and Practice 1995-2000 
Although Chinese analysts had written about information warfare (IW) theory 
since about 1985, the Chinese military had done little to advance or apply the concept. 
They were somewhat surprised when IW articles began to appear in the U.S. in the early 
1990s, and when concepts and tactics were later inserted into field exercises. 
The 1991 Gulf War presented Chinese leadership with the stark realization of the 
power and precision of an information-based force, and that without advancements, the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) would risk becoming an anachronism of the 
mechanized-warfare age.306 In the words of Major General Wang Pufeng, former 
Director of the Academy of Military Science Strategy Department in Beijing: "In the near 
future, information warfare will control the form and future of war. We recognize this 
developmental trend of information warfare and see it as a driving force in the 
modernization of China's military and combat readiness."307 Early Chinese thoughts 
mirrored U.S. developments; however, a distinctly Chinese approach was being debated 
behind the scenes, crystallizing around the 1997-1998 timeframe. 
By conceptualizing underlying cultural, cognitive, and ideological characteristics, 
the Chinese began to instantiate IW theory and practice to allow a quality IW force to 
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empower China, as well as other less capable nations, to theoretically threaten more 
powerful nations through electronic attacks against a nation's financial institutions. Such 
a capability could further hold the worldwide economy at risk through dependence on the 
Internet for financial transactions.308 
As of 1996, Chinese thoughts on IW focused on controlling the flow of 
information and intelligence, protecting one's own systems while attacking the enemy's. 
Through 1997-1998 Chinese definitions and approaches still closely paralleled U.S. and 
international development. One translation emphasized IW as rendering the operational 
space unclear and indistinct to the enemy while making it transparent to one's own 
forces. Chinese emphasis remained on hindering adversary decision-making as opposed 
to attacking enemy information or information systems. "To achieve victory in 
information warfare, the central issue is control of information."309 
A serious debate over IW reemerged in 1999 reflecting IW as a "pitched battle 
against one another in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social, and 
technological fields.. .forcing enemy troops to surrender without a fight,"310 still implying 
IW as more of a cognitive than systems-related process. Another author emphasized the 
struggle to seize and maintain control over information, "capitalizing on and sabotaging 
the enemy's information resources, information system, and informationized-weapon 
systems.. .as well as utilizing and protecting one's own."311 
Timothy L. Thomas, Dragon Bytes, Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice. (Fort Leavenworth, 
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Another Chinese general further distinguished between fighting an IW-enabled 
complete war while defining "informationized" warfare as an entirely new form of 
warfare; one that would not be realized until twenty-first century informationized forces 
were available, but that would constitute the soul of Sun Tsu's "subduing the enemy 
without battle." Three areas of IW included command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), electronic warfare, and 
finally computer attack and defense methods. The concept of information-network 
warfare (INW) was advanced as a confrontation on the network between two opposing 
sides in war. Another author recommended the PLA establish an authoritative, 
centralized and united network People's War organ able to control information operations 
and networking activities. Such an organ would also support mobilization exercises and 
education on People's war on the net. 
It was clear China intended to uphold the principle of combining military and 
civilian dual-use networks, while developing limited Internet service. Chinese focus, 
however, remained on cognitive processes, perceptions and beliefs, reflecting a 
competition to gain the initiative over information resources and control over information 
production, transmission, and processing. The strategic role of communications and the 
media was noted, particularly the deterrent effect it might possess through its ability to 
manipulate the populace. 
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There was also considerable work specifically in the area of cyberspace attack 
operations, or in Chinese terminology, computer confrontation operations: 
"There will be point-to-point confrontation between computers as well as 
theater-to-theater confrontation. There will be wireless confrontation as 
well as confrontation via cables.. .there will be wartime confrontation as 
well as confrontation in peacetime. There will be confrontation between 
military computers as well as between civilian computers."312 
"In the final analysis, information warfare is conducted by people. The basic 
great plan is to cultivate talented people suited to information warfare.. .Scientific 
research institutions should also engage in research on information warfare."313 The PLA 
advanced IW organizations and training over this timeframe to include the lead 
Communications Command Academy well respected for an IW curriculum analyzing 
strategic, operational, and tactical IW requirements. The Academy is located near the 
reserve component IW regiment, an important link to China's emphasis on a reserve 
force structure. Also the Information Engineering University, the Science and 
Engineering University, National Defense Science and Technology University, and the 
Navy Engineering College helped to cultivate professionals for high-tech warfare. 
Disciplines include electronic engineering, information engineering, network 
engineering, and other key information-warfare technologies as their core. One 
conclusion from an April-June 1999 event involving some sixty senior officers studying 
high-tech warfare during the Kosovo conflict was that the information umbrella is the 
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most important factor, and the opponent's nerve center the most important military 
target.314 
The universities and colleges reflected a PLA vision of IW as a strategic combat 
effectiveness multiplier. Computer confrontation training included hardware, software, 
electromagnetic and virus confrontation, in times of both peace and war, and military 
versus civilian systems. Offensive training included virus design, organizing virus 
invasions and control contagions, conducting electromagnetic jamming, deciphering data 
and gaining unauthorized access to the other side's computer networks. Numerous 
significant training events were undertaken between 1997 and 2000. Events included the 
development of a computer-virus warfare capability, development and use of a military 
information network superhighway, computer attack tactics to hit information networks, 
links and points, and confrontational campaign exercises on the Internet.315 
In their book Information War, Zhu Wenguan and Chen Taiyi noted the necessity 
of a preemptive, active offense to disrupt and destroy enemy computer offensive forces, 
and that the PLA had established small brigades of offensive and defensive computer 
confrontation forces to conduct such attacks. They noted the units must be trained 
together using one another as targets, implying the units already existed and were 
practicing against each other. A November 1999 PLA Daily article stated China may 
develop an IW branch of service. The branch would constitute a net force including 
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scanning, offensive, defensive, recovery, and masquerade, or deception technologies that 
could assist someone to masquerade as a commander and take over the net.316 
Chinese analysts meticulously studied the use of armed force during the 1991 
Gulf War, the fight for Kosovo,317 and subsequent fighting in Iraq, noting the integration 
of military strikes and psychological-warfare activities and the increased strategic role of 
mass media during these operations. A number of Chinese authors identified networks as 
the most important aspect of the technological battle. 
"Network psychological warfare is a new topic in psychological-warfare 
defense, but networks will become the main psychological-warfare 
battlefield in the future. Global networks provide more space in which to 
engage in propaganda. Network data can be put online in secrecy by 
almost anyone; it is difficult to verify who the providers of network data 
are; and access to information is not subject to restrictions of time or 
place. Network attacks can throw a country's social, political, and 
economic life into chaos, producing a shock effect on people's minds and 
leading to political instability. In order to develop network defense, China 
must develop network sovereignty, establish laws for network activities, 
and establish information protection forces. Creating competent forces for 
information war and psychological warfare will help ensure China's 
information security and psychological security."318 
China uniquely integrated its IW theory into its People's War concept. A 
multitude of computer operators conducting cyber warfare were to defend the nation 
against an electronic invader from laptops even from their own homes,319 in the form of a 
decentralized and empowered hybrid cyber army. "The people's war of the past was 
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conducted in tangible space, but information war.. .is conducted even more in intangible 
space, such as in electromagnetic fields. It is.. .also a "computer battlefield" in the 
sheltered laboratories and control rooms."320 
"Some Chinese theorists have recommended organizing network special 
warfare detachments and computer experts to form a shock brigade of 
"network warriors" to accomplish this task. These detachments will look 
for critical nodes and control centers on networks and sabotage them."321 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Chinese Defense Ministry established the NET 
Force research organization to evaluate Chinese vulnerabilities. NET Force soon 
expanded to evaluating vulnerabilities of other nations, especially the U.S., Japan and 
South Korea. NET Force continued to grow, and was soon joined by an irregular civilian 
militia known as the Red Hackers Union (RHU), several hundred thousand patriotic 
Chinese programmers and Internet engineers wishing to defend and support the 
homeland.322 
The emphasis on reserve personnel was a critical link to Chinese People's War 
and local-war theories and effectively decentralized the force structure. By 2000, China 
had built a networked civil-military force to conduct network People's War. This 
consisted of a reserve telecom force structure that included a reserve telecom regiment 
with an information industrial base, and a reserve contingent of high-tech telecom and 
transmission personnel. These personnel specialized in satellite, radio, relay, digital, 
telegraph and telephone, and optical-fiber telecoms. 
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This hybrid organizational structure was further empowered through partnering at 
the technical level. By the end of December 2000, the PLA and reserve forces had 
reportedly developed their own web sites and simulation centers. On January 7, 2001 
"several unidentified companies agreed to form the China C-Net Strategic Alliance, a 
second-generation, Internet-like network for China's government and industry."323 
Subunits of the People's Armed Police Corps underwent intensive IW training, and by 
1999 emergency communications subunits were providing support to combat troops. The 
Shenyang military region alone included over one hundred militia high-tech subunits 
covering seventeen specialized fields such as modern communications, computers, 
automatic control, and electronic countermeasures. 
"In order to stem the tide of Internet crime, China reportedly increased the 
size of its Internet police force in 2000 to some 300,000 personnel. These 
crime fighters are part of the Ministry of Public Security and, thus, may 
have jobs other than fighting crime (espionage, etc.). The Internet police 
are mainly responsible for analyzing information content flowing through 
local communication systems or the Internet, fighting computer viruses, 
cracking down on Internet crimes, and stopping the spread of "harmful 
information."324 
In response to Allied operations in the battle for Kosovo, Chinese analysts noted 
NATO prevented third parties from providing intelligence information to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), creating a NATO information blockade. The Serbs also 
used the Internet to fight NATO by setting up websites describing NATO air strikes, and 
trying to overload NATO systems with excessive numbers of e-mail. 
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"Active, protective measures taken by NATO were well advised and paid 
dividends. The Chinese Liberation Army Daily disclosed on 27 July 1999 
that a "network battle" was fought between Chinese and US hackers 
following the 8 May bombing of the Chinese embassy. US hackers, 
according to the report, aimed their counterattack at the following Web 
sites: 
Xin Lang Wang or Sina—http://home.sina.com.cn 
Zhongwen Re Xun or Yesite—http://www.yesite.com 
Shanghai Wang Sheng or Shanghai Web Boom (no http listed) 
The Chinese initiated the short cyber war by altering the home page of the 
US Embassy in Beijing, writing on it "down with the Barbarians." The 
Chinese also reported that they caused a blackout at a few US political and 
military Web sites and some three hundred civilian Web sites. The 
methodology for performing these hacks, according to the PLA Daily 
article, was the mobilization of thousands and thousands of net users to 
issue a ping command to certain Web sites at the same time. This caused 
servers to overload and paralyzed these Web sites. In addition, thousands 
and thousands of e-mails were sent daily that blocked mail servers. 
Viruses were sent via e-mail, and attacks were launched with "hacker 
tools" hidden in certain programs. The PLA Daily article called for 
developing a computer network warfare capability, training a large 
number of network fighters in PLA academies, strengthening network 
defenses in China, and absorbing a number of civilian computer masters to 
take part in future network wars."325 
The Kosovo conflict convinced the PLA it must use short-term solutions while 
modernizing. China did not expect to catch up to the U.S. in the next decade, however, 
the interdependence of PLA IW capability with building the nations information 
economy provided serious will to attempt just that. 
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The battle for Kosovo was a catalyst to speed PLA modernization from 
mechanized to informationized forces. 
"China, instead of building bigger and better, in the mid-1980's decided to 
place emphasis on economic construction and cut its army by one million 
men. At the same time the information age began to emerge, and.. .there 
is a vast gray between peace and war in which the struggle will be largely 
decided."327 "Thus, the 1995-2000 period represented five years of 
learning and advancement for the Chinese military.. .watching coalition 
actions in the Gulf War in 1991 and.. .the war over Kosovo in 1999. Not 
only was theory advanced, but exercises were held and new training 
methods presented."328 
In the U.S., the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1202) 
directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the current and future military 
strategy of the People's Republic of China addressing the current and probable future 
course of military-technological development on the People's Liberation Army. The 
report also included the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, 
security strategy, and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational 
concepts, through the next 20 years.329 
Summary 1995-2000 
In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, Chinese leadership recognized the power and 
precision of an information-based force. A distinctly Chinese approach crystallized 
around the 1997-1998 timeframe to allow a quality IW force to threaten more powerful 
nations through electronic attacks against a nation's financial institutions, or even the 
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worldwide economies financial transactions. Early efforts focused on the control of 
information, computer confrontation capabilities and forces were developed, and 
exercises and operations were conducted. Networks were identified as the most 
important aspect of the technological battle, and China uniquely integrated its IW theory 
into its People's War concept to include a multitude of computer operators conducting 
cyber warfare in the form of a decentralized and empowered hybrid cyber army. By 
2000, China had built a networked civil-military force to conduct network People's War, 
including reserve telecommunications forces incorporated into the PLA force structure. 
The battle for Kosovo was a catalyst to speed PLA modernization from mechanized to 
informationized forces. 
Over the 1995-2000 timeframe it is clear China recognized new technologies in 
the emerging domain of cyberspace and their corresponding destructive potential leading 
to new venues for competition. Unlike similar stages in other domains, however, areas 
for potential cooperation seem to have been either missed, or not capitalized upon. 
Catalyzing events including the 1991 Gulf War and 1999 Kosovo conflict spurred 
competition; however, even in the shadow of Y2K no cataclysmic cyber event 
demonstrated the destructive potential of cyber attacks requiring international attention. 
Even though the open access of the Internet was clearly recognized as a principal element 
in global economic development,330 it did not lead to increased international cooperation 
to secure cyberspace. Rather, the militarization and effectiveness of cyber-enabled 
military forces led directly to a situation of competition and relative gains. 
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Chinese Information Warfare Theory and Practice 2001-2003 
In October 2000, Major General Xu Xiaoyan, head of the General Staffs 
Communications Department, spoke of the tightening coordination between military and 
civilian information resources, and the need for "information mobilization" to be 
conducted during peacetime to strengthen and further enable networks to assist economic 
policy and national security. He noted information attacks in peacetime can cause social 
disorder and achieve the art of winning without fighting. 
"All locations where networks can extend will become IW battlefields. 
No matter if it is the citizens of any country, no matter what locality, as 
long as they possess certain computer knowledge and master certain 
network attack skills, they can then apply the mouse under their thumb to 
war on the network, enabling the global nature of IW."331 
In the fall of 2001 Shanghai's National Defense Mobilization Committee 
reportedly established an Information Mobilization Office with the goal of creating a 
synchronous and real-time coordination mechanism with reliable communications to 
improve military-civilian war exercises and mobilization capacities. "To improve its skill 
base, the PLA has been recruiting specialists via its reserve officer selection program in 
order to design, comprehend, and execute a full-spectrum information 
operations/information warfare (IO/IW) campaign." 
T I T 
C4I systems were considered both China's and the enemy's center of gravity, 
and according to at least one author "the main forms of future combat operations would 
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be electronic warfare, network warfare, computer virus warfare, noncontact operations, 
and space warfare." 34 By 2003 network attacks were a popular topic across the board in 
Chinese writings, and it was clear reserve forces continued to play an important role in 
PLA IW planning and offensive strategies. In February 2003 the U.S. Strategic 
Command announced plans to develop a network attack task force, and China announced 
its own units the following month at the March 2003 People's Congress.335 
As a result of work over this timeframe, China's military leaders began to speak 
of leading military transformation by information warfare themes. Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin, pointed out in April 2003: "The essence of 
high-tech warfare is informationization and.. .IW will be the major form of warfare in the 
twenty-first century." Whereas analysts seldom, if ever, mentioned an active offense 
prior to 2000, in that year the main IW proponent on the General Staff, Major General 
Dai Qingmin, stated: "In the age of IW the active offense is necessary.. .to maintain the 
initiative." In 2001, China's National Defense University published a book discussing 
"the development of preemption strategies and the conduct of a "war of annihilation" 
strategy against enemy networks."336 
Strategy was also advanced over this timeframe, with an emphasis on thirty-six 
traditional Chinese stratagems. The three thousand year-old stratagems remain very 
applicable in today's high-tech world. 
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For example: 
"Strategem One is "fool the emperor to cross the sea." This means that in 
order to lower an enemy's guard you must act in the open while hiding 
your true intentions under the guise of common, daily activities. The IW 
application would be to use regular e-mail services or business links over 
the Internet to mask the insertion of malicious code or viruses. Strategem 
Two is "Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao." This means that when the enemy is 
too strong to attack directly, then attack something he holds dear. The IW 
application is that if you can't hit someone with nuclear weapons due to 
the catastrophic effects on your own country, then attack the servers and 
nets responsible for Western financial, power, political and other systems 
stability with electrons. Strategem Three is "Kill with a borrowed sword." 
This means that when you do not have the means to attack your enemy 
directly, then attack using the strength of another. The IW application is 
simple—send your viruses or malicious code through a surrogate of 
another country. Strategem Four is "Await the exhausted enemy at your 
ease." This means that it is an advantage to choose the time and place for 
battle. Encourage your enemy to expend his energy in futile quests while 
you conserve your strength. When he is exhausted and confused, you 
attack with energy and purpose. The IW application here is to use the 
People's War theory to send out multiple attacks while saving the 
significant attack for the time when all of the West's computer emergency 
response teams (CERT) are engaged. Finally Strategem Five is "Loot a 
burning house." This means that when a country is beset by internal 
conflicts, then it will be unable to deal with an outside threat. The IW 
application is to put hackers inside the West (under the guise of a student 
or business) and attack from the inside. While chaos reigns, steal from 
information resource bases." 
By 2003, Chinese IW specialists offered fewer definitions, indicating the end of 
the debate: 
"[It] is clear that from 2000-2003 some conclusions were reached by the 
Chinese leadership regarding the nature of future war and IW's role in 
it.. .Real-world incidents, such as the hacker confrontation over the 
collision between a US EP-3 plane and a Chinese jet fighter, have affected 
Chinese IW perceptions.. .The number of IW related training exercises has 
risen sharply.. .In short, China's IW theory is much more reflective of 
China's culture and traditions, and the requirements of the times, than it 
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was some nine years ago." 
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A January 2003 issue of Jiefangjun Bao called for enhancing China's capability to 
launch electronic and network-based warfare. PLA representatives at the 2003 National 
People's Congress revealed the PLA was transitioning from mechanized to high-tech 
information warfare units with the ability to conduct network warfare on the Internet, and 
had the capability to transfer data via remote sensing satellites. Little mention was made 
in open sources of specific reserve units' activities between 2000 and 2003; however, the 
monthly journal of the PLA Academy of Military Science, Guofang, provided specific 
instructions in late 2003 on network attack activities to reserve units. Li Mingrang stated 
an auxiliary combat force system with People's War requirements must be built in China 
out of the reserves, and called for the development of "network People's War:" 
"[There] now are nearly twenty million network subscribers in China, and 
there is no shortage of computer experts and network jockeys among 
them, any one of whom could become a network guerilla who could open 
up a gunpowderless battlefield all by himself by harassing attacks on the 
network, namely by releasing large volumes of data from many directions 
concentrated on some enemy network station to jam up its network router 
and bring the network station to a standstill.. .and once there is a military 
requirement, either enter the network system to steal intelligence, or to 
activate viruses or detonate "bombs' to achieve the combat target of 
destroying the network."339 
The People's War concept was refined over the 2000-2003 timeframe; with one 
writer emphasizing the concept under high-tech conditions should focus on cities to make 
the most of their high-tech information force, arming the masses through established 
units, militia and reserves, even recommending a mobilization database on the 
nationwide Internet to improve planning and mobilization. Delegates to the 2003 
People's Congress continued to emphasize the requirement for an information-age 
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People's War, noting: "Even under informationized conditions, China's military strategic 
guiding policy of active defense will still uphold the ideology of Peoples War."340 
China again observed U.S. operations in Iraq with intense interest over the March-
August 2003 timeframe. In addition to television, the Internet provided great 
transparency through pluralistic reporting by Arab, Chinese, and Western media, even 
allowing CNN and FOX News pictures to be broadcast. "Instead of causing instability in 
Chinese society, the reporting showed that a new round of reform might be underway in 
the Chinese media."341 China is undergoing rapid social and economic change that has 
gradually undermined the capacity of the authorities to control the flow of ideas. The 
proliferation of the Internet, as well as a flourishing publishing business not under direct 
government control, produced works unthinkable a decade earlier.342 
Other observations noted that: "Information war should not only be conducted in 
the sphere of computer network war but should proceed in coordination with traditional 
mechanized modes of war." 43 The value of psychological warfare could not be 
overstated, and it was recommended military propaganda include modern mass 
communications and advanced information technology. A June 15, 2003 conference at 
the Academy of Military Science in Beijing discussed psychological operation methods 
employed by the U.S., including an Internet and cell phone campaign to persuade senior 
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Iraqi officials to give up resistance.344 It was recommended China should "cultivate as 
many as possible highly qualified military professionals and professional military officers 
who are experts in computer systems and the Internet and information technology." In 
2003, former Chairman Jiang Zemin noted: 
"[No] matter what changes occur in the form of warfare, even IW, 
People's War remains China's magic key to beat any enemy. In the 
information era, China is laying the material foundation for the armed 
forces to launch a People's Informationized War. Information resources 
must be mobilized and specialized forces combined with nonspecialized 
forces. High technology allows the masses to participate in and support 
war more easily. The military-civilian compatibility of high technology 
allows for greater diversity in how masses can take part. People's War is 
more dependent on the buildup of war energy, is intense and fast paced. 
The new characteristic is exploiting the country's overall national strength 
to the maximum extent. New strategies and tactics of People's War 
should be developed."346 
China's militia continued to advance along these lines, apparently even assuming 
offensive missions. The Guangzhou City's militia organized a battalion headquarters, 
provincial telecommunications company, computer network warfare company, and an 
electronic warfare company. The computer network company included network defense 
and attack platoons. "NetEase Guangdong (gz.163.com) and the China Unicom Paging 
Company have already secured arrangements with the unit to provide equipment."347 
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By 2003 China recognized cyberspace attacks as a means to enable economic 
growth and national security central to military planning, causing other nations to match 
this relative gain in cyberspace security. "China will use power projection as a means of 
achieving success in influencing the activities of foreign nations. Its centralized 
leadership system will continue to exert control over the news, propaganda, and public 
opinion." "Apparently, other nations have noticed China's focus on psychological 
warfare and have responded. In January 2002, Taiwan, taking advice from U.S. military 
officials, activated its first modern psychological-warfare unit to counter China's 
buildup."349 
A September 2003 network break-in at Lockheed Martin was followed several 
months later by an attack at Sandia government laboratories in Albuquerque, NM. 
Sandia analyst Shawn Carpenter noted the similarities and with unfortunately loose 
coordination with the labs, Army intelligence, and the FBI, pursued the cyber infiltrators. 
"Methodical and voracious, these hackers wanted all the files they could 
find, and they were getting them by penetrating secure computer networks 
at the country's most sensitive military bases, defense contractors and 
aerospace companies. Carpenter had never seen hackers work so quickly, 
with such a sense of purpose. They would commandeer a hidden section 
of a hard drive, zip up as many files as possible and immediately transmit 
the data to way stations in South Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan before 
sending them to mainland China. They always made a silent escape, 
wiping their electronic fingerprints clean and leaving behind an almost 
undetectable beacon allowing them to re-enter the machine at will. An 
entire attack took 10 to 30 minutes.. .They never hit a wrong key."350 
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Carpenter accomplished the rare achievement of locating the attackers' country of 
origin to just three Chinese routers in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. He 
carefully installed a homemade bugging code in the primary router's software, sending 
him an e-mail to his anonymous Yahoo! account every time the gang made a move on the 
net. Within two weeks, his account was filled with nearly 23,000 messages, one for each 
connection the router made in its quest for files. The aforementioned Titan Rain 
operation had been discovered, compromising secure networks ranging from the 
Redstone Arsenal to NASA to the World Bank. 
The FBI lacked sufficient cyber experts in 2004, however, to track down such 
foreign rings, and their hands were often tied by strict rules of engagement (ROE). While 
the FBI "aggressively" pursued the possibility the Chinese government was behind the 
attacks, they cautioned they did not know yet whether the spying is official, a private-
sector job or the work of many independent, unrelated hands. China did not cooperate 
with the U.S. investigation, and the Chinese government replied to the charges about 
cyber spying and Titan Rain as "totally groundless, irresponsible and unworthy of 
refute." Highlighting the differences between state-sponsored cyber vigilantism, and 
paralyzing U.S. ROE in cyberspace, Carpenters' reward was the loss of his job and Top 
Secret security clearance for gaining unauthorized Internet access.351 
For the interested reader, Thomas has published a subsequent book,352 and M. E. 
Kabay has assimilated significant PRC IW references from the DoD Annual Report over 
351
 Nathan Thomburgh, "The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (And the Man Who Tried to Stop 
Them)," TIME, August 29, 2005. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html 
(accessed December 14, 2009). 
Timothy Thomas, Decoding the Virtual Dragon: Critical Evolutions in the Science and Philosophy of 
China's Information Operations and Military Strategy. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies 
Office, 2007). 
194 
the years 2002-2009, extending the baseline for this experiment.353 The 2009 Annual 
Report noted: 
"The 2000 edition of this report observed that China is "working to 
ameliorate weaknesses in C4I training and [place] increased emphasis on 
'electromagnetic warfare' to degrade or destroy enemy operational 
systems." At that time, the PLA's electronic warfare (EW) systems were 
derived mostly from a combination of "1950s-1980s technologies." By the 
2006 edition of this report, China's investments in advanced EW programs 
had given the PLA Air Force "technological parity with or superiority 
over most potential adversaries." By improving space-based and terrestrial 
C4ISR and by moving communications infrastructure to fiber, China is 
hardening its own capabilities while making gains in developing weapon 
systems (e.g., counterspace, computer network operations, and anti-
radiation systems) to deny these capabilities to others. The 2004 
introduction of the PLA concept of "local wars under conditions of 
informatization" has guided development in this area, positioning the PLA 
to contest electromagnetic dominance in the early phases of future 
campaigns."354 
Summary 2001-2003 
By 2000, China recognized the need to go on the offense through peacetime, 
preemptive attacks,355 and identified the need for "information mobilization" to be 
conducted during peacetime to strengthen and further enable networks to assist economic 
policy and national security. The focus of future combat operations development focused 
on electronic, network, computer virus, noncontact, and space warfare. By 2003 network 
attacks were a popular topic across the board in Chinese writings, and it was clear reserve 
forces continued to play an important role in PLA IW planning and offensive strategies. 
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China sought to enhance its capability to launch electronic and network-based 
warfare. At the 2003 National People's Congress, PLA representatives revealed the PLA 
was transitioning from mechanized to high-tech information warfare units with the ability 
to conduct network warfare on the Internet, and to transfer data via remote sensing 
satellites. The People's War concept was further refined over the 2000-2003 timeframe, 
even extending into the militia. Chinese observations of the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003 
spurred the development and incorporation of psychological operations into Chinese 
activities along thirty-six traditional strategems. Other nations noticed China's focus on 
psychological warfare and responded with development of their own units. 
Over this timeframe it is clear China recognized technological and operational 
advances through the wars in Kosovo and Iraq. Rather than seeking further cooperation 
through an IY2KCC-like instrument, or proposing a draft agreement as Russia did, China 
seemed to recognize its security would be best served through expansion. Few, if any, 
incentives seem to have been offered for them to cooperate in any meaningful way. This 
led to the militarization and build-up of cyber-enabled military forces exacerbating the 
relative gains dilemma. 
Counterfactual Application of Recommendations 1995-2003 
The unfortunate truth over this timeframe is that China obviously shared a number 
of goals with her global neighbors, including using the Internet for economic 
development, controlling and securing information, and protecting critical infrastructure. 
In 2006, Liu Zhengrong, Deputy Chief of the Internet Affairs Bureau of the State Council 
Information Office argued China's efforts to control the Internet were no different from 
196 
those of Western countries. "After studying Internet legislation in the West, I've found 
we basically have identical legislative objectives and principles.. .It is unfair and smacks 
of double standards when [they] criticize China for deleting illegal and harmful messages 
while it is legal for U.S. Web sites to do so."356 Along these lines, China advanced 
Internet policing, and created hybrid organizations in a distinctly Chinese approach 
through the People's War concept. 
How might this history have differed had the following approach been applied? 
• Cooperative technical development through joint investment allowing for 
variance in views over control of the Internet across technical, economic, 
social and political regions; 
• International funding tied to improved technical and legal standards to spur 
development and provide a tool to enmesh actors through bureaucratic 
bargaining and impose costs through the withholding of funds to detractors 
and non-participants; 
• Empowerment of hybrid organizations cooperating in practical areas of global 
Internet security in order to: 
o advance cooperative Internet sensing and analysis through regional or 
domain hubs incorporating behavioral analysis, activities and effects; 
o place Internet users in a position of power and trust, capitalizing on 
temporary organizations; and 
• International consultations, such as the current IGF dynamic coalitions, in the 
form of negotiating rounds to: 
o Initially focus on descriptive practice as opposed to normative efforts 
such as addressing the wide variance in views over control of the 
Internet, and delineate between sovereign and common elements, or 
agree to the limits of such delineation; 
o Promote regulatory prescriptions in a stepwise approach as identified 
through cooperative efforts, such as property rights and penalties for 
software and malware, and Internet crime legislation and recourse; and 
o Develop a dispute settlement mechanism focusing on effects, again 
allowing for variance across technical, economic, social and political 
regions. 
First, consider the 1995-2000 timeframe leading up to Y2K and the war in 
Kosovo. Suppose ISP regional associations centralized development and security efforts 
Sumner Lemon, "China defends right to censor Internet," IDG New Service, February 15, 2006. 
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at the regional level, extended through hybrid private-public partnerships, and loosely 
coordinated, as they were, through IAB-IETF efforts. A joint program would have 
facilitated the pooling of resources, and promulgation of the Internet in a transparent 
environment. The Internet itself provided the collaboration mechanism necessary to 
coordinate such disparate grass-roots efforts. 
This would have allowed regional hubs to focus on the areas of interest and 
concern to the region or domain, without penalizing other hubs for addressing their own. 
For example, the Chinese have pursued control and censorship unique to their political 
structure. These efforts to prevent domestic Internet users from reaching blacklisted web 
sites or content have included: 
• Monitoring all incoming and outgoing traffic using mirroring routers to scan 
for forbidden information; 
• Using tens of thousands of censors to monitor bloggers and delete offensive or 
subversive material; and 
• DNS blocking, reset commands, connection breaking, URL keyword blocking 
and content scanning. 
Second, international funding tied to improved technical and legal standards 
would have provided not only much desired resources, but also an ability to impose costs 
through the withholding of funds or technologies from detractors and non-participants. 
Cooperative monitoring activities would have increased transparency of individual or 
criminal activities while empowering all participants to address identified risks. Finally, 
it would have greatly facilitated international Y2K efforts, with potential cost savings in 
the billions of dollars for the U.S. alone. 
Certainly some opportunities could have been recognized by numerous actors 
including the U.S. and China. International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank 
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funding following the IY2KCC model would have had to have been very appealing to a 
nation that cut a million men from its army over the 1980s to focus on economic 
construction. The availability of such funds would have immediately pulled the Chinese 
government into a position of accountability, effectively enmeshing at least certain 
aspects of the government. 
While it is doubtful in the wake of the Gulf War China would have forgone a 
move to an "informationized" force, there is no reason to believe the incorporation of 
computer confrontation operations as an offensive weapon or espionage capability was a 
foregone conclusion. The weight of evidence is in fact to the contrary, highlighting one 
potentially significant area of miscommunication during this agenda formation stage of 
the regime. Recall China's initial concerns over this timeframe were defensive in nature, 
with the PLA clearly recognizing a gap in capability with the U.S. and perhaps others. In 
fact given the Chinese emphasis on controlling as opposed to exploiting information, and 
concerns over the impact of open Internet access on domestic stability, there is every 
reason to believe China may have favored such an approach. In the wake of incidents 
such as the 1998 Morris worm, security coordination efforts such as those taken by 
CERT/CC would have been in a position to provide true joint gains for the entire 
community. Incorporating behavioral analysis would have helped to bridge divides 
between technical attribution and political action, as well as the public and private 
sectors through hybrid and state security organizational relationships. 
Significantly, none of this would have restricted ongoing grass-roots efforts 
around the Internet. Internet development and enhanced use through P2P technologies 
could have largely progressed as described in chapter four. The visibility over criminal 
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activities, however, would have been much higher, potentially facilitating improved legal 
or political instruments to address them. In essence, states would have been indirectly 
empowered through such regional efforts. If the 25% loss of revenue in a single year 
from the music industry due to the loss of control of information in the form of 
recordings is any indicator, states stood, and continue to stand, much to lose by failing to 
address decentralization empowered by the Internet. 
Third, regional and international partnering would have provided funds and 
technology transfers in a secure, accountable, and transparent environment. This would 
have promoted, as opposed to skirted, property rights in the same way Apple's iTunes has 
proven to be more favorable than less secure options. It would have most certainly 
contributed to improved understanding of the problems to be solved and evolved the 
handling of new tasks. In such cases as actors had reasons to violate the evolving 
principles and norms, international transparency of violators' actions would have 
supported concerted action on the part of the international community. 
In short, it is quite plausible China would have welcomed such opportunities to 
support Internet security efforts while advancing its force modernization efforts. This 
would have circumvented China's advancement of computer confrontation operations 
except perhaps in the most extreme circumstances of national survival. Such 
opportunities would have provided real incentives and the opportunity to impose costs to 
deter actively offensive measures during peacetime at the risk of losing international 
support and resources. It would not be too bold to say that even in the case of the 1999 
U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy during the war in Kosovo; such incentives might 
have deterred the ensuing cyber battle, even if the Chinese had developed the capability 
to carry out such an attack, which is questionable under these conditions. At the very 
least, the attack would have been more transparent, actors would have been more 
empowered to mitigate it, attackers would have been more likely to act in accordance 
with the principles of the international law of armed conflict, and awareness of these 
factors would have most certainly extended the shadow of the future in their decision-
making. 
Such efforts would have further facilitated national and international response to 
the first global threat to the Internet, Y2K. Facing such a potential catastrophe was 
probably the first opportunity for efforts in cyberspace to reach a level of high politics to 
force Internet security onto the international agenda. 
Fourth, over the 2000-2003 timeframe, consider that in the wake of Y2K the 
international community widely perceived the same benefits of the IY2KCC as did the 
U.S. Senate. These included awareness of international risks and mitigating activities, 
and nurturing the domestic and international industry and government partnerships. 
Suppose the IY2KCC was left intact as an international partnership focusing on technical 
development through joint investments. In this role, the center would have acted as a 
central monitoring hub of Internet activity, as it performed leading up to Y2K, and 
similar to CERT/CC and the ITU's GRC. 
Suppose this provisional organization in concert with the ITU, WTO, ISO, CERN 
laboratories, ICANN and others initiated a series of negotiating rounds addressing 
Internet crime, software and malware property rights and penalties, and a dispute 
settlement mechanism focusing on the effects of cyber activity along the lines of the 
WTO DSU. Perhaps the May 1999 U.S.-Chinese cyberwar, had it occurred, might have 
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been one of the first test cases. Such a venue would have provided the opportunity for 
any number of negotiating rounds to address topics as improved technical standards, the 
application of international law, the development of domestic legislation, and multilateral 
or bilateral agreements regarding reciprocity, rendition, and extradition. 
Negotiations could have facilitated not only the high politics of international 
cyber attacks and the law of armed conflict, but also domestic legislation and ratifications 
further enmeshing participating states. With the emphasis on securing the Internet as 
opposed to securing any individual state or entity, this cause could be advanced under a 
condition of realized joint gains as opposed to perceived relative gains. Under these 
conditions, real legal and monetary costs as well as more subjective political costs could 
be imposed upon violators, further extending the shadow of the future into rational actor 
decision-making. While the deterrence of non-rational actors such as juvenile hackers is 
questionable at best, their resources, opportunities and incentives for hacking may have 
been considerably curtailed. 
Negotiations would have directly facilitated the 2002 OECD Guidelines for the 
Security of Information Systems and Networks, and 2004 COE Convention on 
Cybercrime, effectively maturing the regime to the negotiation stage. In essence, it 
would have provided a more substantive initiation to what in reality became a sluggish 
start to the 2002 WSIS, and resulting IGF efforts, to include the 2007 GCA and 2008 
GRC. The provisional organization may have advanced operational and legal 
foundations not unlike PICAO in the air domain, as opposed to the contentious and open-
ended approach adopted more closely resembling negotiations over the UNCLOS III in 
the sea domain. 
In this specific case, these approaches would not have restricted or deterred the 
focus of China's approach to digitizing their force. In truth, it may have enabled it in an 
open and legal manner. It would almost certainly, however, have mitigated their 
perceived risks of cyber attack, and likely deterred them from dedicating resources to 
develop the force structure history now presents. While China recognized technological 
and operational advances through the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, incentives and 
opportunities for cooperation, as opposed to expansion in cyberspace may have been 
realized. Certainly firm incentives and the ability to impose costs would have been more 
available to the international community and individual states alike. Ultimately, there is 
every reason to believe such opportunity for joint gains would have deterred the use, if 
not limited the development of offensive cyberspace capabilities, even as China's force 
modernization progressed in other areas. 
During the agenda formation stage, we need to clearly distinguish between 
conflicts of interests and misunderstandings arising out of differences in the political 
structure and policy culture of participants. In this case at least two areas of friction with 
China over Internet security warrant serious consideration as cases in point. The first 
identified above is that the primary rationale for China's expansion in cyberspace was 
originally defensive in nature. The second lies in the wide variance of views over control 
of the Internet, and merit in discussing regional or domain approaches to addressing such 
technological, organizational, social, economic, and political differences. 
Allowing various levels of state control over the array of hubs, networks, and 
domains may place another potential conflict of interest aside through better 
understanding and informed decision-making in support of future development and 
investment decisions. Allowing all of this to happen in an open, transparent web of 
relevant hybrid organizations provides for grass-roots development opportunities. These 
efforts offer the opportunity to bypass potential clashes between major actors, as early 
web browser development prevented between Microsoft and Netscape. In this way, this 
limited experiment identifies some of the links between interests and policy preferences, 
and the relative contributions of problem structures and processes.358 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored the question: "How might maturing international 
cooperation mitigate the problem of cyberspace attack attribution." Cyberspace is a 
unique domain, and international cooperation in cyberspace security policy decisions 
poses a fundamental test of security regime theory developed from experience in other 
domains. Lessons from regime development in other security-related domains informed 
the analysis and recommendations for the cyberspace domain. 
The lack of incentives to cooperate or ability to impose costs has led to conflict 
and expansion in offensive cyberspace capabilities. Four recent attacks illustrated 
specific problems of attribution in cyberspace. The application of P2P C2 and other 
technologies are increasing the lack of transparency into mounting threats. The cases 
also illustrated growing international cooperation in the area of mitigating attacks, while 
highlighting hurdles to sharing sensitive information that might lead to more confident 
attribution. This was a key observation informing subsequent analysis and 
recommendations. The cases demonstrated that while individual states may desire a 
more regulated environment, no readily apparent incentives significantly justified 
exposing themselves to potential adversaries. 
Hybrid organizations facilitate information exchange and a sense of ownership 
with the express intent of enabling the Internet community at large to react more quickly 
to an attack. A review of cyberspace domain development makes clear relevant 
intergovernmental institutions are in fact embracing a culture of security; at least to the 
extent funding is provided. These efforts, however, continue to focus on security for 
individual users as opposed to the Internet as a whole, and therefore individual states and 
critical infrastructures. Recent events also provide evidence of national and 
intergovernmental organizations such as CERTs, the ITU GRC, NATO CCDCOE, 
GreyLogic and numerous others attempting to address the decentralized nature of the 
domain through co-opting and empowering Internet users. 
The following emerging principles and norms summarize the current cyberspace 
attack attribution regime: 
• State and hybrid organizations focus on mitigation as opposed to attribution; 
• States and hybrid organizations are empowered to assist in mitigation and 
attribution efforts, working together to mitigate the impact of attacks, and 
sharing attribution information where possible; and 
• Cyber attacks are considered a legitimate form of declared conflict, 
commensurate with established principles and norms of the laws of armed 
conflict (international humanitarian law). 
The following principles and norms appear to be worth pursuing to advance the 
emerging regime, and pressure states and entities to assist in mitigation and attribution 
efforts: 
• Costs are imposed for failing to assist in mitigation and attribution efforts, 
imposing de facto costs on those responsible or complicit. Such costs could 
be economic in nature, tied to current or future access to the Internet or the 
conduct of certain transactions over it, or the expectation of future cooperative 
security efforts or agreements. 
• Those states and entities not supporting mitigation and attribution efforts are 
considered complicit (or even responsible) for them, shifting the burden of 
attribution from the defender to the attacker. 
The regime has so far been ineffective at imposing costs to shift the burden of 
attribution from the defender to the attacker. Past assessments of the capability and 
effectiveness of the regime have led to the collective paralysis of the community pending 
improved technical and legal advancements described by General Chilton. While states 
and international organizations are changing their behaviors based on perceived costs and 
benefits, their lack of effectiveness continues to embolden and even entice violators. 
The regime is, however, creating arrangements that affect more normative 
political behaviors, including processes of social learning. Normative and political 
criteria focused on attack mitigation support a very different assessment and the 
identification of meaningful recommendations for advancing global security in 
cyberspace. 
States and entities voluntarily support mitigation efforts primarily for reasons of 
political support for victim states and secondarily out of collective interest in Internet 
security. If the collective-action problem is to be addressed to realize joint gains, these 
priorities require reversal through mechanisms sufficiently embedded in internal state 
politics to appreciably enmesh state or non-state behavior. 
Applying this evidence against factors prominent in theories of regime formation 
demonstrate the current cyberspace attack attribution regime remains in the early stages 
of regime development. Understanding the maturity level of the regime led to specific 
recommendations tailored to the agenda formation stage. Table 4 summarized the role of 
ideas, power, cooperative efforts, and non-state actors to shape expectations, advance 
institutional learning through stepwise processes, and enmesh actors to ultimately 
develop capacity to coerce compliance. The level of decentralization in cyberspace was 
identified as a significant intervening variable, and informed specific recommendations 
regarding the advancement of hybrid organizations. 
Lessons from regime development in other security-related domains demonstrated 
strong correlation to relevant aspects of the cyberspace domain, informing the following 
proposed policy approach: 
• Cooperative technical development through joint investment allowing for 
variance in views over control of the Internet across technical, economic, 
social and political regions; 
• International funding tied to improved technical and legal standards to spur 
development and provide a tool to enmesh actors through bureaucratic 
bargaining and impose costs through the withholding of funds to detractors 
and non-participants; 
• Empowerment of hybrid organizations cooperating in practical areas of global 
Internet security in order to: 
o Advance cooperative Internet sensing and analysis through regional or 
domain hubs incorporating behavioral analysis, activities and effects; 
o Place Internet users in a position of power and trust, capitalizing on 
temporary organizations; and 
• International consultations, such as the current IGF dynamic coalitions, in the 
form of negotiating rounds to: 
o Initially focus on descriptive practice as opposed to normative efforts 
such as addressing the wide variance in views over control of the 
Internet, and delineate between sovereign and common elements, or 
agree to the limits of such delineation; 
o Promote regulatory prescriptions in a stepwise approach as identified 
through cooperative efforts, such as property rights and penalties for 
software and malware, and Internet crime legislation and recourse; and 
o Develop a dispute settlement mechanism focusing on effects, again 
allowing for variance across technical, economic, social and political 
regions 
Finally, these recommendations were applied through a counterfactual thought 
experiment of Chinese information warfare theory and development to develop 
conclusions and recommendations in the form of current and future opportunities. The 
experiment provided an opportunity to distinguish between conflicts of interests and 
misunderstandings arising out of differences in the political structure and policy culture 
of participants during the agenda formation stage. 
The evaluation showed that despite China's ambitions to modernize their force 
and spur economic growth, there is no reason to believe that offensive expansion in 
cyberspace was a foregone conclusion. Rather, the evidence showed a preference for 
investments in other areas as long as technological advances respected their political 
system and their security in cyberspace could be assured through transparent and 
multilateral efforts. The potential for international investment to promote cooperative 
development and monitoring ultimately leading to transparency, as well as mitigation and 
attribution capability, would have ultimately provided one source of power to impose 
costs on violators which the current regime lacks. 
CURRENT AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
Although opportunities have certainly been missed, the objectives are far from 
lost considering the early stage of regime formation in this issue area. China has invested 
heavily in modernizing its force structure in addition to advancing cyber attack and 
espionage capabilities. China now likely considers its cyber espionage capabilities as 
critical for its economic development and force modernization. Similarly, Russian 
hackers now enjoy a plausibly deniable instrument to carry out an increasingly 
expansionist foreign policy with little risk for the Kremlin. "[The] Chinese - and the 
Russians - are very comfortable with the deniability and using proxies, even through the 
-ICQ 
actions of those proxies could have enormous strategic consequences." 
The cyberspace attack attribution regime is still clearly at a stage of agenda 
formation, proceeding in an atmosphere of openness and fluidity with all significant 
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actors advancing their position through tacit communications and bargaining. "The 
world is just getting around to dealing with information warfare activities.. .Spies will 
have to match counterspies and hackers will have to match counter-hackers. The smarter 
of the two will carry the day," and it isn't affecting just the U.S. "In the past few 
years, sources ranging from the German Chancellor's office to government mainframes 
as far afield as New Zealand and Belgium have made loud public allegations that they 
had been the subject of cyber infiltration from China, all to no avail."361 Chinese 
espionage efforts have cost Germans an estimated 30,000 jobs lost.362 This means it is 
not too late to apply such an approach, despite the fact the window is closing. 
As illustrated in the assessment of regime maturity, direct confrontation or 
negotiation is likely not the answer. 
"[Even] if U.S. officials try to raise the issue of what they believe is a 
constant and growing campaign by China to infiltrate U.S. networks, steal 
secrets and hone Beijing's ability to wreak havoc in case of military 
conflict, the likelihood is that Chinese officials will simply deny that the 
problem exists, as they have done with great success in the past. From the 
American point of view, there's unfortunately currently little Washington 
can do to change the state of affairs."363 
Indeed, "playing dumb"364 to elude issues is a known Chinese facilitating tactic. 
In one recent example, China forcefully protested the DoD Annual Report on the Military 
Power of the People's Republic of China pointing to the doubling of Chinese defense 
spending over the last decade and areas of expansion. China insisted its military 
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spending was purely for defensive purposes, although much spending is hidden under 
budgets of other offices. Since China does not allow translation of certain sanctioned 
media activities, such as decades of writings portraying the U.S. as the opponent in future 
war, China's reaction to the report is based on the idea that anything published in Chinese 
doesn't count.365 
Hybrid organizations should be technically, financially, and organizationally 
empowered in accordance with the level of trust within and between them. International 
cooperation in cyberspace to date highlight a number of multilateral and hybrid 
organizations. Funds tied to improved technical and legal standards should be made 
available to their efforts to provide incentives for cooperation and an ability to impose 
costs for detractors and violators. Given the billions that might have been saved in 
international Y2K efforts, these funds would indeed be worth their weight in "global 
cyber financial transaction gold." The U.S. reportedly spent $100 million over six 
months in 2009 alone to repair damage caused by cyber attacks, most of which originated 
in China.366 
Efforts such as IPv6, providing the backbone to the China Next Generation 
Internet,367 and Web 3.0 development provide cooperative joint opportunities. The 
Service Web 3.0 support action project funded by the European Commission as a part of 
the 2008-2009 Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) provides but one clear example.368 
China is currently mandating government computers adopt a Chinese developed and 
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subsidized Unix variant called Kylin. Chinese interest in moving away from Windows to 
Unix and Linux operating systems for security reasons present additional cooperative 
opportunities to address China's outlaw mentality to software procurement and 
development.369 
Decentralized technical development efforts should be promoted, allowing for 
variances across technical, economic, social and political regions and domains. For 
example, as of December 2009, China continued to advance Internet controls to enhance 
the nation's already strict control of political opposition. China justifies this under goals 
such as protecting children from pornography, and limiting media piracy and Internet 
scams. The "Internet has become an important avenue through which anti-China forces 
infiltrate, sabotage and magnify their capabilities for destruction," ™ so the trend has 
been toward ever tightening control through improving censorship capabilities. The new 
measures restrict citizens' ability to establish personal websites under China's .en ccTLD, 
now limited to registered businesses, or to view hundreds of others. This appears a 
continuation of China's blocking of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and thousands of other 
websites in 2008. China's censorship also extends to the telecommunications, and de 
facto space, domains as the government has similarly pressured cell phone companies to 
"prevent transmissions of online pornography."371 
Internet security organizations (e.g. CERT/CC and GRC) should work even 
closer with private-public hybrid organizations (e.g. IWM, GreyLogic and 
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ShadowServer) to expand Internet sensing and analysis capabilities in an open and 
transparent venue. Clearly, multilateral and bilateral efforts directly between state 
security organizations would further the ability of allies to share information in the 
pursuit of more definite attribution. Incorporating behavioral analysis inherent in 
traditional state intelligence agencies would help bridge the technical attribution-political 
action divide. Such a cooperative approach provides the opportunity to place numerous 
scatter-shot efforts within more comprehensive global and national strategies, which 
according to some at least remain a "ship adrift."372 These include smart-card identity 
credentials and more secure Internet protocols 
These combined efforts provide more opportunities for actors to cooperate in the 
area of cyberspace security, while pressing non-participants and detractors to cooperate, 
or acknowledge their activities as a matter of policy. Together, the efforts provide a first 
step to shift the burden of attribution from the victim to the attacker, and reduce the legal 
grey area between peacetime domestic legislation, international criminal legal 
cooperation, and the international law of armed conflict. 
For example, how is it a country with extensive control over the Internet and an 
estimated 30,000 strong force of secret police technicians (known as the Golden Shield 
Project, or The Great Firewall of China) allow such expansive malicious activity on 
their nets?374 China is clearly willing to resist discussion or play dumb with individual 
actors. The recommendations presented here would pressure China to do so in the face of 
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broad international consensus and scrutiny. Perhaps most importantly, the 
recommendations focus on providing capacity to all states that chose to play by the rules, 
thus realizing joint gains. Sharing cyberspace attack information and gaining joint stakes 
in cooperative Internet development would stiffen the international community's resolve 
to confront prolific violators such as China and impose costs through bilateral or 
multilateral venues. 
WSIS IGF dynamic coalitions and other venues for international discussions and 
consensus-building in this issue area should be pursued in the form of negotiating rounds. 
A stepwise approach shapes expectations, promotes institutional learning, enmeshes 
actors, and facilitates the ability of the global Internet community to coerce compliance. 
Power to do so is gained through cooperative efforts, the ability to withhold funds or 
technologies, and a dispute settlement mechanism again allowing for variance across 
technical, economic, social and political regions. Such empowerment provides real 
prospects for extending the shadow of the future for rational decision-makers. 
These provide meaningful steps for advancing the regime and for discussion in 
such formal negotiations as may present themselves. For example, in November 2009, a 
U.S.-Russian delegation met in Washington, reportedly bridging long-standing divisions 
between the two countries. Two weeks later in Geneva, the U.S. agreed to discuss 
cyberwarfare and cybersecurity with representatives of the United Nations committee on 
disarmament and international security, breaking with policies of previous 
administrations that insisted on addressing those matters in the committee on economic 
issues. 
Russia characterized this new round of discussions as the opening of negotiations 
between Russia and the U.S. on a possible disarmament treaty for cyberspace, noting the 
American position on Internet security had shifted perceptibly in recent months. A U.S. 
State Department official, however, disputed the Russian characterization of the 
American position. "While the Russians have continued to focus on treaties that may 
restrict weapons development, the United States is hoping to use the talks to increase 
international cooperation in opposing Internet crime," maintaining that strengthening 
defenses against Internet criminals would also strengthen defenses against any military-
directed cyberattacks.375 Such discussions provide opportunities for finding common 
ground. 
These efforts should be taken in coordination with related efforts, such as 
cooperation in the space domain. For example, managing issues which threaten the 
common interest in the peaceful use of space also require broader international 
cooperation. Perhaps no state will be more important in developing stable solutions to 
these problems than China. The U.S. and China share a common interest in preserving 
the peaceful use of outer space over such pressing items such as improvements to orbital-
"inf. 
debris mitigation, space traffic control, and transparency. 
States expend significant resources to establish attribution of objects and activities 
in space. Russia maintains a Space Surveillance System using its early-warning radars 
and monitors some 5,000 objects (mostly in LEO), but does not widely disseminate data. 
The EU, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Japan are all developing independent 
375
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space surveillance capabilities. One result of these efforts has been to expand and even 
shift concerns from the threat of direct attack to that of collateral effects. Similarly, such 
efforts, if assumed cooperatively, provide recurring opportunities to establish dialogue 
and engage in confidence-building measures to realize joint gains in areas of common 
interest. These areas include using the Internet for economic development, controlling 
and securing information, and protecting critical infrastructure. 
"China races to embrace its destiny as a global player to be reckoned 
with.. .For decades, the world's most populous nation lived in self-
imposed isolation, but now it moves to engage the world as an economic, 
cultural, and, inevitably, a military power. Just as the Cold War spawned 
the space race and put a man on the moon, much of today's quest for space 
is rooted in the desire to gain—and keep—the military advantage, the 
"higher ground".. .With a space program deeply rooted in its military, 
America remains skeptical and wary of China's intentions.. .But if the 
Cold War taught us anything, it is that measured responses and tentative 
steps can open channels of communication and cooperation." 
Although the focus of this paper is cyberspace as a security domain, the vast 
majority of the Internet is civil, commercial and recreational in nature. Attacks in 
cyberspace are felt across commerce and industry, and non-military activities comprise 
the bulk of responsibilities and authorities. The public-private sphere, therefore, provides 
both a first line of defense, and necessary role in response actions. Addressing 
cyberspace from a purely security perspective is therefore misleading, unhelpful and 
insufficient for formulating recommendations. 
While governments and institutions spawned the Internet and have worked to 
subsequently control and manage it, decentralized forces have revolutionized not only the 
Space Security 2008, Executive Summary, 7. August, 2008. 
http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2008ExecutiveSummary.pdf (accessed July 9, 2009). 
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world of cyberspace, but through it the world we live in. The sheer magnitude of 
cyberspace, and the fact the bulk of communications over it are of a business or leisure 
nature, place departments or ministries with these jurisdictions, such as the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, in a much better position to pursue these agendas than military 
departments or security agencies. This has an important ramification for how state 
security efforts in cyberspace should be viewed. 
While viewing cybersecurity operations as a form of irregular or hybrid warfare 
may be effective in the offense, lack of control over the domain dooms it to failure in the 
defense. A hybrid warfare approach offers no incentives for competitors to work together 
to realize joint gains. The recommendations are rather focused on moving the cyberspace 
domain out of the grey area between peace and war where irregular warfare thrives. 
Regardless of how individual states chose to advance their own security in cyberspace, 
this paper illuminates one immutable truth: my plausible path to meaningful defense in 
cyberspace must include a significant element of international cooperation and regime 
formation. 
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the thrust of this research was policy-oriented, it was fundamentally an 
important study of regime theory. The evaluation showed that regimes do matter as 
evidenced by other domains and Internet development to date. Regimes can achieve 
deterrence through the proliferation of principles and norms. These venues also serve to 
advance technical and legal instruments in the process. 
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Assessing Security Regime Effectiveness 
This study reinforces previous research showing security dilemma factors have 
been prominent in international efforts toward securing cyberspace:379 
• Security issues in cyberspace involve greater competitiveness than do those 
related to economics and other non-security aspects of human behavior; 
• Expansion in cyberspace as a defensive approach does threaten others, 
exacerbating the issue of relative gains, as opposed to protecting one's 
interests in non-security areas which does not necessarily harm or menace 
others; 
• The stakes are higher in cyberspace security areas, since security is the most 
highly valued goal, is a prerequisite for so many things, such as economic 
development, and is unforgiving; and 
• Detecting what others are doing and measuring one's own security in 
cyberspace is much more difficult than gaining such intelligence in other (e.g. 
economic or environmental) fields; creating much higher degrees of 
uncertainty and distrust in security-related areas.380 
Criteria for security regime formation and maintenance informed assessments of 
recent attacks and the regime from a security perspective. Analysis of the land, air, sea, 
space, nuclear, trade and telecommunications domains, also inform an outstanding 
agenda item to apply environmental regime models on security regimes. The social-
practice perspective proved both applicable, and most informative in assessing security 
aspects of the non-environmental regime of cyberspace. 
Significantly, it was the social-practice perspective that provided opportunities to 
address the collective-action problem in cyberspace, largely through peaceful, 
constructive incentives with the occasional power to withhold them as opposed to 
technical defenses or threats of retaliation that we know are not working. The lack of 
state control over the domain, and corresponding lack of maturity of the regime, meant 
Marcus Franda, Governing the Internet: the emergence of an international regime (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2001). 
380
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that normative and political criteria were most helpful in this case. It was in fact 
recommendations resulting from an evaluation of behavioral changes not governed by 
utilitarian calculations that led to a very different utilitarian assessment than previous 
analyses. This should not be lost on the students of international cooperation, and more 
formal treatment of the models applied here on more traditional security regimes should 
be a priority for addressing the range of security-related collective-action problems. 
Similarly, decentralization powered by the Internet should be considered a significant 
intervening variable in updating past assessments. 
The Concept of Maturity in International Security Regime Formation 
The three-stage model of agenda formation, negotiation, and operationalization 
was applicable and informative for understanding the sources of the regime 
ineffectiveness and formulating specific recommendations tailored to the maturity level 
of the regime. Failing to consider the maturity level of the regime has led to any number 
of failed approaches, such as Russia's premature treaty proposal, and the 
recommendations presented inform more recent calls for an Internet arms control 
agreement. 
Reevaluating previous assessments in other regimes informed by their maturity 
level may lead to both differing results and recommendations. This may present a fresh 
approach to organizational learning on the global scene that has previously proven but a 
lofty and elusive goal. 
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Final Thoughts 
Finally, the analysis significantly informed the role of the nation-state as opposed 
to global society in securing cyberspace, and how it is viewed. The Internet has 
irrevocably decentralized numerous aspects of our lives. Just as the music industry 
witnessed a 25% loss of revenue over a single year resulting from the loss of control over 
information in the form of recordings, states should recognize a corresponding loss of 
control over the domain. Conflict in cyberspace presents a direct challenge to the 
centuries-old state monopoly over legitimate conflict, and may represent a nail in the 
coffin of future state-controlled propaganda. The path to regaining some semblance of 
state control over cyberspace is in fact through global cooperation. 
The other side of the coin is that activities in cyberspace are an ideal test bed for 
evaluating issues of governance, and political mobilization. Here in the U.S., we need 
look no further than; for example, Sarah Palin's use of Facebook and Twitter to help 
mobilize the Tea Party movement for evidence of this. While most topics of international 
study occur over extended time periods, opaque exchanges, and often scant data, the 
Internet provides a transparent and data rich living laboratory to observe them, often at 
the moment they are occurring. Even focused study of discrete phenomena, such as 
cyberspace attack attribution, quickly translates into important evidence regarding 
deterrence theory, transnational relations, and global society. Use of cyberspace venues 
to document, analyze, and collaborate on such matters of human behaviors and global 
relations should continue to be encouraged. 
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APPENDIX A 
ACRONYM LIST 
Acronym 
ACT 
APC 
APCERT 
ASAT 
BKIS 
C2 
C4ISR 
CCDOE 
ccTLD 
CERN 
CERT 
CERT/CC 
CERT-EE 
CERT-FR 
CERT-PL 
COE 
CONOPS 
CSIS 
CTNSP 
DARPA 
DDoS 
DHS 
DOD 
DoS 
DSB 
DSP 
DSU 
ESCAPE 
EW 
FBI 
FBIS 
FIRST 
Definition' 
Allied Command Transformation 
Association for Progressive Communications 
Asia-Pacific CERT 
anti-satellite 
Bach Khoa Internetwork Security Centre 
command and control 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence 
country code top level domains 
Centre Europeen pour la Recherche Nucleaire 
Computer Emergency Response Team 
CERT® Coordination Center 
Estonian CERT 
CERT France 
CERT Poland 
Council of Europe 
Concept of Operations 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Center for Technical and National Security Policy 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
distributed denial-of-service 
Department of Homeland Security 
Department of Defense 
denial-of-service 
Dispute Settlement Body 
Defense Support Program 
Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Electronically Secure Collaboration Application Platform for 
Experts 
electronic warfare 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
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FMSO 
FOIA 
FP7 
FRY 
GAO 
GATT 
GCA 
GEO 
GISC 
GRC 
HAKR 
HML 
HTML 
HTTP 
IAB 
ICAO 
ICAN 
ICANN 
ICC 
ICJ 
ICT 
IETF 
IFF 
IMF 
IMPACT 
INMARSAT 
INSS 
INTELSAT 
INW 
IO/IW 
IP 
ISO 
ISOC 
ISP 
IT 
ITO 
ITU 
IW 
IWM 
Foreign Military Studies Office 
Freedom of Information Act 
Seventh Framework Programme 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Government Accountability Office 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Global Cyber Agenda 
geosynchronous earth orbit 
Global Innovation and Strategy Center 
Global Response Centre 
Hacker Alias Knowledge Repository 
Hardware Markup Language 
Hypertext Markup Language 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
Internet Architecture Board 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
International Commission for Air Navigation 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
information coordination center 
International Court of Justice 
Information and Communication Technology 
Internet Engineering Task Force 
Identification of Friend or Foe 
International Monetary Fund 
International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-Threats 
International Maritime Satellite 
Institute for National Security Studies 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
information-network warfare 
information operations/information warfare 
Internet protocol 
International Organization for Standardization 
Internet Society 
Internet Service Providers 
information technology 
International Trade Organization 
International Telecommunications Union 
information warfare 
Information Warfare Monitor 
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IY2KCC 
JFCC-SPACE 
JSpOC 
KrCERT 
LEO 
LRTAP 
MDA 
NAFTA 
NEWS 
NORAD 
NOTAMS 
NRRC 
NSC 
NTBs 
OECD 
ONI 
OSINT 
P2P 
PICAO 
PLA 
RBN 
RHU 
ROE 
SQL 
SSN 
SSAC 
TCP/IP 
UNCLOS 
UNESCO 
UPM 
URL 
USCYBERCOM 
USSTRATCOM 
VNCERT 
VoIP 
VPN 
W3C 
WGIG 
WIPO 
International Y2K Cooperation Center 
USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Space 
Joint Space Operations Center 
Korea Computer Emergency Response Team 
low-earth orbit 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
Maritime Domain Awareness 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
Network Early Warning System 
North American Air Defense 
Notices to Airmen and Mariners 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
National Security Council 
nontariff barriers 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OpenNet Initiative 
open source intelligence 
peer-to-peer 
Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization 
People's Liberation Army 
Russian Business Network 
Red Hackers Union 
rules of engagement 
Structured Query Language 
Space Surveillance Network 
ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internetwork Protocol 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
United Peoples Movement 
Universal Resource Locator 
U.S. Cyber Command 
U.S. Strategic Command's 
Vietnamese CERT 
voice over IP 
virtual private network 
World Wide Web Consortium 
Working Group on Internet Governance 
World Intellectual Property Organization 
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WSIS 
WTO 
XML 
Y2K 
World Summit on the Information Society 
World Trade Organization 
Extensible Markup Language 
year 2000 
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
Term 
botnet 
collective-action 
problem 
computer 
confrontation 
operations 
cyber espionage 
cyber riot 
cyber terrorism 
cyber warfare 
cybercrime 
cyberspace 
cyberspace 
attack (cyber 
attack) 
decision-making 
procedures 
Definition 
Controlled network of hijacked computers 
Situation in which the uncoordinated actions of each player may not 
result in the best outcome each can achieve 
Chinese term translated as computer network attack in U.S. 
terminology 
The act or practice of obtaining secrets without the permission of 
the holder of the information (personal, sensitive, proprietary or of 
classified nature), from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, 
governments and enemies for personal, economic, political or 
military advantage using illegal exploitation methods on the 
Internet, networks or individual computers through the use of 
cracking techniques and malicious software including Trojan horses 
and spyware 
Form of virtual civil disorder characterized by disorganized groups 
lashing out in a sudden and intense rash of cyber attacks against 
people or property; typically chaotic, exhibiting herd behavior 
1) The premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat 
thereof, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to 
cause harm or further social, ideological, religious, political or 
similar objectives; or to intimidate any person in furtherance of 
such objectives; 2) Deployments of disruption attacks by known 
terrorist organizations against information systems for the primary 
purpose of creating alarm and panic 
The conduct of military operations by virtual means 
The use of computer technology to commit crime; to engage in 
activity that threatens a society's ability to maintain internal order 
A global domain within the information environment consisting of 
the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers 
1) Malicious activity targeting the computer telecommunications 
networks of critical infrastructures, such as power systems traffic 
control systems or financial systems; 2) Computer-to-computer 
attack that undermines the confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
of a computer or information resident on it 
Prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice 
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deterrence 
denial of service 
attack 
hybrid 
organization 
informationized 
force 
peer-to-peer 
command and 
control 
norms 
principles 
regime 
rules 
thought 
experiment 
The persuasion of one's opponent that the costs or risks of a given 
course of action outweigh the benefits 
An attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended 
users, generally consisting of the concerted efforts of a person or 
people to prevent an Internet site or service from functioning 
efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely 
Body that operates in both the public and private sectors, 
simultaneously fulfilling public duties and developing commercial 
market activities; deliberately mixing organizational forms in an 
attempt to blend the advantages of two or more different types or 
because the organization changing; e.g. including both 
decentralized aspects more attuned to the decentralized nature of 
cyberspace, as well as traditional centralized features that allow for 
the provision of security, authority, and accountability. 
Chinese term translated as net-enabled force in U.S. terminology 
Distributed command structure capable of spreading to computers 
around the world 
Standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations 
Beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude 
l)Implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
issue area; 2) Social institutions governing the actions of those 
interested in specifiable activities, (or accepted sets of activities); 
recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which 
expectations converge 
Specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action 
Counterfactual analysis 
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